The G7 Ministers’ Meeting on Climate, Energy, and Environment is fast approaching, with ministers due to gather in Sapporo, Japan, at the end of this week, ahead of a leaders-level gathering next month in Hiroshima. At these meetings and throughout the rest of the year, G7 ministers and leaders have a key opportunity to make concrete progress on fossil fuel phase-out, which could in turn encourage other economies to follow suit.

The need for fossil fuel phase-out has never been clearer. Last month’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Synthesis Report highlighted the need for a rapid, global phase-out of unabated fossil fuels and a near-term peak in their consumption if the 1.5°C temperature guardrail under the Paris Agreement is to remain in reach. The G7 meetings, coming so soon after this authoritative statement from the scientific community, need to make political progress on this issue. Meanwhile, the ongoing Russian war in Ukraine continues to underscore how fossil fuel dependence leaves countries vulnerable to geopolitical risk and market volatility.

Bringing together several of the world’s advanced economies—namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union—the G7 meetings are a chance to set the tone for the rest of the political year. Preparations are already well underway for this year’s G20 leaders’ summit under India’s presidency, taking place in early September. UN Secretary-General António Guterres will hold a Climate Ambition Summit that same month. And all eyes will be on COP 28 in Dubai as the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement reaches a political conclusion—and pressure will intensify on world leaders to make a strong statement about fossil fuel phase-out. By securing a robust agreement in the coming weeks on fossil fuel phase-out, the G7 could set the bar high for other political processes to follow. 

There are four ways the G7 can step up and demonstrate leadership in this crucial year.

Set a Date for Coal Phase-Out

In 2022, G7 leaders took a real step forward by committing to decarbonizing their electricity systems by 2035. Although the G7 leaders did not specify how this goal was to be achieved, the ministers’ communique contained more detail. Ministers stated that the G7 would prioritize “concrete and timely steps towards the goal of an eventual phase-out of domestic unabated coal power generation.” Coal phase-out is key, in other words.

What remains missing is a phase-out date. The Powering Past Coal declaration, which the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Canada have already signed, reaffirms the need to phase out coal by 2030 among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 38 member economies, as well as the European Union, and by 2040 in the rest of the world. The International Energy Agency’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE), the agency’s core 1.5°C pathway, backs this up, envisaging that by 2030 advanced economies would end all power generation by unabated coal-fired power plants. With this in mind, the G7 should commit this year to phasing out coal by 2030 at the latest. As it stands, the European Union, the United States, and Japan reportedly still oppose such a pledge.

Make Real Progress on Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies

The G7 has pledged to phase out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies every year since 2009. In 2016, they specified a timeline, committing to phase out subsidies by 2025. What has been missing so far is implementation. Indeed, globally, subsidies today are not lower than they were in 2009, but have rather reached an all-time high of more than USD 1 trillion in 2022, in the face of high energy prices.

In 2022, G7 ministers took a small step forward, committing to make a progress report in 2023 and further stating that they would consider options for developing joint public inventories of fossil fuel subsidies.

In 2023 the G7 needs to show leadership on urgently implementing their commitment to phase out subsidies. At a minimum, they should deliver the promised progress reports and inventories, which should demonstrate the delivery of their pledge. The G7 should submit their inventories annually through the formal reporting process for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 12.c.1 (fossil fuel subsidies)—a process that hardly any countries have completed so far. Consistent and comprehensive compliance from the G7 can encourage improved data transparency from all parties to the SDGs.

Moreover, the G7 should drop the qualifier “inefficient,” which only creates uncertainty about which subsidies need reform. Rather, exceptional cases should be specifically named, and alternative reform pathways identified—for example, in the case of subsidies that are essential for energy access, targeting subsidies in the short term while developing clean alternative technologies. They should also support global commitments to fossil fuel subsidy reform, particularly in least developed countries, by committing to align relevant official development assistance flows with the need for technical and financial assistance in this area.

Implement the End of International Public Finance for Fossil Fuels

In recent years, the G7 has made progressive steps forward on ending international public finance for fossil fuels. In 2022, following a commitment to end direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in 2021, G7 leaders extended this to the entire international unabated fossil fuel energy sector, except in “limited circumstances clearly defined by each country consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement.”

The first thing G7 ministers and leaders should do is reiterate this commitment. But, more importantly, they should ensure that this commitment is fulfilled. Doing so could potentially shift USD 24.3 billion per year from fossil fuels to clean energy, and influence even bigger volumes of private finance. While the United Kingdom, France, and Canada have implemented policies ending international public finance for fossil fuels, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Japan have yet to publish such policies. Fulfilling this commitment this year is key to ensuring the G7’s credibility.

Moreover, the G7 can ensure that their policies on multilateral development banks (MDBs) match the ambition of their commitment. The 2022 G7 ministers’ communique stated that the commitment to end new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector would also “guide [their] approach” on the boards of MDBs. Yet only the United States has published official guidance for voting at MDBs. Other G7 countries should step up.

End New Oil and Gas Development

Finally, ministers and leaders should not open the door to international public finance for gas. Last year’s leaders’ statement left room for public investment in the gas sector as a temporary response, in the “exceptional circumstances” of the Russian war in Ukraine. Despite assurances on avoiding “lock-in effects,” this move was worrying. Far from being an appropriate response to the energy crisis, new investment in gas cannot contribute to resolving the crisis in the short term, while in the long term perpetuating price volatility, exacerbating the climate crisis, and risking stranded assets.

This year, Japan has proposed that G7 ministers recognize the need for upstream investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) and natural gas. The G7 should oppose this language and confirm G7 economies’ domestic efforts to reduce gas demand as a key step toward more energy security.

Going beyond this, the G7 should make a positive statement about the need to end new oil and gas production. The International Energy Agency’s NZE found that, in a 1.5°C world, there is no room for new oil and gas fields. IISD research confirms that all major 1.5°C scenarios agree: there can be no more new oil and gas production if the world is to limit global warming to 1.5°C, and indeed production must decrease by at least 65% by 2050. The G7 must follow the science and affirm the need to stop new production.

In conclusion, the G7 has a key opportunity to step up on fossil fuel phase-out this year. At this time of ever-escalating climate impacts, ever-clearer science, and an ongoing energy crisis, the G7 must take this opportunity. Now is the time for action.

On March 28, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a historic resolution asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—the UN's principal judicial organ—to provide an advisory opinion clarifying what governments' obligations are under international law when it comes to tackling climate change.

The resolution—sponsored by the small island state of Vanuatu—was adopted by consensus and has drawn praise by media outlets, international law and environment experts, and environmental advocates for its potential to provide much-needed legal clarity in this field.

"Climate justice is both a moral imperative and a prerequisite for effective global climate action," said UN Secretary-General António Guterres, praising UN member states for adopting the resolution. "The climate crisis can only be overcome through cooperation—between peoples, cultures, nations, generations. But festering climate injustice feeds divisions and threatens to paralyze global climate action."

The UNGA resolution notes the disparity thus far between the measures governments have outlined in their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement and the actual cuts to greenhouse gas emissions required to stay within that agreement's temperature limits. It also refers to the need for greater efforts on climate change adaptation. 

Under the resolution's terms, the ICJ has been asked to consider not only what states are legally required to do, under international law, to avert further climate change both now and in the future, but also to assess the "legal consequences under these obligations" when governments, both through what they do and fail to do, "have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment."

This latter request asks specifically that the court consider what this harm has meant for both current and future generations, as well as for those countries who, by virtue of their "geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change."

The UNGA resolution comes at a pivotal moment for the international climate community, as governments, civil society, academia, and private actors all prepare for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's 28th Conference of the Parties (COP 28) this November. This climate COP will seek the culmination of the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, showing how close the world is to achieving that Agreement's objectives and how much work remains. 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which recently wrapped up its Sixth Assessment Cycle, has already confirmed that the world is far too close to the 1.5°C limit under the Paris Agreement—while indicating that there are proven options available for averting the worst impacts of climate change, so long as governments and other stakeholders act now.

While ICJ advisory opinions are not directly binding on states, they provide an authoritative interpretation of international law, which is binding upon states via custom and treaties. While an exact timeline for the advisory opinion is not yet known, experts indicate that they expect an outcome within a year.

International Law and Sustainable Development

The request for an ICJ advisory opinion follows a series of developments in recent years to advance the achievement of sustainable development objectives and to enable governments to take more ambitious steps on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and finance.

At the normative level, recent examples include the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by UN member states in 2015, and the more recent UN General Assembly resolution adopted by member states last year on the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. Although these instruments are not legally binding, they evidence global consensus on the necessity of climate action and importance of sustainable development.

This conversation on states’ environmental obligations under international law has also made its way to other courts and tribunals. For instance, last year, the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law made a request for an advisory opinion from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea regarding states' obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment. There are also various climate change cases before the European Court of Human Rights seeking clarity on human rights obligations in the context of climate change.

The ICJ opinion is likely to have a significant impact in boosting countries' efforts to implement sustainable development policies. For instance, the ICJ opinion could provide greater detail, texture, and clarity to the benchmarks used for judging states' sustainable development policies, such as the implementation of the Paris Agreement's goals. The Court's opinion could also inspire greater ambition—and action—under international processes that aim to tackle different facets of the climate challenge.

While the outcome of the ICJ process remains to be seen, a crucial step that governments must already be ready for is making sure they can take the advisory opinion and put it into practice in their national policies and regulatory frameworks. This means understanding how governments' international climate change obligations implicate different sectors, such as energy, investment, mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and fisheries, to name a few examples. It also means analyzing what it means for governments' subsidy policies and other fiscal measures, as well as reconsidering how international agreements on issues such as trade and investment align with these climate change obligations.

IISD welcomes the UNGA resolution and will monitor the ICJ proceedings closely, with the hopes that the opinion will help in mobilizing efforts to promote sustainable development globally. Since its inception, IISD has worked with developing countries and international organizations to implement international climate change law through various regulatory frameworks, policy advice and nature-based solutions, and provided capacity-building services that have helped developing countries to adopt appropriate climate adaptation and mitigation measures.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Synthesis Report of its sixth assessment cycle confirms that the world is already dangerously close to the 1.5°C temperature limit under the Paris Agreement—but also affirms that there are proven options available to avert the most catastrophic warming and improve adaptation planning and action, IISD experts say.

The science shows that preventing the global average temperature increase from exceeding the Paris Agreement target of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century is still possible—but only if governments take immediate, ambitious action. 

IISD analysis of IPCC 1.5°C scenarios shows that no new oil and gas development is possible if the world is to stay with the Paris Agreement temperature limits. Any new oil and gas fields will push the world beyond 1.5°C or generate stranded assets unless relying on levels of carbon dioxide removal that exceed IPCC feasibility thresholds. Governments should stop awarding licences and permits to explore for or develop new oil and gas fields or coal mines, or other long-term infrastructure to produce, transport, or consume fossil fuels. They should set an end date with clear interim targets for fossil fuel production and consumption in their countries based on science and equity.

“The IPCC Synthesis Report gives clear evidence of governments’ failure to address the root cause of climate change. To change course, progress on renewable energy scale-up must be accompanied by a global decline in fossil fuel production and consumption,” said Olivier Bois von Kursk, Policy Analyst for IISD’s Energy program.

The science also makes clear that carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the fossil fuel sector cannot adequately compensate for delaying oil and gas production decline, and these technologies do not bear out their promise in practice. The IPCC has shown that CCS is one of the most expensive and least effective measures to cut emissions—while wind and solar energies have the biggest mitigation potential at the lowest cost. After more than 50 years of investment, only 30 large-scale CCS projects are operating worldwide, capturing only 0.1% of emissions.

“The IPCC warns that relying too much on carbon capture technology represents a major risk to climate safety. The growing consensus is that CCS for oil and gas won’t be enough and costs too much. IPCC research supports that view,” said Angela Carter, Specialist, Energy Transitions at IISD.

To align global energy supply with the 1.5°C limit, the focus must instead be on boosting wind and solar energy capacities while supporting vulnerable communities. The IPCC Synthesis Report shows that we have the global financial capital needed to close the investment gaps on both climate change mitigation and adaptation, but this capital must be redirected. 

Governments can immediately kick-start change by shifting public financial flows which they directly control—but despite numerous commitments to do so dating back as far as 2009, little progress has been made. An IISD submission to the Global Stocktake (GST) shows that fossil fuel subsidies were estimated at USD 543 billion in 2015, the year of the Paris Agreement, but instead of going down, they exceeded USD 1 trillion for the first time in 2022. IISD analysis also shows that planned investments for new oil and gas to 2030 could fully finance the scale-up of wind and solar energy needed to align with 1.5°C. 

Global temperature has already increased by 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels and is expected to exceed 1.5°C during this century, pushing the world past critical thresholds. Climate change risks and impacts will intensify as our planet gets warmer. Alongside the urgent need to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, the IPCC calls on countries to accelerate their efforts to adapt to climate change.

While there has been important progress in adaptation around the world, it is not keeping pace with climate impacts. In fact, the gap between what is happening on the ground and what is needed is only growing—an alarming trend, given that more than 3 billion people are already living in areas highly vulnerable to climate change. The IPCC has concluded that most adaptation responses to date have been fragmented, incremental, and unequally distributed across regions. They have also flagged important barriers to adaptation action, such as:

• Limited resources 
• Lack of private sector and citizen engagement 
• Insufficient mobilization of finance (including for research) 
• Low climate literacy 
• Lack of political commitment 
• Limited research and/or slow and low uptake of adaptation science 
• Low sense of urgency 

Overcoming these barriers and coordinating the range and scale of efforts needed to secure a livable future requires planning and resources. While more and more jurisdictions are developing adaptation plans, they need to be implementable—meaning that they must articulate clear priorities, targets, responsibilities, and associated costs and sources of funding. As the IPCC clearly states, finance for adaptation is insufficient and must increase greatly. 

"The IPCC highlights major gaps in adaptation. It also points to ongoing progress and the benefits of inclusive, equitable, and long-term adaptation planning. Including adaptation in every area of government decision making is now crucial," said Anne Hammill, Associate Vice President, Resilience, at IISD. IISD is the host of the secretariat of the National Adaptation Plan Global Network.

By committing to a National Adaptation Plan process, countries can address these gaps, mobilize financial and other resources, and accelerate the implementation of equitable solutions with lasting impacts–especially for people living in poverty and experiencing discrimination. We must do what we can to close these adaptation gaps that leave our most vulnerable at risk. 

The first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement concludes this November at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 28th Conference of the Parties. With the IPCC’s Synthesis Report serving as a direct input into the GST, this new synthesis report is an invaluable reminder of the need to ratchet up efforts and ambition on mitigation, adaptation, and finance, both in the months leading up to COP 28 and the years to come.

The photo used for the banner image of this article is by IISD/ENB's Anastasia Rodopoulou.

As the first months of the new year give way to the full-fledged pace of international meetings, projects, and conferences, it is increasingly apparent that 2023 could prove to be a definitive year for facilitating an integrative perspective on water issues, from fresh water to the marine environment.

Issues related to water are featured throughout the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—reflected both in specific goals, such as SDG 6 on water and sanitation and SDG 14 on life below water, as well as in dedicated targets within other goals. The biodiversity that is an essential part of the water cycle, and that is fed by this cycle, brings many additional SDGs and targets into view. 

Work on these SDGs and targets happens in a range of forums—including intergovernmental organizations with mandates on environment or trade policy, environment ministries, and scientific research facilities—and in separate, distinct communities, operating under very different timetables.

This year is bringing high-level attention to several related targets, with a new high seas treaty concluded in early March, a once-in-a-generation UN freshwater conference this week, and active talks among UN and World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiators on new treaties and policies that will affect the marine environment. 

Set against a backdrop of the ever-intensifying impacts of climate change playing havoc with weather patterns and introducing new threats to our water supplies, it is looking like 2023 could and should be a critical year for water and the marine environment.

UN 2023 Water Conference: Eyeing a Water Action Agenda

Governments, civil society organizations, scientists, and a host of other actors working on water and water governance will come together from March 22 to 24 in New York for the UN 2023 Water Conference, an event that arrives nearly 50 years after the last such United Nations Water Conference, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 1977.

This year’s event comes at the midway point of the Water Action Decade, aimed at tackling challenges ranging from sanitation to water scarcity. It also comes at the mid-point of the 2030 Agenda and immediately prior to the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development’s focus on SDG 6 progress. The deliberations will also continue in September, when heads of state and government will participate in the SDG Summit. 

Participants at this month’s talks in New York have been encouraged to announce commitments that will be compiled in a Water Action Agenda that will seek to reinvigorate efforts at making the Water Action Decade a success. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called for the Agenda to be bold and ambitious, one that can "[give] our world's lifeblood the commitment it deserves." The discussion forums for this meeting will focus on cross-cutting issues, bringing a focus to interlinkages between water and health, sustainable development, and climate change.

"Across the globe, we seem to be experiencing fresh water’s endlessly evolving vicissitudes firsthand, from unprecedented flooding to old and new pollutants in lakes and rivers across the world. And thanks to the ever-intensifying impacts of climate change, it doesn't seem like our fraught relationship with that which sustains us will be improving any time soon. That’s why this conference matters," said Dimple Roy, Director, Water Management at IISD, writing in the South China Morning Post. 

Crucial within those conversations, she added, is natural infrastructure, which can help provide crucial services like flood mitigation or wastewater treatment. "When it comes to working with governments, we need to encourage all levels—at events just like the UN 2023 Water Conference—to appreciate the benefits of and thus adopt more natural infrastructure projects."

WTO Fisheries Subsidies Deal: Governments set sights on ratification, new wave of talks

Follow up on a key decision in June 2022 that affects the marine environment could also bring a focus to interlinkages on the global agenda. In that decision, the World Trade Organization’s 164 members struck a deal that had eluded them for over 20 years: a new treaty setting binding, enforceable disciplines on harmful fisheries subsidies. 

The agreement is only the second WTO-wide treaty since the organization first opened its doors in 1995, and it is the first WTO agreement that is focused specifically on achieving an environmental objective. The treaty includes disciplines on subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, disciplines on subsidies to the fishing of overfished stocks, and subsidies to fishing activities that occur on the high seas—in other words outside the national jurisdiction of any member—and do not fall within the mandate of any regional fisheries management bodies.

Delivering on this deal’s potential means ambitious implementation, and soon. For that to happen, a minimum of 109 WTO members need to submit formal acceptance of the deal, allowing the treaty to enter into force—though members can also start implementation at the domestic level beforehand. Since the start of 2023, Seychelles, Singapore, and Switzerland have submitted their acceptances, with 106 WTO members still to go at the time of this writing. 

This treaty is not the end of the line for the WTO fisheries talks. WTO members are now in a so-called "second wave" of negotiations, aiming to address topics that had proven too politically contentious for the deal reached last June—namely, those subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.

Negotiators are pushing to wrap up these talks in time for the WTO's Thirteenth Ministerial Conference in February 2024 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. If that deadline proves unfeasible, they have until 4 years from the current agreement’s entry into force to reach a deal or see the existing treaty lapse unless they decide otherwise.

"The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement was a necessary step in the right direction, but the work does not stop there. WTO members must now ensure that current disciplines are complemented by broader rules on subsidies that incentivize the overcapitalization of fleets and excessive fishing pressure," said Tristan Irschlinger, IISD Policy Advisor, Fisheries Subsidies.

New Treaty for the High Seas: A long-awaited deal crosses the negotiating finish line

March opened with big news for ocean and biodiversity governance: after 20 years of talks, UN member states have clinched a new deal for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ).

This new high seas treaty builds on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and revolves around four major areas.

The treaty establishes provisions for “fair and equitable” benefit sharing for marine genetic resources, eyeing concerns involving the overexploitation of these resources and the fear that their benefits might otherwise be limited to those with the greatest ability to make use of them. These provisions are crucial as governments, businesses, and scientists alike explore the potential that these resources have for both commercial applications, like pharmaceutical products, and for achieving environmental goals, like enabling climate change adaptation.

The treaty sets out how governments can establish area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, in the high seas, which will help make it possible for governments to achieve the “30x30” target of protecting 30% of ecosystems, including inland water and marine ecosystems, under the new Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. That framework was adopted by governments at last year’s 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP 15).

The BBNJ agreement also establishes when environmental impact assessments would be required before governments can undertake certain activities on the high seas—and the steps they should take to mitigate and report on any harm that these activities may cause, should the project involved continue after the assessment. The BBNJ accord also features a section on capacity building and marine technology, as well as outlining plans for a financial mechanism to support the treaty’s implementation.

Looking ahead, the treaty will need to be formally adopted by delegations when the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) tasked with the talks reconvenes. After that, the treaty requires ratification by a minimum of 60 UN member states before it can enter into force.

Tackling Plastic Pollution: Next steps for UN, trade talks

One year ago, UN member states at the resumed fifth session of the UN Environment Assembly adopted a resolution agreeing to begin negotiations for a legally binding treaty tackling plastic pollution—including pollution affecting the marine environment.

Talks for this new treaty are now underway in an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). The first INC meeting took place in late 2022 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to weigh questions over the treaty’s scope, along with how it will be put into practice, with the next INC, known as INC-2, taking place in late May and early June. Negotiators are currently aiming to clinch a deal next year.

"Just as for water governance, 2023 is a big year for chemicals and wastes. We’re closely watching the talks towards a new plastics treaty, as well as parallel negotiations on a possible post-2020 platform for chemicals and waste management. A new science-policy panel on chemicals is also under development," said Elena Kosolapova, Senior Policy Advisor for IISD's Tracking Progress team.

Meanwhile, in Geneva, Switzerland, over 75 WTO members are looking at how trade and the trading system can also serve to tackle plastic pollution and encourage a move towards more sustainable plastics trade. This process is known as the Informal Dialogue on Plastic Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade. 

Guided by a December 2021 ministerial statement, this group is looking at crafting outcomes they can share in time for next year’s MC13, with ideas so far falling under the categories of "cross-cutting issues," "reduction and circularity to tackle plastic pollution," and "promoting trade to tackle plastic pollution."

Charting a course forward

These are just a few examples of the myriad efforts underway to help bring SDGs 6 and 14, as well as the other water-related targets across the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to fruition. They are efforts involving people ranging from scientists to policy-makers, Indigenous leaders to international lawyers, and many more. The level of activity underway across these forums is a testament to the value placed on water-related issues—and a reminder of the important work that still lies ahead.

The international community is now approaching the midway point of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with the above-mentioned SDG Summit this upcoming September marking a valuable opportunity to take stock of the work thus far and the road ahead for the SDGs, especially at a time of converging crises. Now is the time to look across the different forums and conversations that affect fresh water and the marine environment and consider what an integrative perspective on these issues could look like.

The author would like to thank Lynn Wagner, Vanessa Farquharson, and Sumeep Bath for their invaluable editorial suggestions and feedback, as well as the experts quoted in this article for their thoughtful contributions.

One year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the country’s infrastructure has sustained extensive damage. Thousands of schools and health care facilities have been destroyed, the energy infrastructure has suffered severe harm, and the total value of infrastructure loss reached an estimated USD 138 billion as of December 2022. In September 2022, the World Bank estimated the cost of reconstruction and recovery at a minimum of USD 349 billion—a number that is slated to rise as the war continues.

The total value of infrastructure loss has reached an estimated USD 138 billion.

Kyiv School of Economics, December 2022

While no large reconstruction projects are planned until the end of the war, planning for recovery has already begun. To ensure that this recovery is sustainable, many stakeholders are now starting to underscore the importance of foregrounding gender equality and women’s empowerment in these efforts. This means recognizing that the damage caused by war is impacting women and girls differently than men and boys, and it means acknowledging and reflecting their differing needs and priorities from the outset of reconstruction planning and implementation.

The Gendered Impacts of War and Infrastructure Loss

Research to date across different international settings shows that in conflict and post-conflict situations, women often make up the majority of the population. They are also frequently the primary earners and caretakers for their families. In Ukraine, several reports have already confirmed the strain of the ongoing war on women, many of whom are having to care for children, the elderly, and other family members with disabilities or reduced mobility. This effort is further complicated by the difficulty they face in accessing food, water, drugs, diapers, formula, and other hygiene items. 

The double burden of care work is real: with the destruction and closing of infrastructure such as health care facilities, schools, childcare, and eldercare centres, women’s care burden is increasing. Simultaneously, women are also facing growing unemployment, especially in occupations often dominated by women, such as nursing and teaching. The lack of access to stable electricity supplies also has gendered implications, including having a severe impact on household activities, thus further increasing the strain of care work on women.

Women face the additional risk to their safety and the threat of gender-based violence to access those items necessary for their household’s survival or for trying to secure earnings to afford them. This comes in addition to women’s active role as agents of resistance in a conflict, where they may be participating directly in the defense of their country through military operations. Women may also be taking part indirectly by providing support to military forces, engaging in humanitarian assistance, or fundraising for aid.

Of the 5.4 million internally displaced persons from the war in Ukraine, 55% were women and girls.

International Organization for Migration, January 2023

As of January 2023, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that of the 5.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the war in Ukraine, 55% were women and girls. The biggest group of IDPs were adult women aged 19 to 59, representing one third of all IDPs. In the same IOM displacement report, 47% of IDP respondents indicated that they were caring for a child, 41% indicated that they were caring for an older person, and 36% indicated that they were caring for a chronically ill person. Additionally, IDP women and girls are known to be at a greater risk of suffering sexual and gender-based violence including trafficking, sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual assault, and domestic violence, due to their displacement and socio-economic status.

Involving Women at All Levels of Reconstruction

The use of infrastructure is also gendered. As stated above, women and girls of different socio-economic groups will likely have varying security needs and livelihood priorities. They will also use infrastructure in different ways depending on their own economic priorities, mobility, and social roles. Their infrastructure needs will further be contingent on their involvement in peacebuilding and security efforts both during and after the war.

These infrastructure needs will also vary within these groups. Such needs will change, for instance, as a result of a person’s sociocultural background, age, economic class, sexuality, education, and disability, to name a few factors. Sustainable reconstruction should therefore be based on thorough gender-based analyses of the needs, priorities, and knowledge of different gender and age groups. These analyses must also consider women’s capacity and desire to take action for themselves as they enact a vision for an inclusive post-war society in Ukraine.

The infrastructure life cycle must adopt gender-responsive decision making.

For gender considerations to be integrated into all aspects of project design, appraisal, and budgeting in the reconstruction efforts, the different stages of the infrastructure life cycle must adopt gender-responsive decision making. This requires recognizing that men often dominate decision-making processes when it comes to infrastructure and construction. The many stakeholders involved in reconstruction need to ensure women’s participation in decision making at all levels, from the subnational to the international, so that their needs and priorities are represented and reflected appropriately in each instance.

Reconstruction will mobilize different sectors, some of which are also historically male-dominated, such as the energy sector or the construction sector. For instance, estimates indicate that women only account for 9% of the construction workforce worldwide and approximately 27% of the energy workforce in Ukraine.

Women only account for 9% of the construction workforce worldwide and approximately 27% of the energy workforce in Ukraine.

UN Women, December 2022

Involving women at all levels and in all economic sectors that will be implicated in the reconstruction effort means considering them as an active part of the labour force. For example, ensuring favourable working conditions and environments will be essential so that women can benefit from employment in the planning, construction, and operation of new energy infrastructure. Specific skills-building programs, on-the-job training, or projects targeting the recruitment of women from communities where energy and other infrastructure projects will be developed could have a transformative impact, helping break down some of the barriers preventing women's access to employment.

Involving women at all levels and in all economic sectors that will be implicated in the reconstruction effort means considering them as an active part of the labour force.

Procurement is another key area that fosters socio-economic benefits for women and men. Equality and inclusion criteria can support more inclusive procurement systems and practices that can contribute to gender equality. Likewise, decision-makers can rethink procurement processes to include, in a meaningful way, Ukrainian women business owners, suppliers, and contractors in recovery plans. This is important to help ensure that women are given equal opportunity to access and benefit from the procurement of those goods and services needed for the country’s economic recovery.

Sustainable Reconstruction as a Driver for Equality

Equal access to and use of infrastructure in the short and long terms rely on taking into account several key factors. These include the different livelihoods of women and men, their differing mobility and use of infrastructure, and the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects on varying social groups.

Given that a large proportion of women spend more time managing a household’s well-being, they will likely have specific views on household needs. This could include the design and placement of the home as well as concerns over affordability, accessibility, and physical safety. Women might also prioritize access to safe transportation, affordable energy, quality childcare, and health facilities and schools, which can lead to greater socio-economic opportunities for the household.

For Ukraine’s reconstruction, it is therefore crucial that decision-makers factor in the needs of different groups of women, such as women-headed households, women IDPs, and women with disabilities. Doing so will ensure that decision-makers can develop a complete portrait of the variety of ways reconstruction can support women’s safety and livelihoods. Examples of how decision-makers might incorporate these considerations include designing accessible public transportation for people with disabilities or setting up appropriate education facilities and livelihood programmes for IDP women and girls during their return, resettlement, and reintegration.

It is therefore crucial that decision-makers factor in the needs of different groups of women.

These are all indications of what could be prioritized based on existing guidance, case studies, and previous recovery and reconstruction programs from other contexts. Only Ukrainian women and girls can determine what is of greatest priority to them in the reconstruction effort, what measures and projects would respond best to their most urgent needs, and where they see the most opportunity for active participation and transformation.

Conclusion

To ensure that post-war reconstruction is truly sustainable, it must consider and address the needs of all Ukrainians, with specific attention to those disproportionately affected by the war. This means incorporating the gendered dimensions of recovery and reconstruction in relevant frameworks, programs, projects, and funding platforms that are developed or revised, and for this to take place across all sectors concerned.

This is the only way reconstruction can be sustainable, just, and equitable. It also has the potential to become a driver for greater inclusion and equality for all Ukrainians in post-war recovery. 

Farmers across the globe have been deeply affected by external shocks, including the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and inflating input costs. Smallholders are especially vulnerable to these challenges because they tend to lack the resources to cope with labour shortages, supply chain disruptions, cancelled contracts, and price volatility, which can reduce their crop sales and income. With many of these pressures slated to persist for the short to medium term, governments should take steps to reduce these vulnerabilities and mitigate risks—and do so in a way that supports smallholders, communities, and the environment.

Complying with organic and other voluntary sustainability standards can help farmers build resilience to shocks. For instance, these standards can help farmers access new markets while providing them with the chance to undertake training on how to enhance soil fertility and preserve water. Adopting these more sustainable production practices, in turn, can improve crop yields while also leading to higher-quality crops that get better prices and premiums in local and international markets. Developing an organic system presents a great opportunity for some developing countries, but success requires a careful approach.

The best way to ensure a smooth transition to organic agriculture involves adopting measures that support both organic supply (push) and demand (pull).

Sri Lanka’s recent experience is illustrative. In 2021, the country’s president announced a nationwide transition to organic agriculture and a simultaneous import ban for synthetic fertilizers and agrochemicals. In theory, these plans had the potential to lead to positive environmental outcomes and improvements in agricultural productivity. Yet significant problems emerged when putting this transition into practice. Conventional farmers, notably producers of rice and tea, were largely unprepared for this change, and many were unable to adapt in time to achieve a good harvest. According to a survey circulated 2 months into the ban, 63% of responding farmers said they did not receive guidance on cultivating their crops without the banned fertilizers and pesticides. Sri Lanka lacked both the domestic capacity to produce the amount of organic fertilizer needed to support crop growth and a plan to import such fertilizers from abroad.

While organic standards are built on the principles of health, ecology, fairness, and care, the Sri Lankan case shows why these transitions need to incorporate the right support for farmers, should be rolled out over time, and should involve farmers themselves in the transition’s design and implementation. Otherwise, governments risk adopting measures that can hurt farmers’ livelihoods and food security, and thereby jeopardize the organic transition and its potential environmental, social, and economic benefits.

The benefits of organic systems are becoming increasingly clear across the globe, including in many developing countries.

As outlined by IFOAM – Organics International, the global organic umbrella organization, the best way to ensure a smooth transition to organic agriculture involves adopting measures that support both organic supply (push) and demand (pull). And since every jurisdiction has unique constraints and particularities, these measures must be adapted to the local context rather than being rolled out in a generic, one-size-fits-all style.

So how can national and sub-national decision-makers build a successful organic system that strengthens farmers’ resilience, improves food security, and enables greater access to local markets?

Support Decentralized, Inclusive, and Direct Advisory Services (push)

Peer-to-peer learning and advisory programs are valuable tools for supporting the organic sector and can be easily adapted to local needs and traditional social structures. In some countries, government-supported local farming organizations offer agricultural producers effective training, education, and other services.

For instance, in 2022, the United States launched the Organic Partnership Program, which funded more than 50 farming organizations so they could provide agricultural producers with technical assistance, paid mentorships, and other support as they adopted organic production practices. Demonstration farms are another excellent tool, allowing local producers to test and model sustainable practices for their farming communities. For instance, Teitei Taveuni, a non-profit farm organization in the Fijian island of Taveuni, has a network of diverse smallholder demonstration farms that undertake research and adapt organic production systems to improve soil health while enabling farmer-to-farmer learning.

Develop Local Organic Markets for Smallholder Farmers (pull)

Governments can play a key role in developing reliable local markets through policies and programs that support demand. For instance, public procurement policies in Brazil favour local organic producers and have created a guaranteed market for at least 120,000 farmer families across the country. And in 2012, the city of New Taipei introduced a food procurement program to offer students at least one organic lunch each week. As a result, the number of organic farms surrounding the city grew by 292% and the cultivated organic area grew by 186% from 2011 to 2020.

Extend Long-Term Funding for the Organic Sector (push and pull)

Developing a thriving community including organic farmers, processors, and researchers can take many years. Reliable long-term funding to support and build this community is therefore crucial. A good example is Costa Rica, where a fuel tax directly finances farmers’ forest conservation efforts (push) and consumer awareness activities (pull). Direct support to farmers can take many forms, such as extending payments for adopting agri-environmental practices, as seen in Mexico; providing subsidies for farmers to purchase or produce organic inputs, such as in South Korea; or covering the cost of attaining certification under a sustainability standard, as seen in Costa Rica. In any case, such measures must be implemented over a multi-year timeline to produce lasting results.

Take a Territorial Approach (push and pull)

Over the last 20 years, several rural areas have adopted an integrated approach to territorial development where the promotion of organic production is closely linked to that territory’s broader economic development. This concept was first developed in Italy’s Cilento Bio-District and France’s BioVallée in the early 2000s, and it has since been adopted in other countries, including India and Tunisia.

In these areas, also called eco-regions, local actors—including farmers, civil society, tourism operators, hotels, retailers, and governments—work together to promote economic development alongside the sustainable management of local resources. The latter is based on organic principles. As a result of these combined efforts, the growth of organic production and consumption becomes a shared responsibility among diverse local actors.

As shown by these examples, the benefits of organic systems are becoming increasingly clear across the globe. Many developing countries—including Madagascar, Pakistan, and Uganda—are working to support domestic organic production. And for those countries where decision-makers are still weighing the best way forward, there is a growing body of evidence from countries making the organic transition on what works well and what needs to improve. A careful approach, tailored to the local context and complemented by supportive push and pull measures, can lead to the development of successful organic systems that strengthen farmers’ resilience to shocks, support their livelihoods, and help ensure local food security.

This article builds upon the IISD’s State of Sustainability Initiatives' advisory work for the Government of Madagascar.

With a new Global Biodiversity Framework now reached after the Convention on Biological Diversity’s COP 15 in Montreal, one of the key challenges ahead for the international community is not just about implementation of these goals to curb biodiversity loss: it also involves resolving the massive gap in finance needed for a nature-positive future.

New data from the United Nations Environment Programme, for instance, indicates that current financial flows to nature-based solutions, which they value at USD 154 billion annually, must triple by the end of the decade if we are to tackle converging sustainability crises—more specifically climate change, biodiversity loss, and land degradation.

These figures have reinforced that massive changes are needed to help make up that gap, and fast. One crucial change will be a rethink of current accounting practices to value natural capital, which are not fit for responding to these challenges effectively.

What Accounting Practices Look Like Now 

Accounting practices have been conceived in a world of abundance of natural resources. Capital, labour, and flow of goods and services are the main components recorded in a company balance sheet. But under these practices, natural stock and the underlying ecosystem services are treated as being available for free, meaning that companies often overlook how these factors are interdependent with the company’s activities.

This failure to integrate natural capital into company balance sheets has contributed to undermining the environment and the ecosystem. While natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals are well accounted for, other types of natural stocks, such as water and soil, are usually omitted. This is one of several factors that have enabled the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources to continue while also contributing to the degradation of the environment. Also absent from company balance sheets are biodiversity values, even though biodiversity is essential for well-functioning ecosystem services.

Transitioning to natural capital accounting would both encourage companies to foster conservation practices and help reduce the nature financing gap.

There has been some progress in recent years: there is greater recognition of the need to change the way company balance sheets work, and there have been notable advances in developing accounting solutions that integrate natural assets and the underlying ecosystem services. However, these practices are far from being widely adopted. Significant advances in recent years include the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting developed by the United Nations, the European Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank Group. Among other functions, this system provides a valuation tool for ecosystem changes and services, and it has been adopted by the UN Statistical Commission.

The European Commission is also proposing a review of the regulation on European Environmental Economic Accounts (EEEA) to align natural capital accounting practices with the UN accounting systems. At the national level, additional initiatives are taking place, such as the Natural Capital Accounting standards provided by the British Standards Institution, which serves as the British national standards-setting body.

Natural Asset Companies: A way to spur the conversation forward

Just over one year ago, the New York Stock Exchange and Intrinsic Exchange Group made a landmark announcement: they would be introducing an innovative financing solution known as natural asset companies (NACs). These NACs are companies that hold rights to the preservation and conservation of a natural asset and its underlying ecosystem services. While still in the early stages, they have the potential to push forward the discussion on natural capital accounting.

For example, a company that protects a wetland raises capital through an initial public offering. The proceeds are then used for the protection of the wetland and the ecosystem services, such as water purification and carbon sequestration.

The innovation of this new asset class lies in the establishment of a long-term equity structure based on natural capital accounting. How much this new investment structure can help change companies’ decision making on nature depends on several factors.

First, robust natural accounting standards can provide strong incentives to invest in nature. For example, the Financial Accounting Board Standard has helped define the accounting and reporting standards of NACs. This has the potential to inform international guidance on how to value natural assets and streamline natural accounting practices.

Initial public offering requirements also play a key role, as they help ensure NACs’ credibility and transparency. For example, a company that wants to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange should satisfy governance requirements that ensure the independence and competence of the board. However, transparent governance, accompanied by strong third-party auditing, should allow investors to verify the restoration and conservation practices of the company. Second, by going public, the company has the potential to reach a large pool of investors, ranging from professional to retail investors. The shareholders will benefit from the shares' performance, which is influenced by the revenue stream that the underlying ecosystem benefits generate. Additional revenue streams can materialize in the long term, such as from increased tourism activities and carbon credits. If these NACs become more common, they can contribute to reducing the nature financing gap by unlocking further capital for nature conservation and fostering the standardization of natural capital accounting.

Third, biodiversity considerations can have a significant role in NAC operations. Highly endangered and degraded areas can benefit from regenerative models adopted by the NAC, producing long-term benefits for local communities. The Intrinsic Exchange Group refers to regenerative models such as regenerative farming that improve soil health, biodiversity, and food production.

Therefore, biodiversity can become a crucial ecological indicator for the accounting models adopted by the NACs. 

Putting the Right Safeguards in Place

However, while NACs have significant potential, this new investment vehicle also comes with risks. One major concern involves the privatization of nature. Generally, NACs only hold rights to the production or sustainable use of the ecosystem services, while the ownership of the natural asset remains with the initial possessor, which can be a public entity, government, or farmer.

As there is no direct transfer of ownership from the owner to the asset company, investors and regulators should pay particular attention to how the company handles the rights for the use of ecosystem services. The asset company should not hinder local communities’ rights to access the natural asset. This is particularly crucial when it comes to Indigenous Peoples and minorities who have often seen their rights violated. On the contrary, NACs’ valuations on the natural assets should be interlinked with the prosperity of local communities. This should be in line with sustainable investment practices that integrate both environmental and social considerations.

NACs should not become another speculative financial instrument causing more harm than good, as happened in 2008, when speculations on food futures caused an overvaluation of food prices. The result, at that time, was a market bubble that forced millions of people in low-income countries into extreme poverty. Supervisory and regulatory requirements can provide additional protection by preventing harmful practices.

NACs have enormous potential to mobilize large amounts of capital to finance nature at a global level by valuing and accounting nature. This can only be achieved if market practices are aligned to benefit nature and local communities. 

Infrastructure is a key enabler of sustainable development. It provides people with the services they need to thrive while also protecting the environment from human impacts, such as pollution. At the same time, urban development—if done unsustainably—is one of the main drivers of biodiversity loss and climate change. In cities, infrastructure needs are particularly high because urban areas are challenged by massive population growth and increasing climate impacts.

How can nature-based infrastructure foster sustainable cities?

For cities to be sustainable, urban infrastructure must be sustainable. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), sustainable infrastructure systems are “planned, designed, constructed, operated and decommissioned in a manner that ensures economic and financial, social, environmental (including climate resilience), and institutional sustainability over the entire infrastructure life cycle.” This infrastructure can be nature based, built in a conventional way, or combine elements of both to form a hybrid infrastructure.

Building with—rather than against—nature has direct benefits for cities. The term nature-based infrastructure (NBI) includes areas or systems that harness nature to provide infrastructure services for people, the economy, and the environment. Examples of NBI include natural ecosystems, such as forests, mangroves, wetlands, and grasslands. But NBI can also involve engineered or “grey” structures that incorporate nature-based solutions, like rain gardens and green roofs. 

NBI helps make cities more sustainable in three ways:

1. NBI delivers cost-effective and climate-resilient infrastructure services, such as flood protection, water filtration, and temperature regulation. This helps provide people with the infrastructure they need for their safety, well-being, and livelihoods.
2. In addition, NBI offers valuable co-benefits for communities and the environment. For example, NBI can support climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, such as by sequestering carbon. These types of infrastructure can also provide habitats for threatened species, support people’s livelihoods, and offer space for recreation.
3. Building with nature also enables investments in other sustainable infrastructure, in particular, in the areas of mobility, water, and energy. For example, urban green spaces help keep urban temperatures at bay, which in turn reduces heat-related efficiency losses from power systems and supports a stable energy supply from renewable sources.

Valuing nature’s benefits for sustainable urban infrastructure

NBI provides infrastructure services, mitigates costs from increasing climate impacts, and generates many added benefits for citizens. A new International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) report finds that if these benefits are taken into account, NBI in cities is, on average, 42% cheaper and creates 36% more value than relying only on grey infrastructure to provide the same infrastructure services. IISD case studies show that for each USD 1 invested, nature-based infrastructure in cities can generate up to 30 times that amount in returns for society, making investments in urban nature economically viable.

How do we know that? At IISD, we have developed an innovative methodology that allows us to quantify the costs, benefits, and risks of infrastructure projects over their entire life cycles. We have applied this Sustainable Asset Valuation (SAVi) methodology to more than 40 infrastructure projects around the world, covering a variety of different assets like roads, wastewater treatment plants, buildings, and NBI.

For example, we analyzed NBI investments in Rainbow Junction, a 140-ha mixed-use development in the city of Tshwane, South Africa. More specifically, we analyzed the outcomes of creating green roofs on new buildings and planting more trees. The assessment indicated that planting 1,000 additional trees would retain more than 6,600 m3 of rainwater, reducing the need to manage and treat stormwater.

NBI can also reduce health risks from extreme heat and reduce the need for conventional forms of cooling, such as air conditioning. Our analysis found that trees in Tshwane would cool down temperatures and cut energy needs for air conditioning by 156,000 kWh, the equivalent of USD 3.82 million per year. In addition, trees in Tshwane could sequester 250 tonnes of carbon dioxide.

Over 40 years, planting and maintaining these trees would cost about USD 142,000. Yet, NBI could help the city avoid costs while delivering additional benefits worth USD 4.42 million. In other words, for each USD 1 invested in planting trees in Tshwane, the result is USD 31 in benefits for society.

Building with nature also enables investments in other sustainable infrastructure, such as projects that support mobility, water, and energy needs. In a recent SAVi assessment of a non-motorized transport (NMT) proposal in the city of Coimbatore, India, this synergy is clearly evident. The NMT project consists of a comprehensive network of walking and cycling routes across the city, implemented over a 15-year period. It will have a wide range of benefits, including reduced air pollution and carbon dioxide emissions, health benefits from increased physical activity, a reduction in the number of road accidents, and increases in retail and property prices. 

IISD’s economic valuation found that investing approximately USD 121 million in the project will yield net benefits of USD 486 million to USD 510 million over a 23-year period. For example, the NMT network will lead to health benefits worth between USD 84 million and USD 91 million by increasing physical activity and reducing air pollution. In addition, the shift from motorized transport to the NMT network will reduce carbon dioxide emissions worth USD 2 million over the project period.

Yet, the assessment also considers that cycling in a polluting urban environment tends to have worse health effects than using motorized forms of transport. This increased exposure to air pollution reduces the overall health benefits for NMT users. Implementing NBI in Coimbatore would be a way to improve air quality and thus create healthier conditions for walking and cycling. Moreover, expanding NBI, such as parks and street trees, in Coimbatore could make such active forms of mobility more comfortable by reducing extreme heat.

In turn, transport corridors offer a key space for a network of NBI in cities, such as green paths, trees along roads, and green roofs on bus stops. Sustainable mobility options such as mass transit and cycling also require less space than transport systems built around private vehicles, which can free up space for NBI, even in dense urban areas.

Leveraging the benefits of nature for sustainable cities requires strategic urban planning with NBI at its heart

To make the most of the benefits of urban nature, NBI needs to become a central part of city planning, project assessments, and financing strategies. Planners, policy-makers, and budget holders need to take a systemic perspective that considers a portfolio of infrastructure investments and maximizes their mutual benefits. This means developing cross-sectoral, strategic plans for sustainable urban development and using systemic assessments to evaluate which NBI investments best support the city’s infrastructure and sustainability objectives.

Cities around the world are working hard to create inclusive, healthy, and climate-resilient environments for their residents. Many are committed to ambitious climate goals and to protecting urban biodiversity, for example, as part of the Global Covenant of Mayors and the CitiesWithNature initiatives. In the face of constrained public budgets and mounting global crises, embracing the benefits of NBI and its synergies with urban infrastructure offers the opportunity to support a transition to sustainable cities.

This article builds on IISD’s new report, The Value of Incorporating Nature in Urban Infrastructure Planning. The report is available on the NBI Global Resource Centre website.

One year on from the announcement of the first "Just Energy Transition Partnership" (JETP) at the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP 26) in Glasgow, how these types of innovative funding models will work, what they can achieve for climate change mitigation, and what pitfalls they must avoid are questions that are drawing increasing attention and scrutiny. With a new JETP announced in early November and four additional countries also set to take part in these mechanisms, now is a valuable time to take stock of the developments to date and what lessons can help inform these partnerships going forward. 

These JETPs are a nascent financing cooperation mechanism, the aims of which are to help a selection of heavily coal-dependent emerging economies make a just energy transition. The goal is to support these countries' self-defined pathways as they move away from coal production and consumption while doing so in a way that addresses the social consequences involved, such as by ensuring training and alternative job creation for affected workers and new economic opportunities for affected communities.

The first such JETP emerged from COP 26 in Glasgow, when South Africa was promised USD 8.5 billion in financing by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. A second tranche of countries announced as partners in the JETP approach included India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal. The donor pool has since been expanded to include multilateral development banks, national development banks, and development finance agencies. As they involve a relatively small group of actors, JETPs can potentially make much faster progress on the energy transition than what would be possible in the UN climate talks themselves, where large oil and gas-producing countries could veto agreement.

In November 2022 at COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, South Africa published its JETP Implementation Plan (JETP IP), which laid out its priority investment requirements in the electricity, new energy vehicles, and green hydrogen sectors. The finance needed to achieve the aims of the JETP IP, at USD 98 billion, is far more than the USD 8.5 billion announced in Glasgow. This means the JETP IP is far broader, and therefore more realistic, in laying out the actual transition needs, but also indicates the scale of change needed in many countries to achieve a just energy transition. 

At the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, also in November, Indonesia's JETP deal was announced: USD 20 billion in finance over 3 to 5 years, half from the donors and half due from the private sector. The JETP laid out an emissions trajectory for the country and how to achieve it: peaking power sector emissions by 2030, not the previous 2037, and capping carbon dioxide emissions levels about a quarter lower than previously expected by the same time.

From Promise to Practice: Ensuring JETPs can deliver

While these announcements show real progress, the implementation of the JETPs will be the true test of their contribution. However, JETPs do have the potential, if their implementation follows the right principles, to extend the scope of climate finance to date because they are more explicitly co-focused on the social aspects of the energy transition and enabling a phase-down in fossil fuel use.

A new IISD policy brief argues that shifting from coal to fossil gas, through JETPs or indeed any international public finance, would not constitute the sustainable and just transition that the JETP model stands for. While there is pressure from some of the JETP countries—and this is something not totally ruled out in South Africa's JETP IP, and Senegal is keen to develop its gas fields—to make a bridging transition to gas, this is technically unnecessary, economically disadvantageous, and dangerous for the climate.

Russia's war in Ukraine has led to high gas prices around the world, which is emblematic of the general volatility of the global gas market. While South Africa, Indonesia, India, and Vietnam source a large proportion of their current coal use domestically, a transition to gas would expose their economies to this volatility. In contrast, leapfrogging from coal straight to wind and solar would enable them to make use of their own natural resources to provide their people with an economically secure source of energy.

Given the technological improvements in renewable and storage technologies, along with the massive cost reductions for these technologies over the past decade, renewable energy is increasingly cost-competitive. In some markets, these technologies are also cheaper than fossil gas infrastructure and the related running costs. Concerns about the supply variability of renewables can be addressed by pump storage and, increasingly, battery storage. These approaches are well suited to grid balancing, as they can be turned on or off in fractions of a second.

All of the JETP countries have considerable wind and solar potential. For example, the International Renewable Energy Agency found that "realistically, and cost-effectively, South Africa could supply 49% of its electricity mix from renewables by 2030" and Indonesia could meet its 31% renewable use goal, which has a 2050 target date, by 2030. However, Indonesia would need USD 16 billion in investments over that period to do so.

Renewable sources of energy are well suited to meeting energy access needs, which remains an issue for all JETP countries with the exception of Vietnam. According to World Bank figures, 36.9 million people in the JETP countries alone lack access to energy. Many people who lack access to modern energy live in rural areas and the modularity and feasibility for energy projects to be installed without needing expensive grid extensions. This makes wind and solar energy ideally suited to meeting the energy access needs that hamper countries' abilities to develop to their full potential. 

Renewables can also have greater social benefits than fossil gas. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the Global Green Growth Institute found that for Indonesia and South Africa respectively, investment of USD 1 million in fossil fuels could generate 22 and 33 jobs. In contrast, investing the same amount in clean energy could generate 103 and 66 jobs, respectively. There has not been much detail yet on how the "just" element will be addressed in the two most advanced JETPs. South Africa's JETP IP refers to the need for strategic planning for the skills needed to support economic diversification and place-based "Skills Development Zones" to provide appropriate training for workers so they can contribute within locally relevant value chains. Indonesia's November 2022 JETP statement spoke of "implementation of concrete actions achieving a just energy transition for workers and communities." More granularity will be needed for the planned energy transitions to be considered just.

The urgency of the challenge

The climate imperative to leapfrog from coal to clean energy is clear. Recent IISD analysis shows that "global gas power generation capacity should decrease by more than 55% by 2035 compared with 2020 levels" in order to try to limit average global temperature increases to 1.5°C, in line with the Paris Agreement target. 

Investing in any new long-lived gas infrastructure would create significant risks of stranded assets. This is because gas-fired power plants have a lifespan of over 40 years, and with renewables continuing to fall in price, and as governments increasingly implement climate regulations, the utilization rates of more expensive gas assets will decline. This means less revenue, thus reducing or negating returns on investment. Furthermore, investments in fossil gas now would simply delay the transition to clean energy in JETP countries and would, in turn, necessitate a second round of JETPs to achieve what could—and should—have been achieved the first time around.

There are no good technical, economic, or climate science arguments for the use of public money to support a transition to using gas as a bridge away from coal. Donor countries have agreed so far that JETP finance should be fossil free, but the fact that the JETP IPs that are being developed may not fully follow that principle means that civil society needs to be vigilant so that climate-damaging projects do not get funded. Renewables represent a credible technical alternative to fossil gas and are an approach that can better address other issues, such as energy access, while not endangering the climate further.

JETPs should serve as a beacon to the wider investment community that participating governments are committed to a global clean energy transition. As South Africa, Indonesia, and donors move toward putting these JETPs into practice, and with the prospect of further JETPs for other countries on the horizon, ensuring these partnerships deliver on their potential means avoiding false solutions like fossil gas, prioritizing renewables, and ensuring these efforts are informed by the latest available thinking on how to ensure a just transition. And these are principles that should guide all use of public finance for energy transition, not just the JETPs.

Still reeling from the difficult 27th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP 27) negotiations, the international community is now heading into another major meeting on the environmental calendar: the second part of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 15), which will take place in Montreal from December 7 to 19. While the biodiversity COPs are normally less embattled than their climate cousin, this year may prove different, as 196 parties come together in the hopes of finalizing negotiations for a new Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF). 

The GBF replaces the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and associated Aichi Targets agreed on by parties in 2010, which were meant to guide international efforts on biodiversity conservation both within the CBD and beyond it. Those targets were largely missed, and the GBF itself is coming 2 years late, given that it was originally due for 2020. An ambitious replacement strategy is urgently needed, given that global loss of biodiversity and ecosystems has accelerated at an unprecedented rate. Humanity is faced with the highest extinction rate in our history, with 1 million animal and plant species currently threatened with extinction, many within decades.

Views differ dramatically over what should be included in this new global framework on biodiversity, including how much of earth’s land and sea to protect, how to finance such an agreement, and how to conserve nature and sustainably use biodiversity in ways that benefit all equitably, particularly for Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs).

One of the hot-button components of the GBF is the “30x30” conservation target, which is draft target 3. This target calls for 30% of the earth’s land and sea to be conserved through the establishment of protected areas (PAs) and other area-based conservation measures (OECMs). The 30x30 target is more ambitious than its predecessor, Aichi Target 11, which aimed for the protection of 17% of land and 10% of coastal and marine areas. Aichi Target 11 was partially successful in numbers, but less so in quality, due to concerns that many protected areas lack connectivity, do not always safeguard the most important areas for biodiversity, and are not equitably and effectively managed.

Target 3 will clearly be contested as negotiators convene in Montreal this month, as there has been vocal opposition in the lead-up to COP 15. Some delegations worry about focusing too closely on numbers rather than on biodiversity outcomes, while others have flagged concerns about how 30x30 will be implemented fairly and equitably. This article unpacks the key concerns, along with recommendations on how to address these concerns in the final GBF and its subsequent implementation.

Quality Versus Quantity

Critics point out that 30% is an arbitrary number, providing catchy public relations appeal, when it is the quality of the protected area that is far more important. They further argue that the global picture of protected areas needs to be representative of all types of life on earth, and given that climate change is already shifting species' distributions, these protected areas should be well connected through corridors that facilitate species' movements and migration patterns. Indeed, there are more than 100 countries and counting supporting the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People, which has been a strong advocate for the 30x30 target.

Meanwhile, some want to protect more than 30% and are calling for an additional 20% to ensure there is a “global safety net” that will enable an effective response to the climate and biodiversity crises. Scientific briefs on the GBF targets raise the issue of quality and acknowledge differing opinions on the percent area target, but whether quality-related parameters will make it into the final language of the GBF and that framework’s interpretation remains an open question heading into part two of COP 15.

Implementing 30x30

Fuelled by experiences of land grabs, loss of livelihoods, and human rights violations, some groups argue that the 30x30 target endangers the livelihoods, tenure, and customary access of IPLCs to land and resources. 

The term “fortress conservation” has been used to describe nature-centric conservation initiatives that have closed off access to the traditional territories and livelihoods of IPLCs, when they have been stewarding nature through generations. Research also points to equal or higher levels of biodiversity in Indigenous-managed lands compared to protected areas in some regions. Other critics describe the 30x30 target as a dangerous distraction from the underlying causes of biodiversity loss, which include rampant overconsumption.

Where Do We Go From Here, and How Do We Reconcile Competing Views?

The GBF must place a heavier emphasis on the quality of PAs and OECMs to accompany the 30% target. While the current language refers to ecological representation, connectivity between systems of PAs, and integration into wider seascapes and landscapes, there should be an explicit mention of strategic siting of protected areas to cover intact ecosystems and key biodiversity areas of variable percentages. This will also help ensure that measures are taken to promote the long-term resilience of these conserved areas to climate impacts. 

A closer look at the supporting information for the 30x30 target reveals a scientific basis for increasing the area target from 17%. Leading scientists from both the climate and biodiversity communities have affirmed this: a joint workshop report co-sponsored by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change noted that conservation targets must become significantly more ambitious and have a greater scope than in earlier iterations. These changes are essential given that many existing protected areas are too small and patchy and are inadequately resourced. Some of these are managed so poorly that they are at risk of degazetting or de-listing—in other words, they could lose the legal protections they have in place or see these protections curbed significantly. 

This increased ambition does not need to result in fortress conservation, as momentum is growing among conservation organizations and national authorities to move toward more integrated, rights-based conservation and development initiatives.

Like the Sustainable Development Goals, the new targets under the GBF should be seen as interlinked, indivisible, and underpinned by human rights-based approaches, including free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). This means that policy-makers cannot achieve one GBF target without also making gains on the other 21 targets. Successful achievement of 30x30 will mean that Targets 20 on traditional knowledge and 21 on participation are also reached, in addition to targets related to securing investments and capacity building for equitable and transparent governance of PAs. 

While safeguards are mentioned in the draft 30x30 target, FPIC, recognition of land tenure rights, and support for livelihood opportunities should be made explicit. Taking care of the other 70% of the earth, including restoring degraded land and ensuring the effective management of existing protected areas, will also be crucial to the success of GBF implementation.

Voices from IPLCs-led conservation initiatives need to be amplified, as Western science has much to learn from other kinds of knowledge systems. For example, in Canada, the Thaidene Nëné National Park Reserve and Territorial Protected Area is co-managed by local First Nations and the government. Through the Indigenous Guardians Program, which supports Indigenous Peoples’ rights to land stewardship, the Łutsël K’é Dene First Nation established the Ni Hat’Ni Dene Guardians to protect and conserve ecosystems and sacred sites within the PA through ecological monitoring and mapping, Traditional Knowledge sharing with younger generations, and interacting with and educating visitors. 

At the same time, prioritizing conservation over other land use should not be a foregone conclusion. This is part of exercising self-determination—that Indigenous governments choose the management priorities for their traditional territories—and an important reminder of why safeguards like FPIC are vital for the 30x30 target.

Rights-Based Approaches Toward Achieving an Ambitious Target on Protected Areas

No matter the ambition of the GBF, conservation efforts will always be fraught with tensions and trade-offs between competing land uses, values, and knowledge systems. Facing these challenges requires examining underlying assumptions and uncertainties in the framework, undertaking careful analyses about who stands to gain and lose, and engaging in transparent and inclusive dialogue on ways forward to balance these trade-offs. 

Even if a global biodiversity framework is achieved at COP 15, which will be an important milestone for international environmental governance, the end result is likely to be imperfect to all. There are ways, however, to ensure that implementation helps make up for some of these imperfections. While the success of the 30x30 target hinges both on quantity and quality, the true test of this target will be the degree to which countries implement human rights-based approaches and empower the leadership of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

The authors of this article would like to thank Viviana Figueroa (Indigenous Women's Biodiversity Network), Alanna Evans, Anika Terton, Alec Crawford, and Sofia Baliño for their feedback on prior drafts.