The 28th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28) ended in late 2023, with negotiators heading back to their home countries and member states turning their focus inward to their national climate strategies. However, the discussions on climate policy and strategies don’t end with the COP, and Canadian youth still have a lot to say about what they want to see in the future.

In the months leading up to COP every year, youth from all over the world gather in Local Conferences of Youth (LCOYs), which fall under the UNFCCC’s official youth constituency. Ultimately, they produce policy documents that outline the priorities of young people on climate policy.

Canada’s LCOY in 2023 was hosted by the Human and Nature Youth Club and the Asia Forest Research Centre at the University of British Columbia. It brought together 250 youth from across the country to discuss their priorities in three major areas: sustainable systems, planetary health, and political, societal, and governance practices. They aimed their policy document at Canada’s federal and provincial level governments and focused on changes they would like to see here at home now that negotiations are over.

IISD’s Water Policy and Youth Engagement Officer, Emily Kroft, was one of the youth involved, helping create a policy document outlining key points and demands from Canadian youth on climate policy in Canada.

A Focus on Sustainable Systems

The 10 demands from the LCOY about sustainable systems cover everything from low-carbon energy to climate finance. Focusing on themes of carbon pricing, fossil fuel subsidies, and the need for a climate finance taxonomy, the participants want to see provincial and federal governments divesting from fossil fuels while at the same time investing in sustainable alternatives that align with the warming target of 1.5°C outlined in the Paris Agreement. They acknowledge Canada’s strengths and weaknesses regarding low-carbon energy. The prevalence of low-carbon electricity throughout the country is a strength; however, transportation is highlighted as an area that needs significant improvement. The authors also remind us that even non-carbon-emitting energy sources can have other environmental drawbacks that should also be accounted for. The list also has a section on sustainable cities, where the primary areas of concern are the importance of protecting urban green space and the need to transition away from automobile dependency. The common thread between both of these is intentional urban planning that encourages alternative modes of transportation, like cycling and public transit, and the incorporation of green space into urban areas.  

Prioritizing Our Planet and a Focus on Food

In terms of the health of our planet overall, the youth authors’ statement featured 12 demands. Canada contains a unique richness of biodiversity as well as multiple anthropogenic factors that place this biodiversity at risk. While the authors feel Canada has generally been doing well in meeting commitments to the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, there is still significant room for improvement when it comes to protecting biodiversity. The authors promote the conservation of natural areas as a key priority, as well as using a diverse suite of metrics when measuring biodiversity and determining which areas need special protection. The three oceanic coastlines of Canada are facing plastic pollution and issues regarding sustainability in the fishing industry. Young people prioritize increased protections for the Arctic coast (which is at particular risk from oceanic warming) and greater transparency in the marine fishing industry on all coasts.

A topic that many Canadians are focusing on—food and agriculture—is highlighted in the youth statement, which encourages policy-makers to consider regionally specific strategies that account for the diversity of biomes across the country. The document also urges the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions at all points along the food production chain, from agriculture to household food waste. Reducing excess emissions produced by animal agriculture was also highlighted, in addition to offering more education about sustainable diets for regional populations. They also demand the implementation of easily accessible municipal composting programs so households can better manage their food waste.

Political, Societal, and Governance Practices

While there were only two demands covering political, societal, and governance practices, the importance of these points highlights the eagerness and ambition of young leaders who want to take action to improve Canada and the world. There is a call for greater accountability from the federal government on hitting climate-related targets and greater inclusion of Indigenous Peoples at all levels of decision making. This takes into consideration climate justice, as Indigenous Peoples are disproportionately harmed by climate change.

Finally, the demands serve as a reminder that Canadian youth are highly motivated when it comes to climate politics and are participating in many different ways, from volunteering during elections to sitting on advisory committees. The contents of this policy document speak for themselves—Canadian youth are knowledgeable when it comes to sustainability policy. All governments need to do is open a seat at the table, and Canadian youth will contribute their incredible passion and knowledge to policy at all levels. Specifically, the authors demand greater inclusion of Indigenous youth, meaningful opportunities for youth co-leadership, and that youth stakeholders who participate in meetings be provided with the same exclusive documents available to other stakeholders.

Themes for Our Future

The full list of demands for policy-makers created by the Canadian LCOY goes into greater depth into these points and delves beyond what is covered here. However, there are a few themes emerging as priorities for the Canadian youth involved in its development.

First is the importance of taking greenhouse gas emissions seriously across all sectors of the economy. Whether it be demands for divesting from fossil fuels in the climate finance sector, calls for reduced emissions in agriculture, or reduced automobile dependency, every focus area ultimately comes back to this one issue. Canadian youth name the limiting of fossil fuel emissions as a high priority.

Indigenous inclusion in decision making is at the heart of what Canadian youth want to see when it comes to impacting climate policy. Indigenous Peoples are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change, and Canadian youth are taking notice, making clear how important it is that diverse voices are heard.

Finally, the report stresses the need to set up Canadians for success when it comes to living sustainably. This includes designing cities to reduce the necessity of car ownership, making food production more sustainable, and making it easier for everyday Canadians to avoid plastic waste. Canadian youth have identified how hard it is to live a sustainable lifestyle without the help of strong, sustainable policies being implemented at all levels. Policy-makers should take note of this concern among the next generation of leaders.

Canadian youth have a lot to say when it comes to climate policy in Canada, and they have the knowledge to back it up. Make sure to check out the LCOY 2023 Policy Document whether you are a decision maker, a climate expert, or even just a supporter of youth leaders.

If you are a Canadian youth who wants to learn more about policy and its impact or want to prepare for a career in sustainable development, IISD Next hosts a Campus Workshop Series on Sustainability each academic year. Sign up to learn when registration opens and to learn more about the series.

At the close of 2023, Environment and Climate Change Canada released the first official Progress Report on its 2022 Emissions Reduction Plan. The report details progress toward the government’s 2030 climate goals as mandated by the Net Zero Accountability Act, forecasting that, if all modelled policies are fully implemented, national emissions will fall to 36% below 2005 levels in 2030. A parallel, independent assessment by the Canadian Climate Institute (CCI) mirrors these findings, forecasting a 34%–36% reduction. While these reports confirm that progress has been made in recent years to reduce Canada’s emissions, they also show that current measures are insufficient to reach the government’s 40%–45% reduction target. To close this gap and help avoid the worst impacts of climate change, it is essential that the federal government implements stronger policies alongside a clearer communications strategy.

What are Canada’s climate targets?

Federally, Canada has two complementary climate targets. The first is achieving “net-zero by 2050,” meaning that any new greenhouse gas emissions from 2050 onwards are offset by verifiable and permanent removals. To prevent the most dangerous effects of climate change, this is a necessary target for all countries, not just Canada. The federal government’s second climate target is to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by 40% to 45% relative to 2005 levels by 2030.

Provincially, most governments echo the federal goal of “net-zero by 2050,” but 2030 targets are still rare. According to CCI, “three quarters of Canada’s emissions come from provinces and territories without their own legislated emissions reduction targets for 2030.” This discrepancy reflects a tension between the two levels of government regarding the pace of the energy transition, as articulated in the recent statements of Alberta’s premier about the forthcoming Federal Clean Electricity Regulations. That is, Premier Smith notes Alberta already has a target of reaching net-zero by 2050, so why bother with stringent 2030 regulations?

Why Canada’s 2030 target is critical for keeping global temperature rise to 1.5°C

Canada’s 2030 target is essential for maintaining a stable climate for two main reasons. The first is scientific. When the International Panel on Climate Change recommended the world reach net-zero by 2050, it simultaneously called for emissions to fall by 45% (relative to 2010) by 2030. What matters for the climate is not the specific year the world stops emitting greenhouse gases but rather the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Figure 1, where total emissions are represented by the area under the line, makes this clear. Even if the world achieves net-zero by 2050, without strong emissions reductions by 2030 it becomes very difficult to prevent more than 1.5°C of global warming. In other words, reaching net-zero by 2050 without taking 2030 targets seriously risks missing the 1.5°C temperature target with disastrous consequences worldwide—including billions of dollars in damage to the Canadian economy.

The second reason for a strong 2030 emissions target is political. By establishing a specific and measurable goal, it becomes easier to assess the government’s progress in addressing climate change. This creates an incentive for politicians to fulfill their commitments to the public. The risk with a “net-zero by 2050” target on its own, however, is that political tenures and election cycles are short. Multi-decadal targets like this offer a convenient delay tactic for politicians who are otherwise unmotivated to address climate change. A 2030 target is essential to keep governments on track for net-zero by 2050, and ultimately that 1.5°C temperature target, by holding our representatives accountable along the way.

What more can be done to meet Canada’s targets?

The government’s progress report shows that despite significant advances in climate policy, more must be done to meet Canada’s critical 2030 targets (Figure 2). To start, announced but unimplemented policies must be designed as stringently as possible. A key example here is the proposed emissions cap for the oil and gas sector, Canada’s most polluting industry. To reach a 40%–45% reduction in emissions by 2030, the government must begin by closing the policy’s proposed loopholes, thereby increasing certainty in the emissions reduction outcomes that the government claims the policy will have. Other policies, such as the clean electricity regulations, must also be implemented as soon as possible. Even then, however, new, innovative policies will still be needed. There are only 6 years to 2030, and there is a lot of work left to do.

Beyond policy development, there is a broader communications challenge facing the federal government. Opponents of climate policy have often tried to link specific measures to the cost-of-living challenges currently facing Canadians, particularly criticizing the carbon tax. This is in spite of the fact that most households benefit from the tax and rebate system. Some provincial governments, meanwhile, show no intention of setting or meeting 2030 targets, while also disputing the federal government’s authority to intervene in response to their inaction. While it is correct that provinces have jurisdiction over natural resources, the federal government can regulate matters of national concern—such as greenhouse gas emissions—in a way that incidentally affects provincial matters. Opposing legal challenges are thus overstated, but they nonetheless carry weight in public discourse. To build the public support necessary to accelerate Canada’s climate agenda, the government will have to do more to address these rhetorical and legal challenges head-on—confidently and publicly.

One crucial step to speed up the worldwide energy transition is reallocating public financial support from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned that government support for the fossil fuel industry financially is “severely misaligned” with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Canada has made promises to stop putting public funds into fossil fuels, but what progress has been made? And how can it improve? 

Funding Fossil Fuels: How far has Canada come? 

Canada has committed to ending subsidies and public financing for fossil fuels at home and abroad and has taken some important steps along the path. In 2021, it signed on to the Clean Energy Transition Partnership, which commits countries to ceasing to provide new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022 and prioritizing support for clean energy. In 2022, Canada became one of the first countries to make good on this commitment by publishing a policy to stop providing public finance for fossil fuel projects abroad. More recently, the country committed to ending domestic public finance for fossil fuels, pledging to publish a plan by fall 2024. And in July 2023, 14 years after its original commitment, Canada published its long-awaited assessment framework for inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.  

These are all essential steps to moving money away from fossil fuels. But the details of these policies, how they are implemented, and how they are enforced will make or break Canada’s commitments. Let’s take a closer look. 

Plugging the Holes in the Frameworks 

Canada’s policies on international public finance and fossil fuel subsidies have some notable strengths. The subsidies policy includes a strong definition aligned with the World Trade Organization’s. Moreover, the policy requires fossil fuel projects that would receive support to prove a lack of renewable energy alternatives and include an assessment of the risk of stranded assets. 

But the policies also include loopholes that could jeopardize their effectiveness—and Canada’s reputation as a climate leader. These loopholes include the following: 

• Natural gas. The international public finance policy allows support for the production of natural gas-fired power in some circumstances, which is incompatible with Paris Agreement targets. Any support allowed in an emergency should be clearly defined and time-bound, ensuring no future lock-in of fossil fuel infrastructure.  

• Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS). The policies allow support for CCUS technologies in the fossil fuel and power generation sectors. CCUS is expensive, energy intensive, slow to implement, and unproven at scale, making it an inefficient use of public funds. Funding CCUS in the fossil fuel sector violates the polluter-pays principle: those responsible should be financially liable for cleaning up their pollution. 

• Lack of accountability. The policies lack details on implementation and enforcement, as well as sufficient transparency to be held accountable. It is essential to have guidelines for how the policies will be put in place across departments and who will keep the government accountable for its promises. For example, Canada has not yet published a list of tax and non-tax subsidies identified in its self-review—and publicly disclosing subsidies is a critical first step to ensuring accountability.

To fulfill its own commitment, Canada needs to publish a policy to end domestic public finance for fossil fuels immediately. 

The biggest hole in Canada’s current policies is domestic public finance for fossil fuels. Most of Canada’s financing for fossil fuels comes from within its own borders: Export Development Canada, the national export credit agency, has provided over CAD 88 billion to the oil and gas sector since 2016, including CAD 19 billion in 2022.

Ending Fossil Fuel Financing at Home 

What does the roadmap to ending domestic public financing for fossil fuels in Canada look like? We have three recommendations. 

First, it should close the loopholes in existing policies. Any policy framework should ensure that the government does not enable financing for infrastructure that would lock in fossil fuel use far into the future. Investments in natural gas and unproven, expensive technologies such as CCUS only entrench carbon-intensive infrastructure. 

Second, it should reproduce the strengths of international public financing policy. Canada’s policy for international public financing of fossil fuels is already robust in its scope and requirements for due diligence. A policy for ending domestic public finance of fossil fuels should:  

• align with the goal of the Paris Agreement to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, 

• exclude the financing of “abated” fossil fuel production, 

• rigorously assess and manage risks of stranded assets and carbon lock-in, and 

• require proof that support for fossil fuels will not hinder the transition to renewables where developing renewables would be possible. 

Most importantly, the policy should outline how recovered funding will be redirected to clean energy. Canada’s policies should not only include robust conditions for phasing out financing for fossil fuels. They should also provide details on how the money will be redirected toward renewable energy projects.

Experts estimate that Canada’s public clean electricity support needs to be scaled up nearly tenfold from its current level to be on track with a 1.5°C-aligned scenario.

Canada is already a first mover internationally in ending the financing of fossil fuels, but fully aligning financial incentives with climate policy requires closing the gap in domestic public finance and eliminating loopholes in its existing policies.  

1. State of Global Environmental Governance

With the pent-up need for countries to agree on how to address climate finance, plastic pollution, biodiversity loss, and other pressing environmental issues, a tidal wave of in-person negotiations swept through 2022. The globetrotting Earth Negotiations Bulletin team reviewed an unprecedented year in sustainable development negotiations, drawing links between talks, considering the context of an uneven pandemic recovery, and reflecting on the next steps in addressing the triple planetary crisis.

2. On Behalf of My Delegation (Second Edition)

This Survival Guide exists to empower meteorologists, environmentalists, policy-makers, or scientists who have to don the garb of a “negotiator” at the talks or professional negotiators with little understanding of the variety of issues that arise in a climate change negotiation. This practical manual explains the substance and procedures of climate talks, mixing theory with practical tips, ideas with material for further research, and words with figures. This guide is written with special consideration for negotiators from the Global South, who arrive at climate conferences with fewer resources and colleagues than the delegations of the Global North. With accessible definitions and advice for all, this second edition of On Behalf of my Delegation ensures that negotiators are equipped to make an impact in negotiations for our very survival.

3. Agrivoltaics in India: Challenges and opportunities for scale-up

Agrivoltaics —the simultaneous use of land for both agriculture and photovoltaic (PV) power generation—offers a potential solution to the competition between agriculture and renewable energy for land resources that may arise in the future in India. This background paper assesses the current state of development and identifies the challenges and opportunities for the commercialization of agrivoltaics in India. The findings in this paper are designed to support state agencies, developers, and other stakeholders in the faster adoption of agrivoltaics by providing policy recommendations and proposing business models, along with a financial and technical transition mechanism.

4. The WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies: A reader’s guide

Members of the World Trade Organization concluded a multilateral deal to curb harmful fisheries subsidies in June 2022. This reader's guide provides a clear overview of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. It describes the rules and legal provisions that have been agreed upon and succinctly explains what the disciplines require. 

5. The State of Play of Natural Infrastructure on the Canadian Prairies

Constrained finances, fragile water resources, and catastrophic weather events are driving the need to rethink water infrastructure for present and future generations. With aging and deteriorating water infrastructure across the Canadian Prairies, natural infrastructure can offer a unique and innovative solution. We sat down with key experts across the region and reviewed the latest literature to determine how to take natural infrastructure from novel to normal on Canada's Prairies. 

6. Fanning the Flames: G20 provides record financial support for fossil fuels

This digital story provides the latest evidence regarding the extent to which the G20, as a whole, has made progress in aligning public financial flows with the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The first four sections cover the main types of support for fossil fuels: subsidies, investments by state-owned enterprises, lending from public financial institutions, and under-taxation. The final two sections examine progress on renewable energy subsidies and investments. Each section contains recommendations for the G20.

7. Achieving Sustainable Food Systems in a Global Crisis: Summary report

This report summarizes the evidence-based and costed country roadmaps for effective public interventions to transform agriculture and food systems in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria in a way that ends hunger, makes diets healthier and more affordable, improves the productivity and incomes of small-scale producers and their households, and mitigates and adapts to climate change.

8. Next Steps for Defining a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning System for the Global Goal on Adaptation by COP 28

In 2022, at the 26th UN Cliamte Change Conference (COP 26), countries created the Glasgow-Sharm-el Sheikh (GlaSS) work program on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), a 2-year program aimed at exploring how the GGA can be operationalized. Additionally, countries agreed to use the last year of the GlaSS to finalize a GGA framework with a view to adopting it at COP 28. This report first provides an overview of key concepts and elements needed under monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems, along with examples and relevant conceptualizations for the GGA for actors to advance their understanding and views of a prospective GGA framework by COP 28.

9. Global Market Report: Cotton prices and sustainability

From the clothes we wear to critical medical equipment, cotton is the most widely used natural fibre in the textile industry today, accounting for almost a quarter of all fibres manufactured worldwide. Cultivating cotton provides livelihoods for 100 million households, of which 90% are in lower-income countries. An additional 350 million people support cotton production and basic processing by working in transportation, ginning, baling, and storage. This report presents and analyzes the sustainable production and consumption trends in the global cotton sector and includes a detailed exploration of how adopting voluntary sustainability standards can affect prices and farmer incomes.

10. Setting the Pace: The economic case for managing the decline of oil and gas production in Canada

The oil and gas sector's role as one of Canada's economic engines is already changing. This report analyzes successful energy transitions in other jurisdictions. It finds that by enacting policies, the government can prepare for the phase-down of oil and gas production, protect Canadian workers and communities, and seize new economic opportunities.

The gavel has come down on the 28th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28). Food systems and agriculture were undoubtedly a central pillar of the UAE’s COP Presidency, but what do delegates take with them as they head home? What do COP 28 food and agriculture outcomes mean for domestic food systems transformation efforts? And where do we need to turn our attention as we look ahead to COP 29 and beyond?

Where Did We Stand on Food and Agriculture at the Start of COP 28?

Food systems continued to climb political agendas in 2023. Growing awareness of the unique role they can play in providing solutions to climate, biodiversity, and sustainable development challenges featured in international processes and forums such as the G7 and G20, the UN General Assembly, and the Africa Climate Summit. 

The UAE was clear in its intention to place food systems transformation at the heart of its COP 28 presidency. It sought to translate growing political will into concrete commitments for action and to unlock additional investment to accelerate closing the food systems transformation financing gap. 

In reality, the food and agriculture outcomes from COP 28 are something of a mixed bag. 

A Breakdown of Progress Against Both Negotiated and Non-Negotiated Outcomes Tracked by IISD at COP 28

Progress has been made on adaptation, but the ambition and momentum we saw during the World Climate Action Summit—with over 130 countries signing the COP 28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action—failed to carry over into either the Global Stocktake or the Sharm El Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security. 

Negotiated Outcomes

Non-negotiated Outcomes

Building Momentum Toward COP 29 and Beyond

As the dust begins to settle on COP 28, how can policy-makers maintain and build momentum toward food systems transformation into 2024? 

Firstly, considerable trust- and bridge-building efforts must be made between negotiating blocs ahead of the Bonn intersessionals in June 2024 and the next formal meeting of agriculture negotiators. Consensus must be reached swiftly on governance of the Sharm El Sheikh Joint Work, to allow sufficient time to advance discussions on a roadmap, operationalization of the online portal, and the content of the thematic workshops. 

Swift and decisive action toward the implementation of the Emirates Declaration is needed to build on the momentum generated in Dubai. The UAE should ideally convene a meeting in the first quarter of 2024 to iron out the framework and timeline for tracking progress on implementation, particularly on country efforts to include food systems indicators in NDCs, NAPs, and NBAPs ahead of the planned COP 29 stocktaking moment. 

World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on agricultural trade will play a critical role in a global transition to more sustainable production, consumption, and trading of food and agricultural goods. Countries that have endorsed the Emirates Declaration and committed to revising how they support their respective agriculture sectors should carry this commitment forward into WTO negotiations ahead of the WTO Ministerial Conference in February 2024, particularly ongoing negotiations around the reform of rules on agricultural support. 

And finally, the GGA sets out 2030 targets for the development of “climate-resilient food and agricultural production, supply and distribution of food.” Achieving these targets will depend on access to sufficient public and private finance. The FAO Global Roadmap is a step in the right direction toward stimulating increased investment. However, future iterations should ensure targets also reflect language in the GGA decision text regarding the need to scale up sustainable and regenerative production, as well as engage more openly and deeply with a wide variety of stakeholders—including smallholder farmers, women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples—to ensure investment generated is channelled to activities that best serve the needs and priorities of frontline food systems actors. 

We saw a suite of encouraging financial pledges for food systems announced at COP 28. Prompt action on these four steps will be key to ensuring they underpin the transition to sustainable, resilient food systems—and help leverage further investment going forward.

On Monday, December 3, an event at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28) conference highlighted findings from United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP’s) Emissions Gap Report 2023.

As well as revealing the scale of the disparity between current emissions trajectories and the targets set out under the Paris Agreement, this year's report warns that the world is heading for a temperature rise of about 3°C by the end of the century unless countries now deliver more than they have already promised to tackle climate change.

Greg Muttitt, a senior associate at the International Institute For Sustainable Development (IISD) and lead author of a chapter of the report, was a panellist at the COP 28 event, where he spoke about what is needed to achieve a global energy transformation in line with the Paris Agreement goals.

As attention now turns to whether a "phase-out" of all fossil fuels can be met in the final COP 28 decision, or whether global leaders ultimately agree on a "phase down," Muttitt explains that existing fossil fuel projects have already put us on course for "very dangerous amount of warming," with urgent action now needed to rapidly halt polluting industries.

What are the headline findings in the Emissions Gap Report?

Greg Muttitt: The key finding of the report as a whole is that we are well off course from what is needed to achieve the Paris goals. Based on current policies, we're headed for three degrees of warming, which is a catastrophic level of warming.

Even taking into account the NDCs [countries' agreed climate plans, known as nationally determined contributions], it's 2.5°C to 2.9°C of warming. So there's a massive gap. There's a gap in 2030 ambition, and to get on course for limiting warming to 1.5°C,  the emissions need to be 42% lower than we're currently on course for.

I focused on a chapter which set up the energy part of the Emissions Report. The first part of the report is about assessing the gap—are we on course? The second part is about policy solutions. Clearly, energy is crucial to this—it accounts for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions—and a central finding of our section of the report is if you add up the fossil fuel infrastructure which is already built, operated over its lifetime, the emissions will be several times what we can afford to emit to limit warming to 1.5°C.

What that means is that some of the existing infrastructure needs to be closed. Some oilfields need to be closed. Coal mines, power plants, and some industrial systems which are fossil fuel-based—all must be closed before the end of their natural economic life, and we need to stop opening up new ones.

If we open new ones, then even more have to be closed early. There's a big overhang of too much fossil fuels.

Why should this concern us with COP 28 underway in Dubai?

Greg Muttitt: It matters in two respects. One is the global stocktake, which starts off a process of governments making new emissions pledges targeting 2035, so it's important to highlight that we're way off track and need a massive scale-up of ambition in emissions reductions.

Also, fossil fuels are going to be a central issue at COP 28—a key measure of COP 28's success is: will there be a clear decision on phasing out all fossil fuels?

The last two COPs have had decisions on "phasing down" unabated coal power. There was a big push at last year's COP in Egypt to expand that to all fossil fuels, and a lot of governments are going into COP 28 with that as a key part of their negotiating mandate.

What the Emissions Gap Report and the UNEP’s Production Gap Report do is add to the evidence base that emphasizes how urgent it is to phase out fossil fuels and actually have quite a rapid phase-out pathway.

What would be a good result from COP this year?

Greg Muttitt: At this point, we need a concrete negotiated decision in which all governments commit to a phase-out of all fossil fuels. We would like to see individual governments talking about what the timeline for that is, but the key piece is phase-out of oil, gas, and coal—all three fossil fuels—in the negotiated decision text.

Has there been any meaningful progress so far and what can countries learn from those who have made any progress?

Greg Muttitt: If you express it in terms of emissions pledges, then the Emissions Gap Report finds there is a bit of progress, but it is way smaller than what it needs to be. At the time of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the projections for 2030 were a 16% [emissions] growth from 2015 levels. Now the projections are a 3% growth. So there is less growth than there was and that is because of upgraded NDCs, but actually there needs to be a very rapid decline—approaching 50%—whereas there is still projected growth, albeit small growth. So there's a bit of progress there.

Where I see more progress is in voluntary initiatives in which governments come together and make higher-ambition pledges. So a couple of great examples of that are the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) where governments commit to phasing out oil and gas production— and the group is growing fast since it was established in Glasgow 2 years ago. The other thing, also from Glasgow, was the Clean Energy Transition Partnership (CETP), which commits to stopping international public finance for fossil fuels and moving it into clean energy.

BOGA signed up its first significant global south producer this year, which was Colombia. Meanwhile the CETP has shifted billions of dollars out of fossil fuels and into clean energy. One thing we really need to see is more governments getting involved in BOGA and CETP and setting more ambitious targets that are more aligned with the science than we're currently seeing.

The UN’s Emissions Gap Report, Production Gap Report, and Adaptation Gap Report revolve around the concept of a "gap." What are the common threads in these reports, and what does the gap mean?

Greg Muttitt: The common thread between the reports is the gap in climate ambition.

Governments need to take climate change more seriously than they are doing. The three reports unpack that in different ways.

As well as the Emissions Gap Report saying they need to cut emissions more deeply than they are currently planning to in their NDC pledges, the Production Gap Report says they need to also plan a reduction in fossil fuel production rather than an increase as currently planned.

The Adaptation Gap Report says there is a gap in adaptation financing, and governments—particularly in the Global North—need to scale up the amount of finance they're providing to enable adaptation in the Global South.

These are three gaps which are all part of the picture on climate ambition, and collectively they say that governments need to get more serious about climate change.

The 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 28) presents a crucial opportunity to take stock of public financial flows to fossil fuels. Fourteen years after the G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation countries made initial commitments to tackle “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies, there is a major gap between governments’ rhetoric and action. In 2022, world governments provided a record USD 1.3 trillion in fossil fuel subsidies. This came despite the objective in Article 2.1(c) of the 2015 Paris Agreement of making “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (p. 3).

Removing fossil fuel subsidies makes sense not only for accelerating climate action but also for broader economic and environmental reasons. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finds that “removing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions, improve public revenue and macroeconomic performance, and yield other environmental and sustainable development benefits” (p. 46). On climate mitigation specifically, the IPCC notes that “fossil fuel subsidy removal is projected … to reduce global CO2 emissions by 1–4%, and [greenhouse gas] emissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across regions” (p. 46).

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is not the only international institution to address fossil fuel subsidies. International economic institutions, including the G20, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization are also engaging with this issue, and subsidies are a target of one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 12.c). Still, the UNFCCC plays an important part in strengthening global and national commitments, improving transparency, and providing space for dialogue and the sharing of experiences.

COP 28 in Dubai could be a turning point for action on fossil fuel subsidies—if there is political will. How have fossil fuel subsidies featured in UNFCCC negotiations so far? And how can action on fossil fuel subsidies be taken at COP 28 and beyond?

Fossil Fuel Subsidies and the UNFCCC: The story so far 

Fossil fuel subsidies have received only limited attention in 3 decades of climate change negotiations, notwithstanding the tangible climate and development benefits of addressing them, as well as several attempts by individual countries to put the issue on the negotiating agenda. This began to change 2 years ago, at the Glasgow Climate Conference (COP 26), when negotiators took an important—though long overdue—step by calling for the “phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition” (p. 5). The same call was repeated a year later at COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

While these calls are a clear sign that negotiators see addressing fossil fuel subsidies as important for climate action, the commitment is flawed in that it (i) lacks a clear deadline, (ii) uses an undefined qualifier (“inefficient”) that allows countries to argue that they have no fossil fuel subsidies, and (iii) does not provide for a follow-up process to track progress.

In addition to this global commitment, some countries have referred to fossil fuel subsidies in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement. This is important because including fossil fuel subsidy reform in NDCs may make it harder for political leaders to backslide and for future governments to reverse reforms, as domestic stakeholders can hold their governments to account.

However, a closer look at these references reveals several weaknesses. First, so far only 29 out of 198 parties have included some form of reference to fossil fuel subsidies in one of their NDCs. Second, as of the latest generation of new or updated NDCs, only 16 parties have included an actual commitment to reform their subsidies. Two parties (Armenia and Singapore) use their NDCs to argue that they have no subsidies whatsoever (notwithstanding data suggesting otherwise). Four parties (including India and Indonesia) mention that reforms have been carried out in the past. And another party (New Zealand) only includes a commitment to help other countries with reforming subsidies. Third, six countries (Burkina Faso, China, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia, Vietnam) that included a reference to some kind of fossil fuel subsidy reform in their initial NDC submitted at the time of the adoption of the Paris Agreement omitted this in their new or updated NDC submitted a few years later.

The 16 countries that committed to reform their fossil fuel subsidies include some of 2022’s big subsidizers, such as Egypt (USD 28 billion), Kazakhstan (USD 18 billion), Nigeria (USD 5 billion), and Turkmenistan (USD 4 billion). However, most countries that commit to reform are low-income and small economies that do not provide a large volume of fossil fuel subsidies. Strikingly, there are no G7 countries among them (even though the G7 committed to phasing out subsidies by 2025), nor do they include any G20 countries. Likewise, the European Union’s (EU’s) NDC is silent about fossil fuel subsidies, even though the bloc has pledged to phase out fossil fuel subsidies domestically.

How Parties Should Strengthen Global Commitments on Fossil Fuel Subsidies at COP 28 

At COP 28 and in its immediate aftermath, Parties have numerous opportunities to address the identified weaknesses. They can start doing so in Dubai by strengthening the commitment made in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheikh. This process would include

• setting a clear deadline—e.g., 2025 for developed countries, following the G7’s example, and 2030 for developing countries.
• removing or clarifying the term “inefficient,” which does not have an internationally agreed definition. A better approach would be to instead name exceptional cases when subsidies could be considered justifiable. For example, the EU is calling for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies “which do not address energy poverty or just transition.”
• mandating a follow-up process—e.g., requesting that the UNFCCC Secretariat develop a report on fossil fuel subsidies and climate change.
• expanding the commitment to address all public financial flows, including domestic and international public finance, and investment through state-owned enterprises. G20 countries provided at least USD 372 billion in such finance to fossil fuels in 2022.

One way of achieving this at COP 28 would be to adopt a so-called “cover decision” similar to the Glasgow Climate Pact. However, given that cover decisions are the product of negotiations on the official UNFCCC agenda, their adoption is not a given, and more far-reaching cover decisions are likely to encounter more resistance from Parties.

A global commitment to reform fossil fuel subsidies by a given date could also be part of the outcomes of the first global stocktake, which is due to wrap up at COP 28. In the global stocktake’s technical dialogues, various Parties and non-Party stakeholders have drawn attention to the potential of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies for climate change mitigation. As a consequence, a synthesis report by the UNFCCC Secretariat summarizing these submissions included concrete suggestions on how fossil fuel subsidy reform may feature in the outcome of the process. This means that if countries fail to adopt a cover decision, there is still a clear opportunity for Parties to include a commitment to address fossil fuel subsidies as part of a possible COP decision resulting from the global stocktake. Although the precise outcomes of the global stocktake are as yet undetermined at this stage, they could include a COP decision along with a technical annex, which could specify details.

How Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Should Feature in New National Commitments and Enhanced Transparency 

Following the global stocktake, Parties are expected to develop and submit new—and more ambitious—NDCs. These offer space for governments to include national commitments on reforming or removing fossil fuel subsidies, drawing on—and, where possible, improving—existing practices. These contributions could include, for example, time-bound reform commitments or pledges to phase out specific subsidies. The spotlight should be, in particular, on those countries that have committed to subsidy reform in other forums (notably the G7, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation countries), as well as countries that have advocated for reform (including countries that belong to the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform).

What’s more, it will be important that the references to fossil fuel subsidies are forward-looking, including actions to be taken by countries, rather than reflecting on past developments. Civil society will play an important role in providing support for countries to include fossil fuel subsidy reform in their NDCs, as well as accountability for countries that have already committed to doing so. International organizations, such as the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme, will play a similarly important part in assisting countries in including subsidy reform commitments in their NDCs.

To the extent that countries include fossil fuel subsidy reform commitments in their NDCs, there is also an opportunity to strengthen transparency through the UNFCCC. Parties are required to submit biennial reports on the progress made in implementing and achieving NDCs. These reports are reviewed by technical experts, as well as through a facilitative, political peer-review process. Importantly, however, Parties can choose the indicators they will report on. For the reporting and review process to be meaningful, it will be crucial that Parties with commitments choose fossil fuel subsidy-related indicators (e.g. indicators related to SDG 12.c) and report on those. Countries should also be encouraged to submit the data on the fossil fuel subsidies they have reported in the context of the SDGs.

How Fossil Fuel Subsidies Can Be Addressed Through Discussions on Climate Finance 

Another place where fossil fuel subsidies can be—and have been—discussed is under talks on climate finance, particularly those related to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement. At COP 27, Parties established the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2.1(c), which held two workshops in 2023. Fossil fuel subsidies have not been specifically discussed in this dialogue, although the EU has suggested doing so in future.

Also related to Article 2.1(c) is the work by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), which has included information from third-party sources (e.g., the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker) on fossil fuel subsidies as part of its Fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows. In addition, the SCF has been collecting views on how to achieve Article 2.1(c). In response, various Parties and non-Party stakeholders have called for action on fossil fuel subsidies, including both a general phase-out commitment and follow-up action (e.g., an annual progress report). However, some Parties have also expressed reservations about considering fossil fuel subsidies in the context of Article 2.1(c). COP 28 is expected to include discussions on Article 2.1(c), and these could potentially result in a decision on a further dialogue or work program in which fossil fuel subsidies could feature as a topic.

Moreover, discussions on the UNFCCC’s “new collective quantified goal on climate finance” (NCQG)—which requires developed countries to provide developing countries with climate finance to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement—have included fossil fuel subsidies. One of the purposes of these talks is to negotiate a new goal that would follow the USD 100 billion annual climate finance goal from 2025 onwards. In addition to the new “quantity” (i.e., how much climate finance ought to be provided), Parties have begun to discuss the “quality” of climate finance. For instance, the Association of Latin America and the Caribbean has suggested a concept of “net climate finance,” where the value of climate finance would be reduced by finance provided to high-emissions activities, including fossil fuel subsidies. Some Parties have also suggested that fossil fuel subsidy reform may be used as an innovative source of financing, which could help achieve the NCQG. Discussions on the NCQG are expected to wrap up at COP 29 in 2024, and it remains to be seen how fossil fuel subsidies will feature in the final goal.

How Countries Can Create a Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in the Mitigation and Just Transition Work Programs 

Fossil fuel subsidies may feature in two recently established work programs. First, COP 27 established a work program on just transition pathways, which may address fossil fuel subsidies as part of its work. However, at this stage, Parties still have to agree on the objectives, scope, and modalities of the work program. Similarly, Parties in Sharm el-Sheikh launched a new Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work program to scale up mitigation action in the short term. In the first “global dialogue” of this work program, participants highlighted fossil fuel subsidy reform as a mitigation action. Although the outcomes of these work programs remain to be determined, they provide an opportunity for countries to share experiences on fossil fuel subsidy reform.

The Time for Action on Fossil Fuel Subsidies is Now 

Parties have plenty of options to make progress on fossil fuel subsidy reform at and after COP 28. What we need now is the political will. Fossil fuel subsidy reform is essential to an effective global response to the climate crisis. Countries must take the opportunity to make progress on this agenda at COP 28 and beyond.

Harro van Asselt is Hatton Professor of Climate Law, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge and Jakob Skovgaard is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden.

In 2021, Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched the Glasgow-Sharm-el Sheikh (GlaSS) work program on the global goal on adaptation (GGA). Over the past 2 years, the GlaSS work program has provided space for Parties and non-party stakeholders to exchange views and increase their understanding of the GGA. As the final rounds of negotiations on the GGA kick off at the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 28), a looming question remains: Will it be comprehensive enough for countries to implement in the years ahead?

As important discussions about the type and number of targets continue, countries have started seeing convergence on other elements of the GGA framework. Keeping in mind the bigger picture of adaptation, the GGA framework must be clear and comprehensive to provide countries and other stakeholders with the direction to meaningfully capture and generate lessons about adaptation progress through their national monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) systems. In particular, Parties and observers must consider four key elements required in the final decision text for the GGA framework to truly drive adaptation action and support. Otherwise, the GGA will fail to drive the much-needed increase in evidence on adaptation progress, potentially leading us to maladaptation and increased losses and damages.

Taking a Step Back: How did the GGA begin?

In 2015, the Paris Agreement established the GGA with the aim of “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change” (Article 7.1). Many expected the adaptation mandates under the Paris Agreement to pave the way with clear next steps that detail the content and operationalization of a framework to assess the GGA. However, progress was slow until Parties launched the GlaSS work program in 2021. This program focuses primarily on discussing approaches and methodologies for evaluating progress toward adopting the GGA at COP 28.

An ongoing challenge is that, unlike mitigation, no global metrics can meaningfully capture what “successful adaptation” entails across all contexts and ecosystems. As such, defining a framework for assessing the GGA has taken longer than expected.

Over the past 2 years, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), with the support of the UNFCCC Secretariat, have organized a series of eight workshops to bring Parties and other stakeholders together to discuss the scope and content of the GGA. Despite a bumpy road in the first year of experimenting with different modalities for improving inclusion, the GlaSS work program remarkably achieved several, if not most, of its eight original objectives. The progress made on the visibility and understanding of the GGA is clear.

State of Play: GGA discussions ahead of COP 28

Ahead of COP 28, Parties are converging on several elements. Over the past year, the definition of a framework for the GGA advanced notably with COP 27’s Decision 3/CMA.4. Later in 2023, despite difficult discussions at the Bonn talks in June, the draft conclusions from the 58th meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB58) built on COP 27’s decision to propose possible structural elements for the outline of a draft decision to be adopted at COP 28.

Figure 1 shows the proposed elements that could be part of the COP 28 decision, based on SB58’s draft decision and ongoing party submissions over 2023, along with a traffic-light assessment of the level of convergence for each target.

Figure 1. Possible structural elements of a COP 28 decision text and traffic-light assessment of convergence

Structural elements	Level of convergence
Purpose
Principles
Inclusion of overarching layer (target or political message)
Target under the overarching layer
Inclusion of dimensions of the iteration adaptation cycle
Targets under the dimensions
Indicators under the dimensions
Inclusion of themes
Consolidation of themes
Targets and indicators under themes
Inclusion of general and cross-cutting considerations (CCCs)
Consolidation of CCCs
Targets and indicators under the CCCs
Inclusion of enabling conditions
Inclusion of means of implementation (MoI)
Targets and indicators related to MoI
Follow-up work
Development of indicators under dimensions
Development of further targets (themes, CCC)
Additional mandates to the Secretariat, Constituted Bodies, etc.
New agenda item under SBSTA and SBI on the GGA
Finance and budgetary provisions
Reporting and sources of information
Links to the global stocktake
International cooperation and the role of stakeholders

Source: Adapted from Bueno et al., 2023. 

Note: A green tick icon indicates convergence; a yellow exclamation mark icon indicates different approaches, yet convergence is possible; a red cross icon indicates prominent divergence remaining. For further information and explanations of the traffic light assessment, please refer to the recent reports from ARG1.5o prior to and after the 8th GlaSS workshop.

Four Elements for a Successful GGA Framework at COP 28: Impact, effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy

While the global stocktake (GST) and the GGA are concerned with assessing global, collective progress on adaptation, the realities of this progress are highly contextual and localized within countries. Here, national and subnational MEL systems play a crucial role in generating the much-needed empirical, secondary, and synthesized evidence to populate the GGA framework and inform the GST assessment. National MEL systems are a critical part of national adaptation planning, providing a source of multiple communication and reporting instruments for the UNFCCC and capturing data, experiences, and lessons about progress on adaptation across their constituencies. In short, the GGA decision must contain elements about types of information and the processes for generating this information; this will guide countries in operationalizing and integrating this framework into their existing MEL systems.

Discussions on the GGA have greatly advanced since 2021. However, some difficult conversations have been left to the last minute or haven’t happened at all. To reduce the risk of the GGA framework falling short of informing policies and enhancing finance flows, the following four elements must be included in the decision text:

1. Impact: A comprehensive overarching statement that complements focused dimension targets. Targets can play a pivotal role in capturing the attention of decision-makers and signalling where countries should invest in contextualizing an adopted GGA framework through their national MEL systems. There is no need for a wide array of achievable targets, which risk diluting attention and information across too many dimensions. A handful of focused targets can go a long way to hook global and national politicians and justify loosening their purse strings.

Here, let’s remember that ambition does not equate quantification. For example, defining quantitative outcome-level targets, such as the percentage of increasing resilience globally, would require detailed global methodologies that would not capture all contexts, along with burdensome baselines. Rather, the GGA could look at the example of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’s monitoring and evaluation to set qualitative high-level goals that can be assessed from national and other sources rather than by rigid or aggregated methods. As such, the overarching statement should spell out a qualitative, comprehensive, and time-bound vision that can frame the GST assessment of progress towards the GGA.

2. Effectiveness: Inclusion of MoI across the decision text. The inclusion of MoI in the GGA decision text is a contentious issue. This is not uncommon in adaptation and loss and damage discussions; mentions of tracking and committing to support are rarely popular among developed countries. However, as the Adaptation Gap Report 2023 points out, adaptation is underfunded, and countries remain unprepared. With 133 of the 155 developing countries currently engaged in their national adaptation planning processes, the need to move from planning to implementation with appropriate funding strategies has never been more urgent. The reality is that without appropriate funding, accelerating adaptation actions and achieving the GGA will not be possible.

Circumventing or ignoring the importance of MoI in achieving the GGA would dilute the GGA framework’s purpose and limit its effectiveness. As one of the three pillars of the Paris Agreement, MoI has been recognized as separate from other enabling factors, such as leadership or institutional arrangements. Despite pushback by some countries, MoI’s importance should be reflected, ideally with clear mentions in more than one element of the GGA decision text.

3. Equity: Attention to gender and human rights considerations throughout the text. Achieving the GGA and building resilience to climate risks requires addressing the systemic issues that exacerbate vulnerability, including gender inequality and the denial of rights. It is crucial that the GGA framework provides clear mentions of gender and human rights to signal to countries the importance of operationalizing the GGA and its framework with these factors in mind.

Integrating gender considerations in the GGA framework will help ensure that countries monitor, assess, report, and ultimately generate lessons about the gendered impacts of the climate crisis and equity in adaptation efforts. More specifically, this means having clear mentions in the framework and the decision text that ensure that both data collection (to generate gendered evidence) and analyses (to understand gendered impacts) at national and global scales account for gender and different social groups. Gendered data and lessons, in turn, lead to improved design in adaptation actions and support, including gender budgeting.

4. Legitimacy: Clarified roles and responsibilities for further work. While it is critical to embed the three elements above in the GGA decision text, there is a high probability that further work will be needed. For example, this includes on the development of a handful of indicators under each adaptation dimension and potential additional mandates to the secretariat and/or constituted bodies. How further work is undertaken will also play an important role in the legitimacy and sustainability of the GGA framework and whether it will be fully endorsed and implemented by Parties.

Over the course of the history of the GGA discussions, it has been impossible to disentangle technical issues from political ones. These go hand in hand, as the choice of methodological approaches has implications on the level of burden on countries’ capacities and, of course, the funding needed to implement them. As such, the process for further work—for example, through a temporary ad hoc working group—must be both technical and political to be productive. This means having strong representation from the scientific and technical communities, as well as from countries and underrepresented groups.

It has been a long road since the start of the GlaSS work program in 2021. The advances are significant, but too often, UNFCCC decisions remain in the realm of global agreements without uptake from countries and local actors. The GGA framework must clearly signpost these four key elements for countries to follow up in order to operationalize it. This will help to break the GlaSS ceiling by removing barriers to achieving the GGA.

Extreme events exacerbated by climate change have become more frequent and intense around the world; yet, according to the technical dialogues of the global stocktake, our current level of adaptation falls significantly short.

At the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28) in Dubai, the conclusion of the first-ever global stocktake will present the opportunity to emphasize the pressing need for strengthening resilience and accelerating global adaptation efforts.

After 2 years of intense discussions and negotiations, the inaugural stocktake will provide the final assessment of the current state of global climate action in reducing emissions, strengthening resilience, and mobilizing the necessary resources to tackle the climate crisis to determine whether countries are making progress in reaching the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It will tell the stories of both ambition and reality: the successes and gaps of our collective efforts, as well as how to recalibrate and confront challenges to set the course for the next 5 years of global climate action.

This is happening at a pivotal moment, as countries are preparing to update and enhance their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and other domestic climate policies, such as their national adaptation plans (NAPs) and strategies.

The political messages marking the end of the global stocktake will be critical. They will offer a crucial signal to countries to ramp up ambition on adaptation to achieve the Global Goal on Adaptation, which aims to protect communities and ecosystems in the face of escalating climate impact.

Countries Are Making Progress on Adaptation, But Not Fast Enough

In September 2023, the co-facilitators of the global stocktake’s technical dialogues released their synthesis report, capturing over 252 hours of meetings and discussions and approximately 170,000 pages of information submitted from countries and civil society organizations. Among the 17 key findings from the technical dialogues, nine focused on adaptation and loss and damage.

The technical dialogues concluded that (especially developing) countries are demonstrating increasing ambition in their adaptation plans and policies. More than 140 developing countries have a NAP process underway, enabling them to identify and address their medium- and long-term priorities for adapting to climate change. To date, 47 countries have already developed and communicated their NAP documents.

While countries are making modest strides in implementation, most observed adaptation efforts were characterized as “fragmented, incremental, sector-specific and unequally distributed across regions.” Against the backdrop of cascading climate risks and the rising losses and damages associated with climate change impacts, the report notes that adaptation is the responsibility of all levels of governance, and countries need to scale up their adaptation efforts.

The window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all is rapidly closing… When adaptation is informed and driven by local contexts, populations and priorities, both the adequacy and the effectiveness of adaptation action and support are enhanced, and this can also promote transformative adaptation.

Farhan Akhtar and Harald Winkler, co-facilitators of the technical dialogues

Much more is needed to fulfill the Global Goal on Adaptation, including enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability. Governments must urgently move from planning to implementation. For developing countries, however, this is not an easy task. The synthesis report emphasizes the pressing need to significantly scale up financial resources, technology, and capacity building from rich countries through expanded and innovative sources, including the private sector.

The synthesis report also points to good practices and lessons learned to support countries in the aftermath of this first global stocktake. First, it highlights that climate risks must be integrated into all aspects of development planning and mainstreamed in government decision-making. This more holistic approach will build resilience across sectors and promote coherence and synergistic actions.

Second, the synthesis report underscores the importance of inclusive and participatory adaptation planning processes that are informed by local contexts, populations, and realities. Adaptation is the responsibility of stakeholders at all levels and should be planned and implemented, taking into account the knowledge, priorities, and needs of local communities. Furthermore, access to early warning systems and downscaled climate services and data are crucial for sub-national governments to assess, plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate adaptation actions.

Finally, the report emphasizes the importance of systematically measuring progress in effective adaptation. This accentuates the crucial role of monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems for adaptation and the need for downscaled, accessible climate information and climate services at the sub-national levels.

What Do We Need From the Global Stocktake’s Conclusion on Adaptation?

In Dubai, countries will negotiate and adopt a final decision on the global stocktake, offering a way forward. It is an opportunity for countries to signal to the world their collective will to address one of the most pressing challenges of our time and ramp up ambition, action, and support for adaptation.

The global stocktake’s final decision needs to send a message on the urgency of adaptation, balancing its focus on emissions reductions and adapting to climate change impacts, and include elements that will inform the update and enhancement of NDCs and NAPs. It should follow the recommendations from the synthesis report and the technical dialogues and shine a spotlight on the importance of adaptation mainstreaming across planning and decision-making processes; a whole-of-society approach to building resilience; iterative and well-designed monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems for adaptation; and locally led adaptation. It should also highlight the need for the sufficient provision of grant-based, predictable, accessible adaptation finance and the centrality of the NAP process for developing countries to address climate risks, reduce vulnerabilities, and increase resilience.

Effective adaptation requires community-led approaches that give the most vulnerable people a voice. People have a right to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. We also need to change the narrative—women are not just vulnerable; they are powerful actors in driving adaptation action.

Angie Dazé, Director, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion for Resilience

Equally important is the consideration of gender equality and human rights. Addressing gender equality and employing a rights-based approach could lead to more effective processes and sustainable outcomes, ensuring an inclusive and participatory planning process and the equitable distribution of adaptation benefits for people of all genders and social groups.

COP 28 is happening at a critical moment in global climate governance. Our climate is changing. Disasters exacerbated by climate change are occurring at an alarming scale and frequency. Communities and ecosystems need to adapt to this new reality.

The assessments of the first global stocktake is a clarion call underscoring the imperative to bolster resilience, reduce vulnerability, and protect people and nature. As the world watches closely, negotiators and ministers need to understand that their final decision is not just another procedural conclusion for this 2-year process. It needs to send a signal of hope—a collective commitment from countries to increase ambitions, actions, and support on both mitigation and adaptation—for this and the generations to come.

As COP 28 approaches, all eyes are on the energy sector. Amid a striking 91% of global carbon dioxide emissions originating from fossil fuels in 2022, the world is watching for an ambitious energy transition package at this year’s UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai.  

Many regard this year’s edition as the most important COP since COP 21, where governments adopted the Paris Agreement. The global stocktake, the Paris Agreement mandated inventory of global progress on climate action, is set to conclude in Dubai, with world leaders expected to present a political response. The global stocktake has already revealed that countries are not on track to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Rather, the world needs to move much faster to reduce emissions. 

In this context, COP 28 is a moment of reckoning for the energy sector. It presents a significant opportunity for governments to construct a credible and ambitious deal to dramatically step up climate action to speed up the energy transition. 

In the last year, discussions about phasing out fossil fuels and scaling up renewable energy have gained traction. The Dubai conference is a chance to build on this momentum. For an ambitious and robust energy package at COP 28, governments need to step up on five key areas. 

1. Agree to phase out fossil fuels 

It’s clearer than ever that the world needs to get off fossil fuels—and fast. This year’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report Synthesis highlighted the need for a rapid global phase-out of unabated fossil fuels and a near-term peak in their consumption if the 1.5°C guardrail is to remain within reach. Last month, the International Energy Agency reaffirmed that there is no room for new oil and gas fields in a 1.5°C-aligned pathway, a conclusion supported by many other scenarios.  

But fossil fuel phase-out at the pace and scale required is, in fact, not “inevitable,” as the COP 28 president suggested in June. The UNEP’s recent The Production Gap report showed that while coal, oil, and gas supply and demand must decline “rapidly and substantially” between now and 2050, governments are still planning to produce around 110% more fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. 

COP 28 presents an opportunity for governments to correct course and send strong signals to corporations and financial institutions to stop investing in fossil fuel expansion.  

In Glasgow in 2021, COP 26 called on countries to “phase down” unabated coal power and phase out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies. Building on this landmark statement, at COP 27 in 2022, around 80 developed and developing countries supported India’s call to phase out all fossil fuels, not just coal.  

The momentum behind the call to phase out all fossil fuels has only grown since COP27. In May, the G7 committed to “accelerat[ing] the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels.” The High Ambition Coalition has repeatedly called for fossil fuel phase-out. The global stocktake technical synthesis report, which summarizes the science showing what’s needed to get on track with Paris Agreement goals, was very clear that phasing out all unabated fossil fuels is necessary to achieve net-zero. The European Union (EU) has made fossil fuel phase-out a key pillar of its COP 28 strategy. More than 100 companies have also backed the push for fossil fuel phase-out. 

However, several players are taking a stand against this position. The G20 was unable to agree on fossil fuel phase-out due to push-back from Saudi Arabia and several other countries. Meanwhile, China’s climate envoy has said that fossil fuel phase-out is “unrealistic.” 

A key debate will revolve around the inclusion of the word “unabated.” Agreement on phasing out “unabated fossil fuels” would leave room for new fossil fuel plants equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, there is a lack of evidence on the efficacy of CCS—the IPCC found it has limited emissions reduction potential—and IISD analysis shows that CCS is not a promising solution for the oil and gas sector. Besides, there are already feasible, effective, and cost-efficient alternatives to produce power. Fifteen members of the High Ambition Coalition, including France, Kenya, the Marshall Islands, and the Netherlands, have indicated they will oppose the inclusion of the word “unabated” in any COP 28 decision. 

A credible and robust decision on fossil fuel phase-out at COP 28 would include all fossil fuels, not just “unabated,” and be worded as “phase out,” not “phase down.” 

2. Agree to triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency 

Alongside fossil fuel phase-out, a 1.5°C-aligned energy transition also requires a rapid scaling up of renewable energy capacity and energy efficiency. The International Energy Agency has indicated that the world must triple its renewable energy capacity and double the rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030.  

The momentum behind this call has snowballed in 2023. Led by the United States, the EU, and the UAE, more than 60 countries now back a commitment to triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency at COP 28. This pledge would be structured as a political declaration, although these countries would also push for language in a formal COP decision.  

COP 28 is a critical moment to tip the policy and investment landscape further in favour of renewables and efficiency—especially in developing countries, an essential part of the COP 28 energy package. In implementing any such agreement, governments must be cautious that the significant increase in supply of the transition minerals required for renewable energy is properly managed, including policies to safeguard against social and environmental risks of mining and ensure local communities benefit. 

3. Implement commitments to end finance to fossil fuels and scale up financing for clean energy 

Rapidly scaling up renewables and energy efficiency will require serious investment. The International Renewable Energy Agency estimates that global clean energy investment needs to quadruple to around USD 5 trillion a year on average between 2023 and 2030. Financing is particularly needed in emerging and developing economies other than China, with Africa currently only attracting 3% of global clean energy investment.  

It’s not until COP 29 that countries are due to agree on a “new collective quantified goal” to replace the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 goal for climate finance from developed countries to developing countries. That said, COP 28 is a key milestone to check the progress of negotiations on the new goal.  

A large chunk of the required clean energy investment could be freed up by shifting public money away from fossil fuels. At COP 26, countries agreed to pursue the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and they repeated this commitment at COP 27. However, in 2022, fossil fuel subsidies from G20 countries skyrocketed to a record USD 1 trillion. 

COP 28 could make progress on ending fossil fuel subsidies: decision text should drop the qualifier “inefficient” and instead name exceptional cases when subsidies could be considered justifiable. In this vein, the EU is calling for a phase-out of subsidies “which do not address energy poverty or just transition.” Countries should also set a deadline for ending subsidies. A 2025 deadline, like the G7 set in 2016, would be appropriate for developed countries. Finally, commitments should go beyond just subsidies to address all financial flows, including public finance and investments through state-owned enterprises. 

4. First-mover coalitions should demonstrate progress 

Away from the formal negotiations, three key country groupings have the opportunity to demonstrate progress at COP 28: the Powering Past Coal Alliance, Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, and Clean Energy Transition Partnership (CETP). All three groups have committed to advancing the transition away from fossil fuels or, in the case of the CETP, shifting public finance from fossil fuels to clean energy. 

It’s important for all three alliances to show momentum at COP 28, such as by announcing new members. 

5. Any new commitments from energy companies should be credible and robust 

Sultan Al-Jaber, the COP 28 President, has mentioned plans to launch a new oil and gas sector alliance at the conference, to be called the Global Decarbonization Alliance. The alliance will reportedly set a goal of reaching net-zero scope 1 and scope 2 emissions by 2050—excluding scope 3 emissions, which result from burning fossil fuels and account for 80%–95% of oil and gas sector pollution. The group is also expected to commit to progressive targets for reducing methane emissions from upstream production.  

The UN High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, tasked with developing stronger and clearer standards for net-zero emissions pledges, has made it clear that credible oil and gas sector pledges must commit to ending exploration for new oil and gas fields, the expansion of oil and gas reserves, and oil and gas production. Companies must also commit to publishing trackable plans showing how they will cut their emissions (from all scopes) by 2025 and reach net-zero by 2050. 

With ambitious options for a COP 28 energy package on the table, it’s critical that inadequate initiatives are not allowed to hamper momentum. 

The stakes are too high for half measures—COP 28 must deliver the full package 

Scaling up renewable energy and phasing out fossil fuels are two sides of the same coin—COP 28 must deliver on both. A deal to triple renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency, without a corresponding agreement on fossil fuel phase-out, would not fulfil COP 28’s full potential. Shifting public financial flows away from fossil fuels is essential to turn words into action. And first-mover coalitions and other groups have an important role to play in raising momentum—not undermining it. 

The time to act is now. The global stocktake has laid bare the course correction governments must make to safeguard our future. Countries must use COP 28 to match global ambition to the urgency of the task at hand.