What is being done about plastic pollution?

Plastic products have a finite lifespan, and their presence is ubiquitous in the natural environment. From discarded water bottles on the side of the road to microplastics found even in breast milk, plastic pollution is simply everywhere. Because the wide breadth of human and environmental problems associated with plastics is now well known, governments and civil society groups are working to address the problem.

Many governments have responded to the challenge of plastic pollution by enacting a variety of national and subnational actions to reduce plastic pollution. And the number of new policies addressing the use of plastic—such as bans on plastic bags or straws—has been increasing over the past decade. These concerns also drove action internationally, which came to a head in March 2022 when United Nations (UN) member states gathered in Nairobi for the annual United Nations Environment Assembly. After much deliberation, UN members adopted Resolution 5/4, which mandates countries to both end plastic pollution and establish a legally binding agreement on the full life cycle of plastics by the end of 2024.

The UN Environment Programme’s Executive Director was mandated to convene an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop this agreement. According to the resolution, the agreement “could include both binding and voluntary approaches, based on a comprehensive approach that addresses the full life cycle of plastic.”  

How do plastic pollution policies impact global trade?

Plastic is one of the most internationally traded goods. As such, any measures taken to reduce plastic consumption and production will also have an impact on international trade.

While Resolution 5/4 addresses an increasingly urgent call for action on plastic pollution, countries are unprepared for the wide range of global trade implications that are already resulting from plastic pollution policy measures.

Two international mechanisms have measures in place to address the movement of plastics: the 2019 Basel Convention Plastic Waste Amendments (which has control measures for the international trade of plastic waste) and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (which has control measures for persistent organic pollutants that are often incorporated into plastics for use as plasticizers and flame retardants). However, there is currently no plastics-specific multilateral trade agreement at the WTO—and this is where trade challenges are already emerging.

What plastic pollution measures are the most problematic for trade?

Almost half of WTO members have already declared that they have implemented plastic pollution measures related to trade. However, 21 specific measures (implemented by 14 WTO members) have been questioned by other WTO members. While none of these concerns have evolved into an official dispute, some countries are clearly concerned about how certain policies will impact their ability to export goods to these markets.

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has just published a new policy brief that takes a careful look at this growing list of formal trade concerns that have been raised by WTO members as a result of trade-related plastic pollution policies. Analysis found that these concerns tend to fall into six distinct categories: a timing and implementation time frame, transparency, stakeholder engagement, proportionality, justification, and discrimination.

• Timing and implementation time frame issues can include whether trading partners are given enough time to adopt manufacturing or packaging changes to comply with a new measure.

• Transparency issues include whether trading partners have been given access to adequate information about the details of the policy.

• Stakeholder engagement issues question whether trading partners have had an opportunity to provide formal feedback on the new policy.

• Proportionality issues question whether a policy is proportional to the intended policy outcome (i.e., is it overly burdensome to manufacturers and exporters?).

• Justification issues ask whether implementing members have provided an adequate scientific, technical, or technological basis to support the rationale of the policy.

• Discrimination issues look at whether a particular policy unfairly benefits domestic producers to the detriment of foreign suppliers.

Is the multilateral trade system standing in the way of meaningful action on plastic pollution?

The WTO is not an enemy of achieving effective environmental action. The multilateral trade system is designed to allow members to question policies that may have intended or unintended trade consequences. As outlined in IISD’s new policy brief, there have already been a number of exchanges between WTO members on plastic pollution policies—and none have developed into a trade dispute. This process is a normal part of the development of international policy that allows countries to be mindful of how new policies are developed and implemented.

What should policy-makers consider before implementing plastic pollution measures?

To avoid the six most common types of trade concerns when considering plastic pollution measures, policy-makers should consider the following.

For issues related to a timing and implementation time frame, policy-makers should ensure that an implementation timeline has been established and shared with trading partners. Early in the process of designing a particular measure, they should allocate a reasonable consultation period to collect comments from trading partners (thus ensuring that the process will allow sufficient time and space to integrate comments into the final draft). They should also establish a clearly defined transition period to allow trading partners to adapt and prepare for compliance. Finally, they should prepare implementation guidelines in a timely manner and make them available. This will allow adequate time for trading partners to adapt products or production methods to the new requirements.

To avoid possible issues related to transparency, plastic pollution policy-makers should ensure that new measures are submitted to relevant WTO bodies and make the comprehensive text of any proposed regulation (and its implementing guidelines, if needed) available to all WTO members. The same transparency should be afforded to any updates and/or translations of texts, timelines, and implementation guidelines.

To ensure adequate stakeholder engagement, policy-makers should establish a formal opportunity for stakeholders to provide input, suggestions, and feedback on the potential trade impacts of a proposed measure. They should also provide clear guidance on how stakeholder consultations related to the measure will be conducted and how they can participate. Time frames for stakeholder engagement should also be clearly defined, reasonable, and accessible to trading partners.

Proportionality challenges can be avoided by ensuring that implemented measures are proportional in scope and impact to the problem they are designed to address. Measures should also not create excessive costs or cumbersome obligations that could restrict trade if the same outcome could be achieved with less burdensome obligations. Policy-makers should defer to or seek consultation from the research community on established plastic pollution approaches that are already effective at achieving certain objectives.

Justification issues can be addressed by ensuring that all measures provide the necessary scientific, technical, or technological basis to support a particular rationale. This established basis should be provided when a measure is notified to the WTO or when sharing the measure with trading partners. Policy-makers can also review alternative measures—including those already in use elsewhere—for potential alternatives that may be better suited to achieve the intended objective.

In order to ensure trading partners are not subjected to discrimination through a given policy, introduced measures should not favour domestic economic actors, and they should be consistent with national treatment obligations. In general, any exemptions, flexibilities, or temporal grace periods provided by the implementing member should be equally accessible to domestic producers and trading partners.

When and where will INC-5 take place?

The fifth Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5) is scheduled to take place from November 25 to December 1, 2024, at the Busan Exhibition and Convention Center in Busan, South Korea.

It is the final milestone on the Road to Busan, which was preceded by INC-4 (April 23–May 1, 2024, in Ottawa, Canada), INC-3 (November 3–19, 2023, in Nairobi, Kenya), INC-2 (May 29–June 2, 2023, in Paris, France) and INC-1 (November 28–December 2, 2022, in Punta del Este, Uruguay).

Over 7,000 SEZs operate worldwide under various names, such as free-trade zones, export processing zones, or industrial parks. Each one is unique, differing vastly in scale, goals, and regulations. Broadly, they can be defined as geographic areas within a country offering business-friendly environments. Unlike other areas of the country, SEZs provide enticing perks like tax breaks, simplified regulations, and customs relief.

It is true that some SEZs have managed to drive economic growth. There is the widely known success story of Shenzhen in China, a fishing village transformed into a global technology hub thanks to its designation as a SEZ. But in many cases, governments have extended generous tax breaks in SEZs that have not led to high-quality investments. Rather, they have lost revenue, undermining broader development goals, especially in developing countries. Zambia’s Multi-Facility Economic Zones, introduced in 2005, for example, aimed to foster a dynamic business environment by attracting companies with tax cuts but was unable to drive economic development due to weak institutional capacity, inadequate infrastructures, and other non-tax challenges.

Tax incentives alone could never guarantee the success of SEZs. With the GMT, policymakers will need to apply extra scrutiny to determine whether tax incentives are necessary to attract investment in SEZs—and if so, what kind.  

Evaluating the True Impact of Tax Incentives in Special Economic Zones

Since 2000, several special economic zones have been phased out or substantially amended due to non-compliance with international tax standards. Now, with the GMT mandating a minimum 15% effective tax for large corporations, SEZ authorities must once again align their incentives with global tax standards.

The first step they should take is evaluating the effectiveness of the tax incentives offered in their SEZs. Have these incentives attracted quality investments that drove long-term economic growth? If they are effective now, how will they hold up under the GMT? How much revenue is at stake? By answering these questions, SEZ authorities can pinpoint and repeal incentives that are not effective, or that will be hit hard by the GMT.

This review of tax incentives also provides an opportunity to tackle broader issues within SEZs, looking at tools that truly contribute to sustainable growth and focusing on improving the overall investment environment, such as infrastructure, a skilled workforce, and enhancing regulatory efficiency.

Tax incentives in special economic zones should be rigorously evaluated to see how they fare under the global minimum tax.

Removing incentives is not without risk, including the potential for disputes with investors. Arbitral tribunals have sometimes ruled that countries violated their commitments under bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in repealing tax incentives in SEZs—in particular, failing to follow transparent and equitable administrative processes. Equally, tribunals have been clear that in the absence of stabilization, foreign investors are not entitled to expect that a tax regime will not change. Policymakers should carefully consider the existing legal framework—including BITs, investment laws, and investment contracts—and engage in meaningful consultations with investors to mitigate risks. But they should not be put off. The likelihood of arbitration is low overall, considering widespread support for the GMT and the fact that taxpayers will have to pay the tax elsewhere no matter what, making damages difficult to prove.

Embracing a New Era for Special Economic Zones

The new global tax rules will affect all countries with in-scope multinationals, irrespective of whether they subscribe to the regime or not, driving questions about the use of tax incentives and SEZs more broadly.

SEZ authorities, tax policymakers, and investment promoters must work together at the country level to determine and implement an appropriate response to the GMT based on their economic and legal circumstances. At the International Institute for Sustainable Development, we have prepared a comprehensive policy brief to guide stakeholders through these challenges.

The potential benefits—high-quality investments, increased tax revenues, and enhanced local development—are well worth the effort.

In an article in the journal Science, a collaboration between IISD and University College London, we propose a viable pathway to phasing out fossil fuels. What we need is a moral norm, a standard of expected behaviour that is progressively applied by governments worldwide. Our analysis argues that this norm should be no new fossil fuel projects. 

Our starting point is the scientific evidence on Paris-aligned energy systems. In the first peer-reviewed study to assess new fossil fuel projects under a 1.5°C global warming limit, we confirm and expand the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) 2021 finding that no new oil and gas fields are needed on the path to net-zero emissions by 2050. 

Fossil fuel and financial interests have suggested that using different scenarios would mean fossil fuel expansion can continue. 

In fact, there is nothing radical or unusual about the IEA’s conclusion: there is no room for new fields in any credible 1.5°C-aligned scenario. 

Our focus is on scenarios that feature in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report. In a supplement to the Science paper, we examine a full range of 1.5°C scenarios from other researchers. We go further than the IEA by finding that no new coal-fired or gas-fired power plants are needed in 1.5°C scenarios either. 

The analysis works by comparing how much energy existing fossil fuel projects can supply—using data from Rystad Energy and from Global Energy Monitor—with how much is consumed in 1.5°C scenarios. We find that production from the existing projects exceeds the Paris-aligned future consumption levels; hence, no new projects are needed. 

Then there is the political economy of energy decisions. For the company that proposes it, a new project is one of many investment opportunities to choose between. However, once a project has been built, the company will be incentivized first to recover its sunk investment and then to continue profiting from the project. As long as the product (oil, gas, or electricity) can be sold for more than the marginal cost of producing it, the owner will want to continue running their project. This effect is sometimes called “infrastructure lock-in.” 

Similar factors work at the political level. A new project commonly stands to create both winners and losers. At the proposal stage, the losers (for example, people who will be affected by pollution) are usually more able to organize to maintain the status quo. Whereas once it has been built, jobs depend on its continuation, creating a resistance to changing this new status quo. 

And from an institutional perspective, it is a sovereign decision whether to grant a permit for a project to be built. But once it has been built, the project owner may have legal entitlements to demand compensation should any policies restrict it, including under international investment treaties. 

In these respects, stopping new projects from being built is a much more achievable approach than trying to close existing ones. As the saying goes: when you are in a hole, stop digging. 

But how can these lead to limiting emissions at a global level, as is needed to achieve climate goals? Drawing lessons from political science and international relations, we argue that a social-moral norm is a good mechanism for such a policy to spread around the world. 

A norm usually starts with proposals from advocates and researchers, and spreads as larger institutions add their weight, and then governments start to adopt it. As they do, the norm gains momentum, placing stronger expectations and pressures on the remaining governments to also follow suit. Evidence from history shows that norm building is especially suited to efforts to end harmful behaviours, such as trading in enslaved people, testing nuclear weapons, or smoking cigarettes. 

And some initiatives are already applying the norm-building approach to fossil fuels. The Powering Past Coal Alliance, in which governments commit to phasing out coal power generation, has grown from its 2017 founding by small players to now include major consumers Germany and the United States. Core members of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance commit to ending licensing of new oil and gas; again, membership has continued to grow and gain momentum since it was founded in 2021. And the Clean Energy Transition Partnership, also founded in 2021, creates a norm where institutions and governments commit to providing no international public finance for fossil fuels. 

By progressively building momentum, norms become self-reinforcing.

Faced with a challenge as large as climate change and the fossil-fuelled economy, it is precisely these kinds of accelerating dynamics that we need to put the COP 28 promise into action. 

The need for a transition away from fossil fuels is beyond doubt. At UNFCCC COP 28 countries came to a landmark agreement on “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems”, raising the bar for what is expected from the world’s governments. The International Energy Agency showed in 2021 that no new fossil fuel production was needed on a path to net zero emissions by 2050. A UCL-IISD study published in the peer-reviewed journal Science in May extended that analysis to show there is no room for any new oil and gas fields, coal mines, or coal- or gas-fired power stations in any credible 1.5°C-aligned scenario. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report is clear that unabated fossil fuels must be rapidly phased out globally. Meanwhile, devastating climate impacts from floods to heatwaves in recent weeks make clear the consequences of climate action failure.

Coinciding with the end of the climate talks in Bonn, and bringing together several of the world’s advanced economies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union – the G7 meetings are a chance to set the political mood music for the Global North for the rest of 2024. The G7 are among the world’s largest fossil fuel producers, accounting for 27% of current global oil, gas, and coal production, while the US, UK, and Canada alone could be responsible for nearly half of the CO2 pollution from new oil and gas extraction projects planned between 2023 and 2050. If managed right, the G7 leaders could set the stage for further ambition in what remains of the year.

Here are four ways the G7 leaders can show true leadership on the transition away from fossil fuels.

Bring Forward the Coal Phase-Out Date to 2030

The G7 leaders should bring forward the coal phase-out date to 2030, with no exceptions.

In April 2024, G7 Climate, Energy, and Environment Ministers took a crucial step forward by committing to phase out ‘existing unabated coal power generation’ during the first half of the 2030s ‘or in a timeline consistent with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach, in line with countries’ net-zero pathways’. This built on G7 Leaders’ 2022 commitment to decarbonizing their electricity systems by 2035, prioritizing ‘concrete and timely steps towards the goal of an eventual phase-out of domestic unabated coal power generation’.

What is critical, however, is that the first half of the 2030s – by 2035, in other words – is not fully aligned with what the science says is necessary to keep 1.5°C in reach. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE), the IEA’s main 1.5°C-aligned pathway, counts on advanced economies ending all unabated coal-fired power generation by 2030. The Powering Past Coal declaration, which the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Canada have already signed, affirms the need to phase out coal by 2030 among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, as well as the European Union.

End the Development of New Long-Lived Fossil Fuel Infrastructure, and Commit to Phase-Out Timelines

Leaders should commit to not licensing or permitting any new long-lived fossil fuel infrastructure.

The G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers reaffirmed the COP 28 call to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, and their own 2023 pledge to ‘accelerate the phase out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net-zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest in line with the trajectories required to limit global average temperatures to 1.5°C’. They committed to operationalising their own contribution to the transition through the development and implementation of domestic plans, policies and actions, ‘including to inform and be reflected in our NDCs and LTSs’. This is all positive, and leaders should reaffirm this commitment—but should go further.

In this light, it is worrying that the G7 Ministers stated that investment in fossil gas can be ‘appropriate as a temporary response’, and stressed the ‘important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play’. Recent studies have demonstrated that existing gas infrastructure and projects under construction are enough to ensure a steady and diversified supply of natural gas, and emancipate G7 members and their allies from Russian gas exports. Indeed, new gas investments could rapidly turn into stranded capital, undermining the competitiveness of G7 economies.

Leaders should instead avoid dangerous distractions and rather focus on tripling renewables and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements as key steps towards greater energy security.

Make Tangible Progress to End Fossil Fuel Subsidies

Although the G7 has pledged to phase out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies every year since 2009, specifying a 2025 timeline in 2016, so far implementation has been severely lacking. In 2022, the latest year for which data is available, fossil fuel subsidies across G7 countries hit an all-time high of USD 199.1 billion.  

This year, the G7 needs to urgently implement their commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. G7 ministers in April committed to report in 2025 on progress towards the achievement of their commitment, and consider options for developing joint public inventories of fossil fuel subsidies. At a minimum, this reporting should be done via the formal reporting process for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 12.c.1 (fossil fuel subsidies) – a process that hardly any countries have completed so far.

What’s more, there has long been concern about the qualifier “inefficient”, which only creates uncertainty about which subsidies need reform. In 2024, G7 Ministers committed to promote a common definition of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and called on relevant international organizations including the OECD and the IEA to work together to further develop such methodologies. However, a better outcome which leaders can still adopt is to drop “inefficient” altogether and instead require each G7 member to create a national roadmap for subsidy phaseout. This would require them to justify any remaining subsidies and identify alternative policy levers to achieve the same objectives.

The G7 should prioritize phasing out any support measures for fossil fuel exploration and production.

Producer subsidies do not help with energy poverty, since any cost reductions are distributed across all industrial and household customers, not just the vulnerable. Removing producer subsidies helps to align demand and supply while reducing the risk of stranded assets.

Implement the Commitment to End International Public Finance for Fossil Fuels

In recent years, the G7 has made progressive steps forward on ending international public finance for fossil fuels. In 2022, following a commitment to end direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in 2021, G7 leaders extended this to the entire international unabated fossil fuel energy sector, except in “limited circumstances clearly defined by each country consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement.”

In 2024, G7 ministers reiterated this commitment, adding a pledge to “scale up” support for clean energy, and G7 leaders should reaffirm it.  G7 ministers also committed to ‘work constructively to reach an agreement’ on talks to end export finance for oil and gas at the OECD—a crucial political signal that G7 leaders should again reaffirm.

Beyond reaffirming their commitment, however, in 2024 G7 countries should go beyond statements to action. Although the United Kingdom, France, and Canada have implemented policies ending international public finance for fossil fuels, Italy, Japan, and Germany’s policies contain large loopholes, and the United States has yet to publish such a policy. Since the end of 2022, the G7 has financed at least USD 8.5 billion in public support for fossil fuel projects abroad, with Japan and the United States providing the majority of this financing. Fulfilling this commitment this year is key to ensuring the G7’s credibility.

As the Summit kicks off on Thursday, G7 leaders have a critical opportunity to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. A failure to do so would be an excuse for inaction from the rest of the world.

The Rwenzori Mountains loom large over the surrounding scenery in southwestern Uganda. Here, snowmelt and rainwaters flow through alpine meadows and forests of otherworldly flora, including giant lobelia and heather taller than a person, to provide the source waters of the Nile. Moving south, the lakes, rivers, and grasslands of Queen Elizabeth National Park are home to not only elephants, buffalo, and hippopotami but also vast herds of kob—and the tree-climbing lions that prey on them.

Standing within these beautiful settings, you could be forgiven for thinking that nature is thriving. However, these exceptional places, inscribed as part of our collective natural heritage by UNESCO, are increasingly islands of ecosystem health in fragmented landscapes and seascapes beset by outside pressures.

The Sixth Extinction

It is a well-known story, and the headlines are often dire. Rates of species extinction and ecosystem degradation are accelerating; according to the 2019 Global Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 1 million animal and plant species are currently threatened with extinction, many within decades, unless urgent, transformative action is taken. Abundance has plummeted for many of those species not yet gone; WWF’s 2022 Living Planet Report notes an average decline of 69% in the relative abundance of monitored wildlife populations around the world between 1970 and 2018. The scale of the problem is so large that it is now commonly referred to as the sixth extinction: the loss of an unusually large number of species in a short time, driven by human activities.  

Compounding Crises

IPBES cites five anthropogenic factors as key drivers of this crisis: land- and sea-use change; direct exploitation of natural resources; climate change; pollution; and invasive species.

Nature has a foundational role in global health, food systems, livelihoods, climate adaptation, economies, and security. Thus, the acceleration of nature loss, when considered in the context of rising demands from growing populations for both ecosystem services and natural resources, means that avoiding further degradation or loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services should be an increasingly important consideration for governments, communities, and the private sector.

This crisis is unfolding in the context of rising global temperatures. The climate crisis is having a significant impact on the natural world. While land- and sea-use changes are currently the greatest drivers of nature loss, a failure to limit planetary warming to 1.5°C will result in climate change becoming the dominant cause of global biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation in the coming decades.

Climate change is disrupting natural feedback loops and altering the habitats and ranges of various fauna and flora. Its impacts also undermine the delivery of ecosystem services, harming human lives and livelihoods and compromising efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger and provide safe water for billions of people. Achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, alongside the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, will depend on a coordinated response to these deeply connected emergencies.

How Can Nature-based Solutions Build Climate Change Resilience?

But while climate change and biodiversity loss often act to reinforce one another, so do effective climate change adaptation and nature protection. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) have emerged as an integrated concept beyond climate change adaptation and traditional conservation. NbS may have the potential to tackle multiple societal challenges, such as protecting, managing, and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems. Their services are increasingly seen as an effective way to address some of the shared root causes and impacts of the biodiversity and climate crises.

In Belize, Fiji, and the Greater Virunga and Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) landscapes in sub-Saharan Africa, NbS are being rolled out to increase the resilience of both communities and ecosystems to climate change. Through the Climate Adaptation and Protected Areas (CAPA) Initiative, IISD is working with the Wildlife Conservation Society, the World Wide Fund for Nature, and local partners and communities within these spaces to conserve, protect, restore, and sustainably manage protected areas.

More than 50 km from the mainland of Belize, Glover’s Reef atoll lies just inches above the deep blue waters of the western Caribbean. Glover’s is a critical link in a chain of reefs and islands that form the largest barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere. Here, IISD and the Wildlife Conservation Society are working to strengthen the reef's health and its ability to support local livelihoods, remain a suitable habitat for marine species, and provide coastal protections against extreme weather events.

Half a world away, in southwestern Uganda, lies what is arguably Africa’s most biodiverse landscape. The Greater Virunga Landscape stretches along the shared borders of Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—a mosaic of mountains, savannas, rivers, lakes, swamps, tropical rainforests, and volcanoes. Here, conservation interventions implemented by the World Wide Fund for Nature and partners focused on reforestation, invasive species removal, land restoration, and nature-based livelihoods will help build the resilience of three national parks (Rwenzori Mountains, Queen Elizabeth, and Bwindi Impenetrable) and the communities that surround them to rising temperatures, increased flood risk, landslides, and erosion. Even more work is happening under the project in the KAZA landscape and in Fiji to support reforestation, restock wildlife, promote sustainable fisheries, and improve flood mitigation, among other activities.

The threats facing these ecosystems—and, by extension, the conservation practitioners that manage and support them; the communities that sustain and depend on them; the flora and fauna that make them indispensable—can often seem insurmountable. But there is hope. CAPA is one small part of a growing movement of projects, partnerships, and approaches using NbS to simultaneously address these two existential emergencies. Scaling up this work to match the urgency and reach of the crises will be a challenge, but it is a challenge we must embrace.

To learn more about the CAPA Initiative, please visit www.iisd.org/capa.

Carbon markets and the sale of carbon credits can help countries and companies meet ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. They can also channel much-needed finance to low- and middle-income countries and facilitate investments in climate mitigation. Nonetheless, there is concern that a focus on offsetting, rather than reducing emissions, will hamper the achievement of global climate goals. There is also increasing concern about the risks that investments in carbon offsetting projects pose for the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Indeed, such concerns led to the recent adoption of safeguards that give affected communities the chance to challenge UN-approved carbon removal projects. This important development highlights the need for governments to ensure they address the risks associated with the carbon offset deals they are negotiating.

Carbon offset deals are proliferating, raising concerns about the rights of affected communities

Earlier this month in Bonn, government negotiators approved an appeals and grievance procedure for Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement—a market-based mechanism allowing for the voluntary trade of credits from carbon removal and emissions reduction projects. The newly agreed procedure addresses ongoing concerns that carbon markets have not always respected the rights and voices of communities upon whose land carbon removal projects take place. Provision is made under the new procedure for communities to launch appeals before carbon removal projects registered under Article 6.4 begin and to air grievances throughout their duration. 

In recent years, the pace and scale of large-scale land-based investments for carbon removal have increased. Investors are negotiating deals with governments to take control of large tracts of (often forested) land in developing countries. Carbon fixed by this land is then turned into carbon credits for trading on emerging international carbon markets.

This has been driven in part by the Paris Agreement, which allows countries and companies to “offset” their emissions by investing in carbon reduction, avoidance, or removal elsewhere, such as under schemes like REDD+. A recent report finds that governments have already proposed approximately 1 billion hectares of land for land-based carbon removal as part of their climate mitigation pledges.

One Dubai-based investment company made headlines for negotiating Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) in five sub-Saharan African countries—Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Liberia—assuming control over millions of hectares of forested land upon which it plans to support the protection and rejuvenation of forests for the generation of carbon credits to be sold on the emerging international voluntary carbon market.

However, while some claim that such carbon offset deals bring a range of benefits for livelihoods and the environment, others, including non-governmental organizations and media outlets, have questioned their benefits and highlighted the risks they pose. There are serious concerns about the potential of carbon markets to contribute to emissions reductions, as well as concerns about the impacts of carbon offset deals on Indigenous Peoples and local communities. In certain instances, tensions arise from governments evicting Indigenous Peoples and local communities to pave the way for such deals. In others, concerns have been raised about the contravention of local land laws which give communities ownership rights to their customary lands. While the violation of local law and the tenure rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities are damaging in their own right, evidence suggests that land managed by Indigenous Peoples and local communities is far better preserved and less impacted by human actions. Governments considering undertaking these deals must, as a first step, ensure that they respect and protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Otherwise, they risk the very environmental and social outcomes they claim to safeguard.

Revisiting past mistakes: Land grabs to green grabs

As with the 2009–2010 land rush in the Global South, the large tracts of land being acquired for carbon offsetting projects are rarely idle and are either occupied by Indigenous Peoples and local communities or are a primary source of their food security and livelihoods. As such, the lack of community consultations witnessed in deals across Africa, Central America, and Asia, coupled with insufficient transparency surrounding these deals and a failure to deliver promised benefits, is fuelling grievances among affected communities and is at odds with food security and ecosystem resilience goals.

In Southeast Asia, for example, one carbon offset project violated the affected Indigenous Peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent and did not have a benefit-sharing agreement with any of the local communities included in the project. A recent analysis of two other carbon offset projects demonstrates that even where companies have attempted to inform, include, and benefit local populations, outcomes have not always matched intentions. This analysis reveals that despite consultation efforts, affected communities were not sufficiently informed about how their land was being used to generate income. It also shows how expected livelihood benefits from intercropping failed to arise due to the limited viability of such intercropping in practice.

What governments can do to mitigate the risk of green grabbing 

Governments should carefully assess whether these carbon offset deals benefit their people and further national sustainable development objectives. If they do choose to undertake such deals, governments should design and use robust legal frameworks to select, negotiate, and implement quality projects. Taking the following steps will help.

1. Ensure robust and appropriate laws are in place and that deals are negotiated and implemented in line with these laws.

It is important for governments to design robust laws with measures to safeguard the rights of local communities, mitigate emissions, and regulate the sale and taxation of carbon credits. However, adequate enforcement mechanisms are also needed to ensure these laws are followed.

Comprehensive, well-enforced laws remain the best way to ensure investments related to land and other natural resources respect the rights of legitimate tenure holders, promote local food security, and contribute positively to building climate resilience. This is particularly true for carbon offset projects. Robust laws also clarify both the requirements for the sustainable use of a country’s natural resources and access rights for communities who may be dependent on these resources for their livelihoods. Early screening and proper due diligence of an investment proposal should be done to ensure investments follow national laws and policies. These processes, which are in the interest of all, reduce the risk of losses for the government and the community.

Ghana’s national framework on international carbon markets and non-market approaches, for example, provides guiding principles and requirements on how the authorization, tracking, and reporting of voluntary carbon market transactions and granting of formal recognition to offset credits arising from voluntary carbon market projects should occur. It also emphasizes the need for environmental integrity, transparency, and the promotion of sustainable development.

Where laws are not up to date or robust in addressing these issues, governments can turn to their own nationally developed model contracts that integrate international best practice and principles on responsible investment as a basis for drawing up fair and equitable deals with investors. Such a tool would act as a stopgap in the interim as they work toward reforming their laws more holistically. The goal of model contracts is to help ensure that long-term land leases are done responsibly, with the necessary safeguards to protect local communities, their livelihoods, and the environment.

2. Establish appropriate local grievance mechanisms for affected communities.

While the recent approval of an appeals and grievance procedure is an important step in establishing a global carbon market under the Paris Agreement, more needs to be done to provide other avenues for affected peoples and communities to assert their rights, including in the context of carbon deals negotiated outside the scope of the Paris Agreement.

Currently, only one voluntary carbon market standards body, Gold Standard, provides appropriate recourse for communities to file grievances when affected by climate projects. “Appropriate” in this instance means following the six key criteria of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: accessibility, transparency, predictability, independence, adequacy, and safeguards for communities. It is critical that governments ensure that the carbon offset deals they negotiate provide appropriate grievance mechanisms for affected peoples and communities.

3. Carefully use MOUs to develop a roadmap for collaboration and map out steps toward successful project implementation.

Carbon offset deals often start with an MoU between the government and the investor as a first formal step toward collaboration. This early phase is crucial, as there are many important considerations before an investment takes place and an agreement is finalized. Yet despite this, MOUs are frequently rushed or not carefully vetted, as they are seen as “soft” agreements that do not bear legal consequences and that mostly serve to provide comfort or assurances to the investor. This practice represents a missed opportunity.

Well-crafted MoUs can help ensure that Indigenous Peoples and local communities affected by these deals are adequately consulted by detailing how such consultation shall be done. In addition, an MoU can also specify when an investor should provide information on the investment project proposal to the relevant government authorities to enable them to undertake timely, thorough, and systematic due diligence and screening of the proposed project.

The authors would like to thank Suzy Nikièma for her contributions to this article.

G7 climate, energy, and environment ministers gathered in Turin, Italy, this week. It was their first meeting since the historic UNFCCC COP 28 international agreement to transition away from fossil fuels and the penultimate one before a self-imposed 2025 deadline to eliminate “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies.  

The Ministerial had the potential to be a success in tackling some low-hanging (though prickly) fruit on the climate change mitigation front—in particular, ending governments’ subsidies to fossil fuels that amounted to at least USD 1.5 trillion globally and USD 199 billion in the G7 countries in 2022.  

But the final Ministerial communiqué ultimately falls short when it comes to breaking the 15 years of gridlock on fossil fuel subsidies.  

Here’s how G7 leadership can use their next meetings to demonstrate measurable progress.

Fix the Loophole on “Inefficient” Subsidies 

First, the G7 governments should drop the long-standing loophole in their reform commitment that technically involves the phase-out of only “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies. The Turin statement finally clarifies what “inefficient” subsidies are: they are those that “do not address energy poverty or just transitions.” This clarification is an improvement over the previous G7 language but demonstrates no leadership as it merely brought the G7 in line with what was agreed at UNFCCC COP 28. A better outcome would have been to drop “inefficient” altogether and require each G7 member to create a national roadmap for phasing out their fossil fuel subsidies. These would require them to justify any remaining subsidies and identify alternative policy levers to achieve the same objectives. 

Commit to Supporting People, not Fossil Fuels 

Second, G7 governments should demonstrate leadership by committing to address energy poverty, just transitions, and other social concerns like inflation under the principle “support people, not fossil fuels.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent oil and gas prices soaring, and many governments introduced emergency measures to shield consumers from the impact on their fuel bills. Within the G7, the United Kingdom and Italy provided the biggest subsidies, of USD 50 billion each, in 2022.  

In Turin, ministers said any crisis measures should be “timebound, transparent, and limited to address vulnerable groups without distortion of the incentives to save energy.” They should have gone further and ruled out fossil fuel subsidies as a crisis response—instead, considering direct cash transfers to vulnerable groups or grants for heat pumps, electric vehicles, and renewable energy.

Phase out All Subsidies to New Fossil Fuel Production

Third, the G7 should prioritize phasing out any support measures to fossil fuel exploration and production. These accounted for a substantial USD 42 billion across the G7 in 2022, even as oil and gas companies posted record profits. The science is clear that there is no room for new oil and gas production under a 1.5°C-compatible pathway, and global production must decline by at least 65% by 2050. Producer subsidies do nothing to tackle energy poverty, as any cost reductions are spread across all industrial and household customers, not just the vulnerable. Removing producer subsidies helps to align demand and supply while reducing the risk of stranded assets. This should be a priority. 

Ministers in Turin stressed the need for a common definition of fossil fuel subsidies. Their statement calls on the G20 and international organizations to work together on a methodology and agree on such a definition—something the G20 has tried and failed to do for many years. It is obvious that countries’ disagreement on definitions is driven by political considerations rather than any methodological challenges, given there is a long-standing—and legally binding—definition of subsidies under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as a detailed and WTO-consistent methodology outlined in Sustainable Development Goal 12.  

While the G7 consensus is frustratingly weak, help is at hand for those member governments ready to take on the challenge. Where there is a will, there is a way. Canada and nine EU countries, including France, joined a coalition launched by the Dutch government at COP 28 to tackle this issue. The rest of the G7 should follow and make every effort to deliver by the 2025 deadline.  

Fresh water is vitally important to everyone. It’s the water we drink and use to hydrate our agricultural lands and livestock. It’s the water in our communities' ponds, lakes, and wetlands.  

Every year, more plastic is being released into these environments, including microplastics, even in the most remote freshwater environments, and the North American Great Lakes, where 90% of water samples had microplastics levels surpassing safe levels for aquatic wildlife. That’s why current research at IISD Experimental Lakes Area is tackling the problem head on.
 

“Microplastics pollution is impacting even the most remote lakes in the world. We need better policies to protect freshwater ecosystems.”

– Michael Rennie, Research Fellow, IISD Experimental Lakes Area

The World Coming Together to Tackle Plastics Pollution

The world has a problem with plastics, and countries are collaborating to find solutions. Negotiators are meeting in Ottawa April 23–29, 2024, for the fourth meeting of the International Negotiating Committee (INC-4) to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution.

A revised draft text for the agreement has already been made available, and from a freshwater perspective, there are reasons for hope and some opportunities for improvement.

We Need to Focus More on Plastics Pollution in Freshwater

The most recent version of the agreement is holistic in scope, accounting for the entire life cycle of plastics. This is encouraging because minimizing plastic production and use is one of the most effective ways to prevent plastic pollution from damaging the environment. The text also takes careful consideration of chemical additives to plastics, acknowledging that they are known to have their own environmental harms.

Even so, we need to go further; freshwater pollution needs to be addressed more explicitly and comprehensively. After all, freshwater bodies have seen an exponential increase in the presence of plastic waste in the past few decades, and act as a source of plastics into marine environments.

Freshwater environments are explicitly mentioned in two sections of the preliminary text going into INC-4, which has a central focus on marine environments—understandable, considering the title of the negotiation itself includes references to marine environments. However, this agreement represents an opportunity to protect all natural environments from plastic pollution that the international community will not want to miss.

There are currently several options for what different parts of the text could look like. In some of these options, broader language such as “aquatic environments” or “water” is used in place of “marine environments” or “ocean” to better represent how various types of environments might all be affected by the same pollution sources. This is a positive step forward that opens opportunities for additional revisions to explicitly address freshwater concerns within the treaty.

Bringing Fresh Water Into INC-4: A few examples

Looking at the revised draft through the lens of freshwater protection, there are areas where it would make sense to include specific references to freshwater environments, but they are overlooked.

In nearly every section of the draft agreement, the word “marine” is mentioned, appearing 51 times. Meanwhile, specific references to fresh water are made only seven times.

There are many opportunities within the full text of the document released ahead of INC-4 to bolster and explicitly reference freshwater protection in the context of plastics pollution.

Below, we will highlight a few specific options; however, if you are interested in reading the plastic treaty document shared before INC-4 in full, click here.

• Plastic waste being generated from fishing gear is the specific focus of Section 9b, without considering the hundreds of inland freshwater fisheries worldwide. As the word “marine” is in the agreement title, inclusion of freshwater fisheries would need to be made explicitly to encompass these systems.
   
• In all clauses that specifically impact freshwater environments, there should be an inclusion of the term “fresh water.” Alternatively, we recommend using the term “aquatic environments” to include both marine and freshwater environments.
   
• An example of bringing freshwater concerns seamlessly into the INC-4 document can be found in Section 8, Option 4.4 on the Emissions and Releases of Plastics Throughout Its Lifecycle. In this paragraph, which pertains to an aspect of plastic pollution that may specifically threaten freshwater ecosystems, the text reads:

Here, freshwater bodies are specifically referenced alongside marine environments, acknowledging their distinct, important role in managing the impacts of plastic pollution.

Overall, the negotiation of such a treaty and the current draft text provide reason for optimism. The inclusion of detailed clauses for preventing the initial release of plastics into the environment, considerations of problematic chemical additives, and plastic emissions throughout the life cycle of plastic products are potentially impactful elements.

INC-4 is a critical international process, and the much-anticipated binding global agreement on plastic pollution could and should have major implications for freshwater quality around the globe.

The global living treaty developed by the end of INC-5 is important for the protection of all natural environments. We eagerly await a final draft at the end of next week that incorporates freshwater considerations as a means for a stronger and more effective agreement to ensure healthier lakes, fish, and drinking water for all.

The 2023 Statistical meetings of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) conducted from October 30 to November 3 in Nassau, Bahamas, were an opportunity for statisticians and policy-makers to agree on key statistical initiatives that will better support policy-making across the region. The meeting covered several important issues, including gender statistics, national accounts, censuses, geographical information systems (GISs), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moving beyond GDP emerged as a key step that will contribute to fostering resilience and guaranteeing the well-being of future generations.

In his address, Halim Brizan, Regional Director of Statistics of the CARICOM Secretariat and Chairman stressed, “We should make sure the statistics that we produce are fit for purpose... we need to complement [GDP] statistics to assess the situation of our economy.” In inviting member states to complement GDP statistics, the Director addressed two concerns regarding GDP: its usefulness and sufficiency in policy-making.

On the former, GDP remains an important tool for policy-makers due to its complete coverage of domestic activity, harmonization, and standardization over time and space. Regarding the latter, global leaders, including the United Nations Secretary-General, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Economic Forum are raising concerns around the use of GDP to assess national well-being. These concerns have prompted the design of complementary measures to GDP. One such measure is comprehensive (or inclusive) wealth—the sum of natural, produced, human, financial, and social capital. Comprehensive wealth is measured by the World Bank, United Nations Environment Programme, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development.

In the list of assets composing wealth, natural capital is the most at risk today. While GDP in the Caribbean has more than tripled since 1970, the region has lost 80% of its coral reef cover in just a few years. This significant decline jeopardizes the supply of crucial fish stocks and shoreline protection. The region is facing several other environmental risks, including rising sea levels and surface temperatures, depletion of forest resources, pollution of marine ecosystems (with consequences for the tourism upon which many small islands rely) and increasing frequency and cost of natural disasters. Since 1950, Caribbean countries have suffered the impacts of more than 60% of disasters that struck small states. Large segments of the Caribbean population live on coastlines and are dependent on natural resources for economic opportunities. Around 70% of the region’s population lives on coastlines, and the ocean alone accounts for almost 20% of GDP. Estimates suggest that the Caribbean’s 88,170 km2 of seagrass provides more than USD 255 billion in ecosystem services and stores more than 1,300 Tg of carbon. This puts these countries at greater risk of "importing climate effects" despite being among the lowest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions.

Because GDP does not account for these challenges, comprehensive wealth accounting is required to complement GDP measures and equip policy-makers with better tools to monitor the economy’s health.

Comprehensive wealth accounts should be incorporated into current and future data collection, compilation, and dissemination activities in the Caribbean. This is growing in importance as the international reporting requirements for environmental data increase due to rising climate impacts on small states. Work on comprehensive wealth accounting should initially focus on compiling natural capital accounts (NCAs). In this, countries in the region can draw upon the international standards available from the United Nations under the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) framework. SEEA-based natural capital accounts can contribute directly to the efforts to move beyond GDP by measuring the extent and condition of ecosystems, their uses in productive processes, and their degradation over time. NCAs can help countries quantify their stock of natural assets and monitor their contribution to national income and wealth. In this regard, NCAs will be a useful tool to track the losses and damages faced by Small Island Developing States.

To produce NCAs, a whole-of-statistics approach that stretches across data producers, users, and partners is necessary. To achieve this, the Caribbean must address structural issues that inhibit the coverage and scope of data collected. In this regard, improving national statistical systems and building relationships between data producers—at local, regional, and international levels–and national statistical offices are essential steps for creating responsive national statistical systems and enhancing the data value chain in these countries. This includes the need for integrated data-sharing systems, a natural asset register through administrative sources, and real-time reporting on the impacts of natural disasters on populations and key natural assets. Such an approach will improve the accessibility, timeliness, and quality of statistics on population, living conditions, and housing conditions, thereby equipping policy-makers with more adequate tools for monitoring the well-being of both current and future generations.

The annual UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) is always the most awaited climate conference of the year. Thousands of people from around the world come together to agree on ways to address the climate crisis, such as limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C, helping vulnerable communities adapt to the effects of climate change, and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. And every year, the COP just keeps getting bigger. Considering there were only an estimated 38,000 participants at COP 21 in Paris, COP 28 might be the biggest yet, with a record-breaking 100,000 people registered. However, one does question the effectiveness of the conference, given the number of participants in the world’s biggest decision-making forum on climate change. With the stakes getting higher, will the large number of participants hinder or help the negotiation process in what can be dubbed as a “mega” COP?

The first day of COP 28 started off with a bang, with delegates already approving the operationalization of the loss and damage fund and several developed countries pledging millions of dollars to the fund. This sent a wave of hope amongst developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable, who need the fund to address the devastating impacts of climate change in their countries. Unfortunately, what started as an early victory soon descended into a battle of voices behind the scenes, with each delegate pushing for their respective country’s interests while doing their best to reach an agreement that collectively benefits all.

For the next several days, informal consultations were convened to discuss key issues such as the global goal on adaptation, mitigation ambition and implementation work program, just transition pathways work program, and global stocktake, among others. Negotiators debated which principles to include, what targets to set, how work programs can be implemented, and what text should be included in the draft decision, one of which is the highly controversial inclusion of fossil fuels phase-out. One could see some negotiators being part of different consultations, running from one room to the next to ensure their country’s voice would be heard and their interests protected, while other countries have sufficient representation in all the consultations. In several cases, countries that have the same interest over key issues banded together to declare their positions and negotiate as a coalition. It was fascinating to see international diplomacy and cooperation at its best, and sadly, also at its worst. One can sense the frustration in these rooms as some countries chose to take a hard stance on key issues, making it difficult for discussions to move forward. Indeed, the art of negotiations is a tricky one, requiring a delicate balance between protecting one’s own interests and finding common ground with the rest of the world.

Just as I was gaining an understanding of the negotiations process, COP 28 President Sultan Al-Jaber announced he would convene a “Majlis.” This Arabic term for “council” was meant to foster “heart-to-heart” discussions with the aim of helping countries reach consensus and break deadlocks on key issues. Such a step was unexpected and not a usual part of the process, but I learned it was not the first time such a group was convened. At COP 23, the Fiji Presidency established a Talanoa Dialogue. The Majlis was quite a spectacle, with a grand round stage and key country players speaking on contentious issues that need to be resolved.

The next few days brought on a flurry of behind-the-scenes activity, with negotiators working around the clock to finalize discussions and reach an agreement on decision texts, particularly on key issues. Finally, on December 13, one day after the scheduled end of the conference, decisions were adopted and gaveled through. The adoptions were followed by myriad reactions, ranging from applause for progress made to tears of frustration at the lack of a clear call to phase out fossil fuels. Despite the drama and chaos of COP 28, most of the media hailed it as a historic outcome.

Looking back at the events during COP 28, the large number of participants made the negotiation process more transparent. However, it may have also made the negotiations more challenging and, ironically, even less inclusive at times. The ideal solution would be to strike a balance and ensure the participants who do attend COPs are there for the right reasons, although the many definitions of “balance” were the reason we needed a strong outcome in the first place. Ultimately, whether it’s a mega COP or not, what we all hope for is that every COP brings us closer to the world we want.

Maria Cristina Mundin is a Writer with Earth Negotiations Bulletin as well as a lawyer at the International Lawyers Project where she leads the Environment and Sustainable Development Programme. She is a Philippine national based in London.

From the adoption of a key funding decision on the first day of COP 28 to the inclusion of the first-ever explicit reference to “fossil fuels” during the closing plenary, I quickly surmised how each climate COP has critical opportunities to set a new path for climate action. How well these opportunities are acted upon depends partly on how the COP Presidency and the Secretariat steer this annual debate in the direction for global climate efforts. Civil society also prods governments more than I expected.

However, ultimately, it is government leaders who must find the political will to break out of their debates and determine if negotiations will match the evolving global needs. 

I arrived in Dubai expecting to see the COP Presidency and UNFCCC Secretariat actively organizing and leading the discussions, and I was not disappointed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided an impressive venue and worked long hours to facilitate discussions throughout COP 28. The UNFCCC Secretariat also worked tirelessly behind the scenes, as demonstrated by the number of new negotiating drafts that arrived in my inbox on a regular basis. In addition, for the first time, the UNFCCC Secretariat published a detailed list of attendees, including their affiliation. This effort to increase transparency was widely appreciated, and I look forward to COP 28 setting a precedent on this issue for future meetings.

A group of actors that I did not expect to see were the civil society protesters. During a COP, civil society works within guidelines established and negotiated with the meeting organizers to coordinate “actions.” In Dubai, attendees entering the COP were greeted by colourful signs, costumed individuals, and full-throated chants on policies that civil society wishes would change. Although these activities took place on conference grounds—which are temporarily transferred to UN oversight during a COP—it still struck me as remarkable that they were taking place in a country that severely limits demonstrations and some types of organizations.

The decision to operationalize the Loss & Damage Fund, which was based on the recommendations reached by the Transitional Committee established at COP 27, showed that the multilateral process can move forward quickly when there is sufficient political will. The quick capitalization of this fund was impressive, although the size of some pledges indicated that the priorities of those with the most power are still not where they need to be. The UAE announced a relatively significant sum of money towards the new fund: USD 100 million. Developed countries announced sums that ranged from equally significant (including Italy and France’s pledges of up to EUR 100 million each) to paltry (the US pledged USD 17.5 million). The passionate pleas from civil society and government representatives for richer countries to do more on this issue will stay with me for years.

The challenge of including a reference to fossil fuels in a decision came from what I was told was a more “traditional” process of give-and-take negotiations. While this stalemate resulted primarily from a bloc of oil-producing countries, the division between developed and developing countries within the UNFCCC establishes a binary context for many debates. A number of countries in the “developing” category have outgrown that status, which was established through the annexes to this treaty that was adopted a few years before I was born. The resulting debates left me with the impression that the assumptions under which parties are expected to negotiate are not grounded in reality. If the basis for their negotiations does not match the current global context, I was left asking if it is a surprise that we are not making rapid progress.

The climate change convention is a landmark international agreement that gathers 198 countries to address a shared challenge. But there is a need to find a way around its built-in limitations. Although many questioned the value of registering around 100,000 individuals to attend COP 28, I saw the side events, special days, high-level forums, and more as evidence of a thriving public consciousness of the needs and solutions to protect this little blue planet we call home. And throughout the meeting, I recognized that I was watching history being made, and was proud to be writing its first draft in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 

Hillary Rosentreter is a policy advisor with IISD’s Tracking Progress team. Her work focuses on the community indicator system Peg and the successful implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals at the local level.