Batteries have proven to be an integral part of people’s day to day life.

And if you use a digital camera, smart phone, or drive an electric car, you rely on a specific type of battery: lithium-ion. Our need for these batteries won’t be ending soon, with estimates suggesting the lithium-ion battery market will reach USD 77 billion by 2024.

But what happens to your lithium-ion battery once it dies?

The battery should be recycled, so the valuable minerals therein—including cobalt and lithium—can become part of the circular economy.

The circular economy is a process of minimizing waste and making the most out of finite resources to achieve sustainable development. Many governments and mining companies are seeing the value of mineral recycling, including the U.S. Department of Energy, which recently announced its USD 20.5 million investment in lithium battery recycling.

However, there are barriers to effective mineral recycling. Below are just a few, but you can read a more comprehensive list in our new report, Sustainability and Second Life: The case for cobalt and lithium recycling.

Conflict and corruption at extraction sites

Certain minerals, such as cobalt and lithium, are extracted from regions where fragility, conflict and violence are prevalent. Some stakeholders hesitate to recycle materials that originated from conflict zones, as they worry that will compound their complicity in the corruption and violence intrinsic in their origin.

Raw material price fluctuations

Prices for virgin lithium and cobalt are projected to increase as the demand for batteries grow, especially driven by the uptake of electric vehicles (EVs). This increase in price can lead manufacturers to substitute cobalt with other, low-value materials, making batteries not economically worthwhile to recycle.

Designing batteries without foresight for second-life uses

The design of products can limit the ability of minerals to be recovered and recycled. If they are manufactured with permanent assembly methods, for example, this presents a challenge to proper disassembly and dismantling in secondary processes. And without proper labelling, the lithium-ion batteries would need to be tested and assessed before designating them for reuse, remanufacturing or recycling. This process which could be time consuming, energy intensive and expensive.

Hibernation of electronics

Hibernating electronics, the period when the product isn’t thrown away but held onto despite a lack of use by the owner, is a major obstacle, because while these items typically retain most of their battery capacity, they do not enter processes for reuse, remanufacture or recycling.

Challenges can also appear after a product has reached its end of life in the recycling supply chain. Inefficient collection infrastructure, technological and safety concerns, and transparency issues can also present an obstacle to lithium and cobalt recycling. And even if these barriers are addressed, there remain a number of issues in the regulatory environment impede increased mineral recycling. These barriers include the public sector’s struggles to establish appropriate definitions for secondary processes, to clearly allocate responsibility and liability in the supply chain for recycled products, and to set meaningful recycling targets.

With all these barriers to lithium and cobalt recycling, how can stakeholders improve and expand upon mineral recycling so that it can contribute to a circular economy and sustainable development?

Increased collaboration between stakeholders

The public sector, private actors and civil society should collaborate to overcome market and regulatory barriers. This coordination will ensure that new or revised investments and regulations are reflective of the changing needs of the recycling industry.

The public sector should also coordinate their efforts with relevant stakeholders to develop and understand applicable definitions of recycling and other secondary processes, clearly designate the actors responsible and liable for recycling materials, communicate these regulations to businesses, and evaluate the risks and benefits of mineral recycling using multiple values.

Fostering eco-designs

Manufacturers should consider the eventual recycling of the product during its initial design to ease the dismantling, recovery and retrieval phases to include recycled lithium and cobalt in the circular economy.

Encouraging recycling among consumers

Awareness of mineral recycling processes should be raised among consumers, and incentives should be applied to encourage consumers to recycle their unused electronics. For example, a financial incentive can be offered to consumers for handing in their used mobile phones, laptops and other electronics.

Additional opportunities to foster mineral recycling include: enhancing transparency in the supply chain, developing new business models for mineral disposal, improving the perception of products with second-life minerals, and evaluating the risks and benefits of mineral recycling using multiple values.

As some of the main components in lithium-ion batteries, lithium and cobalt will play central roles in the transition to a low-carbon economy. When the public sector, private actors and civil society work together to ensure transparent mineral recycling processes, a sustainable circular economy can be achieved.

On March 7, 2019, the Cabinet approved what has been dubbed an Rs 31,560 crore (USD 4.6 billion) “prescription pill” for the power sector in India.

This includes investments worth Rs 21,528 crore (USD 3.1 billion) cleared for two coal projects to a combined capacity of 2,640 megawatt (MW) and a slew of measures to ease the 40,000 MW of coal power that is “stressed” and awaiting a Supreme Court ruling on insolvency proceedings.

But is this the cure for the challenges facing India’s energy system—or temporary pain relief that will rapidly wear off?

Cabinet is trying to relieve stressed assets by improving coal linkages and providing flexibility to power producers when distribution companies are not paying their dues. However, several drivers behind coal power stress are only set to grow, increasing risk of future stranding.

India’s citizens have grown discontent with air pollution. A study by the Health Effects Institute finds that coal will be the single-largest source of air pollution by 2050, responsible for 1.3 million deaths per year. New emissions regulations will add to the cost of coal power, increasing future stress.

Meanwhile, competition from renewables is expected to grow as solar and wind continue to offer tariff bids at rates lower than coal power.

Water availability will also have impacts on the coal sector’s viability, particularly where it overlaps with concentrations of coal asset stranding. A joint study by the International Institute for Sustainable Development and Overseas Development Institute finds the three states with the highest degree of stressed coal capacity today—Chhattisgarh (58 per cent), Odisha (55 per cent) and Jharkhand (27 per cent)—are supplied by water basins expected to be "water-stressed" by 2050.

This isn’t a pleasant diagnosis. Uncertainty surrounding the future cost competitiveness of coal should worry decision-makers in both the public and private sector. It suggests the current intervention plan to triage assets and possible future capital infusions miss the bigger picture.

If coal becomes sufficiently costly, it is natural to assume some share of capacity can and should become stranded. The key question is not asset owners—but how any big shift might affect the estimated 1.6 million workers in the coal supply chain and their communities. Now is a golden opportunity to explore how government resources can be used—in the case of assets that cannot or should not be saved—to make sure no worker or community is left behind.

India faces concurrent structural challenges around employment and ensuring a sustainable and reliable energy supply for its people. It is becoming increasingly obvious how deeply linked these challenges are. Granted, the large number of jobs being created in the renewable energy sector is good news. At a macroeconomic level, it looks on track to more than compensate for any job losses. But the experiences of other countries show it will be just as important to ensure there is a fair deal for workers in the conventional energy sector—particularly when there is no easy way to match jobs from conventional to clean energy.

As things stand, taxpayers will foot the bill to prolong the lives of coal infrastructure projects; projects becoming increasingly financially unviable as the cost of renewables drops, air pollution legislation makes coal costlier to mine and burn, and water shortages leave power plants unable to run at capacity.

With 21 per cent of India’s coal-fired power plants already financially "stressed" and this figure set to rise, policy-makers have a choice. Instead of further subsidizing struggling coal infrastructure, India—and particularly the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Jharkhand—can begin to reallocate limited public funds to ensure a fair transition for workers and communities as the country shifts to a cleaner, healthier, lower-carbon energy system.

Previous signals from government suggested a portion of funds raised through the "coal cess" would indeed be allocated to a fair transition away from coal. This has failed to materialize so far. While this may seem far from the current practice of many policy-makers in India, the signs suggest coal’s symptoms may well worsen. It is important to think early and seriously about the right remedy in light of recent trends.

This editorial first appeared on ET Energyworld on April 4, 2019.

What is a just transition? Essentially, it’s a balancing act.

From an environmental perspective, we know we need cleaner energy to meet Paris Agreement goals and avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate change. From an economic perspective, those cleaner energy options are consistently dropping in price, making them increasingly more attractive than fossil fuels (e.g., solar energy prices have fallen more than 80 per cent over the past decade alone according to the International Renewable Energy Agency). And finally, from a social perspective, we understand the need for work that pays well in the energy sector, providing the necessary benefits for workers and their families and contributing to vibrant communities and economies.

The energy transition is happening and these three dynamics mean concerted efforts are needed to ensure the transition is fair for all. The implications are massive. Protests over energy policies in France, Canada, Mexico and elsewhere show just how high the stakes are, and that people are watching closely.

After all, energy transitions are about people: the ones who make the decisions and the ones affected by those decisions. A ‘just transition’ approach ensures the affected people are considered by those making decisions.

Examples from around the world show how countries have looked to adopt the just transition approach:

• Poland was forced to face coal restructuring that shrunk employment in the coal mining sector by 75 percent in only a decade and a half. The government worked with labour unions to develop a mining social package and special privileges for mining communes.
• In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo­—recognizing that transport fuel subsidies were unsustainable for the national budget—campaigned in 2014 on subsidy reform, with the promise of better alternatives to promote development than cheap fuel. Upon election, he used his mandate to remove the subsidies and replaced them with investments in infrastructure, transfers to villages; and poverty reduction programs.
• A national commitment to phase out coal-fired electricity in Canada was coupled with a national task force made up of industry, labour, environment and coal community representatives. This group travelled across the country to listen to Canadians regarding the supports and government policies they would need to weather the transition and come out stronger.
• In Egypt, the government promoted a message of "shared sacrifice" to make the case for much-needed fuel price reforms that would meet an urgent need for financial and economic stability. The message was coupled with measures—including minimum wage boosts, food stipends and progressive taxation—to ensure no one was left behind, and no "sacrifice" was too large.

In each of these cases, the people affected by the transition were part of the decision-making process. A common thread was an understanding of the local context, to know who had influence and who would be affected by transition. Champions were identified to carry the message of the need for transition within their own constituencies, building a coalition for reform. Making the case, through transparent and inclusive engagement and communication was critical so people knew why the transition was occurring and how their concerns would be addressed. Finally, complementary policies were adopted to implement the transition and ensure vulnerable groups were protected. This "4C" approach has proven to be a hallmark of sustainable transitions.

The proposed Green New Deal in the United States and a similar move recently called for in the United Kingdom are positive signs that climate policy debates are moving from the realm of technocrats to recognizing social realities. Putting people at the heart of climate policy is essential to how we manage the move to a low-carbon future.

Further reading

Report: Real People, Real Change: Strategies for just energy transitions

Event: Shifting to Below 2°C Economies: Strategies for just energy transitions (April 10, 2019)

Report: Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform and the Just Transition: Integrating approaches for complementary outcomes

Blog: Good COP, Bad COP: Reflections from a climate change conference

On March 4, 2019, IISD hosted a forum to discuss progress on Canada’s 2030 Agenda strategy:

• The draft Federal Development Strategy (FSDS) for 2019–2022 (currently under consultation) was presented by Gail Haarsma, Acting Director, Sustainable Development Policy Division, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC).
• Proposed amendments to the act that mandates the development of the FSDS were presented by Nathalie Trudeau, Director, Information and Indicators Division, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC).
• Julie Gelfand, Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, shared lessons learned from the audit on Canada’s readiness to take on the 2030 Agenda.
• An overview of the development of Canada’s 2030 Agenda National Strategy was presented by Gail Mitchell, Director General, Intergovernmental Affairs, Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC).

Sustainable development is considered to be critical framework for protecting our planet and ensuring future generations can enjoy healthy and prosperous lives. That said, national and international strategies to advance sustainable development have been around for two decades, but have often varied in ambition and political will, and have been allocated limited financial resources to ensure results.

(Français suivre)

The universal adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 created a renewed interested in sustainability—in part because the SDGs provide a clear, compelling vision of a world that embraces sustainability. This ideal world would foster equality, ensure access to health care and schooling, end hunger and malnutrition, and conserve our aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity.

Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, countries have been developing their SDG implementation strategies and reporting on progress to the annual High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development. In 2018, Canada submitted its Voluntary National Review (VNR) to the HLPF. In this report, we learned that the Government of Canada is committed to developing a national strategy on the 2030 Agenda.

The FSDS, which has been the Government of Canada’s vehicle for sustainable development planning since 2010, is a key contribution to Canada’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The 2016–2019 FSDS includes linkages between the FSDS and 12 of the 17 SDGs, mostly involving goals targeting environmental issues. A draft FSDS covering 2019–2022 was released for public consultation on December 3, 2018. Forum presenters emphasized that this strategy aims to strengthen linkages between the environmentally focused SDGs and the goals listed in the FSDS. The consultation will last until April 2, 2019, with the updated strategy expected to be tabled later this year.

Several amendments have been suggested to the Federal Sustainable Development Act. In 2016, the report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (ENVI) recommended changes such as moving the focus from environmental to sustainability decision making, adding SDGs and international commitments, and improving the enforceability and accountability of the strategy. Bill C-57, an Act to Amend the Federal Sustainable Development Act, responds to these recommendations. One of the key issues raised during deliberations in the House of Commons and the Senate was the importance of considering crucial principles—such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the SDGs—and emphasizing the government leadership on sustainable development. Bill C-57 received royal assent February 28, 2019, and is expected to enter into force after completing the Governor in Council (GIC) process.

The Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development has previously raised issues related to sustainable development and the SDGs. Specifically, the report to the Parliament of Canada on Canada’s Preparedness to Implement the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (published in spring 2018) found that the Government of Canada:

• Had not developed a formal approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs
• Had no communication plan and no engagement strategy on how to include other levels of government and Canadians in a national dialogue on the 2030 Agenda
• Had no implementation plan or system to measure progress in achieving the goals.

In the fall of 2018, the Minister of Employment and Social Development (ESDC) was tasked to lead the overall coordination of Canada’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda, in collaboration with all ministers and departments.

In addition, seven core departments were flagged as “champions” to support the advancement of the SDGs. These include:

• ESDC
• Global Affairs Canada
• Environment and Climate Change Canada
• Indigenous Services Canada
• Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs
• Innovation, Science and Economic Development
• Status of Women Canada

The 2018 federal budget included funding over 13 years:

• CAD 49.4 million to establish an SDG Unit and fund monitoring and reporting by Statistics Canada
• CAD 59.8 million for an SDG funding program to support the implementation of the SDGs in Canada

The SDG Unit at Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is responsible for coordinating the overall implementation of the 2030 Agenda. This includes:

• Raising public awareness of the SDGs
• Engaging with provinces and territories, municipalities, Indigenous partners, civil society, businesses and academia on the development of a national strategy
• Administering an SDG Funding Program that supports action.

Currently, from March 15 to May 15, 2019, Canadians can share their ideas and contribute to the development of the 2030 National Strategy.

Based on information presented during the forum, it was well understood that everyone has a role to play in implementing the 2030 Agenda. Work is already underway by the government, civil society, non-governmental organizations, academia and the private sector to identify and address key priorities that can serve as a basis for Canada’s national SDG roadmap. Given the jurisdictional roles in a number of areas related to the SDGs, the provinces, territories and municipalities play a pivotal role in the successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

In summary, the draft FSDS 2019–2022 provides linkages to the SDGs, and the final version will be tabled later this year. Once an amended Federal Sustainable Development Act enters into force, the focus of the FSDS will shift to sustainable development decision making, and it will have the flexibility to include more social and economic aspects and will complement a national strategy for the 2030 Agenda led by ESDC. During the discussion, the invited experts agreed that, similar to other countries, eventually one federal sustainable development strategy that includes the SDGs expressed as national priorities would be desirable, but Canada is not there yet.

IISD is grateful to all the experts for their contributions to the event.

Links to the presentations follow this post.

FSDS (EN)
SDG Unit Presentation (EN)
Updated Bill C-57 Deck (EN)

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Quel est l’avenir de la planification du développement durable et du Programme de développement durable à l’horizon 2030 au Canada?

Le 4 mars 2019, l’IISD a accueilli une discussion axée sur les progrès à l’égard de la stratégie du Canada pour la mise en œuvre du Programme de développement durable à l’horizon 2030 (Programme 2030).

• Gail Haarsma, directrice intérimaire, Division des politiques relatives au développement durable, Environnement et Changement climatique Canada (ECCC) a présenté la Stratégie fédérale de développement durable (SFDD) pour la période 2019-2022 (qui fait actuellement l’objet d’une consultation).
• Nathalie Trudeau, directrice, Division de l’information et des indicateurs, ECCC a fait un exposé sur les propositions de modifications de la législation qui prescrit l’élaboration de la SFDD.
• Julie Gelfand, commissaire à l’environnement et au développement durable, Bureau du Vérificateur général du Canada a fait part des enseignements tirés de l’audit de l’état de préparation du Canada pour la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030.
• Gail Mitchell, directrice générale, Relations intergouvernementales, Emploi et Développement social Canada (EDSC), a présenté un aperçu de l’élaboration de la Stratégie nationale du Programme 2030 du Canada.

Le développement durable est considéré comme le cadre fondamental de la protection de notre planète et de la garantie que les générations à venir pourront jouir d’une vie saine et prospère. Ceci étant dit, les stratégies nationales et internationales pour promouvoir le développement durable qui existent depuis vingt ans sont fondées sur diverses ambitions et volontés politiques et bénéficient de ressources financières limitées pour parvenir aux résultats prévus.

L’adoption universelle du Programme 2030 et des objectifs de développement durable de l’ONU (ODD) en 2015 a suscité un regain d’intérêt pour la durabilité, en partie parce que les ODD donnent une vision claire et impérieuse d’un monde qui adopte la durabilité. Ce monde idéal favoriserait l’égalité, garantirait un accès aux soins de santé et à l’éducation, verrait l’éradication de la faim et de la malnutrition et la préservation de notre biodiversité aquatique et terrestre.

Depuis l’adoption du Programme 2030, les pays ont élaboré leurs propres stratégies de mise en œuvre des ODD, et ont rendu compte de leurs progrès chaque année au Forum politique de haut niveau (FPHN) sur le développement durable. En 2018, le Canada a présenté son Examen national volontaire (ENV) (disponible uniquement en anglais) au FPHN. Dans ce rapport, nous avons appris que le gouvernement du Canada est engagé envers l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale pour la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030.

La SFDD, le véhicule du gouvernement du Canada pour la planification du développement durable depuis 2010, est un apport fondamental à la mise en œuvre, par ce pays, du Programme 2030. La SFDD 2016-2019 comporte des liens entre la SFDD et 12 des 17 ODD, portant principalement sur des objectifs axés sur des enjeux environnementaux. Un avant-projet de SFDD pour la période 2019-2022 a été publié le 3 décembre 2018 aux fins de consultation publique. Les conférencières du Forum ont souligné que cette stratégie vise à renforcer les liens entre les ODD axés sur l’environnement et les buts énumérés dans la SFDD. Les consultations se poursuivront jusqu’au 2 avril 2019, et déboucheront sur une stratégie mise à jour dont le dépôt devrait avoir lieu plus tard cette année.

Plusieurs modifications de la Loi fédérale sur le développement durable ont été suggérées. En 2016,  le rapport du Comité permanent de l'environnement et du développement durable recommandait un certain nombre de changements, notamment opérer un glissement de la prise de décisions fondée sur l’environnement à celle fondée sur la durabilité, ajouter des engagements envers les ODD et les engagements internationaux, et améliorer le caractère exécutoire et l’aspect de reddition de compte de la stratégie. Le projet de loi C-57, Loi modifiant la Loi fédérale sur le développement durable, répond à ces recommandations. L’importance de tenir compte de principes fondamentaux, tels que la Déclaration des Nations unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones et les ODD, et de souligner le leadership du gouvernement fédéral quant au développement durable, est l’une des principales questions soulevées lors des délibérations devant la Chambre des communes et le Sénat. Le projet de loi C-57 a reçu la sanction royale le 28 février 2019 et devrait entrer en vigueur à l’issu du processus  du gouverneur en conseil.

La commissaire à l’environnement et au développement durable a déjà exprimé des préoccupations connexes au développement durable et aux ODD. Plus précisément, le rapport destiné au Parlement du Canada sur L’état de préparation du Canada pour la mise en œuvre des objectifs de développement durable des Nations Unies (publié au printemps 2018) a conclu que le gouvernement du Canada

• n’avait pas élaboré d’approche officielle de la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030 et des ODD,
• ne possédait ni plan de communication ni stratégie de mobilisation décrivant la manière de faire participer d’autres ordres de gouvernement et la population canadienne à un dialogue national sur le Programme 2030,
• ne possédait ni plan de mise en œuvre ni système de mesure du progrès quant à l’atteinte des objectifs.

À l’automne 2018, le ministre de l’Emploi et du Développement social (EDSC) a été chargé de la coordination globale de la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030 par le Canada, en collaboration avec tous les ministres et ministères.

En outre, sept ministères de base ont été décrétés « champions » du soutien de la promotion des ODD. Il s’agit des suivants :

• EDSC
• Affaires mondiales Canada
• ECCC
• Services aux Autochtones Canada
• Relations Couronne-Autochtones et des Affaires du Nord
• Innovation, Sciences et Développement économique
• Condition féminine Canada.

Le budget fédéral 2018 contenait le financement suivant étalé sur 13 ans :

• 49,4 millions de dollars canadiens pour établir une équipe des ODD et financer le suivi et les rapports de Statistique Canada,
• 59,8 millions de dollars canadiens pour un programme de financement des ODD qui appuie leur mise en œuvre au Canada.

L’équipe des ODD d’EDSC coordonne la mise en œuvre globale du Programme 2030, ce qui comprend les mesures suivantes :

• accroître la sensibilisation du public à l’égard des ODD,
• mobiliser les provinces et les territoires, les municipalités, les partenaires autochtones, la société civile, les entreprises et les universitaires pour l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale,
• gérer un programme de financement des ODD qui appuie les mesures prises.

En ce moment, dans le cadre d’une consultation ouverte du 15 mars au 15 mai 2019, les Canadiennes et les Canadiens peuvent faire part de leurs idées et contribuer à l’élaboration de la Stratégie nationale pour le Programme 2030.

À la lumière du contenu des exposés réalisés au cours du Forum, il est manifeste que chacun a un rôle à jouer dans la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030. Le gouvernement, la société civile, les organisations non gouvernementales, les universitaires et le secteur privés ont déjà commencé à déterminer et à traiter les principales priorités qui peuvent servir de base pour la feuille de route nationale du Canada pour les ODD. Les provinces, territoires et municipalités joueront un rôle essentiel dans la réussite de la mise en œuvre du Programme 2030 étant donné les compétences qui sont les leurs dans un certain nombre de domaines connexes aux ODD.

En bref, l’avant-projet de SFDD pour 2019-2022 fournit des liens vers les ODD, et la version définitive sera déposée plus tard cette année. Une fois que la Loi fédérale sur le développement durable modifiée sera en vigueur, la SFDD sera désormais axée sur la prise de décision en matière de développement durable et elle possédera la souplesse nécessaire pour inclure un plus grand nombre d’aspects sociaux et économiques, ce qui complétera une stratégie nationale pour le Programme 2030 dirigée par EDSC. Au cours de la discussion, les experts invités ont convenu que, comme pour les autres pays, il serait souhaitable que le Canada possède une SFDD qui inclue les ODD reconnus comme priorités nationales, mais il n’en est pas encore à ce stade.

IISD est reconnaissante envers tous les experts pour leurs apports à ce Forum.

Presentations

SFDD (FR)
SDG Unit Presentation (FR)
Updated Bill C-57 Deck (FR)

Imagine this: A municipality pledges to make all of its buildings carbon-neutral by 2050.

To do so, it needs to invest in renovations using the most innovative, energy-efficient solutions available. The procurement department, however, has limited capacity to work through the complexities of the procurement process and has no expertise in energy efficiency. Municipal budgets are tight. Many local start-ups are developing innovative solutions for efficient, clean energy in infrastructure projects, but there’s legal uncertainty about whether and how the municipality can buy these solutions. So plans stall.

Although the momentum around sustainable public procurement (SPP) is growing, implementation is still difficult. Understanding what is holding back action is a big first step.

First of all, what is SPP?

SPP is about delivering the best value for taxpayer money when buying goods, services and public works. It means moving away from buying based only on the cheapest price, and instead incorporating other socioeconomic, social and environmental values. SPP has different layers, and they differ in the way they are regulated.

Green procurement is an environmentally friendly approach to SPP: it entails buying products, infrastructure and services that have a low-carbon footprint and that reduce impacts on biodiversity, decrease greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce pollution and pressure on natural resources.

Social procurement encourages buying products, infrastructure and services that take into account working conditions, gender equality and respect for human rights throughout their operations and production processes.

Socioeconomic procurement is when procurement is directed at or reserved for specific economic actors, such as small and medium-sized enterprises, women-owned businesses, Indigenous groups and businesses employing disadvantaged groups, such as visible minorities or people with disabilities. This approach is meant to economically empower these groups and better integrate them in the economic system.

What do trade agreements say about SPP?

Over the years, international trade agreements have increasingly begun to cover public procurement between countries. For example, the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA) is now a plurilateral agreement between 15 WTO members, including the European Union, with its 28 member states. The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU has very broad coverage when it comes to public procurement, down to the level of municipal and provincial procurement in Canada.

Procurement chapters in these agreements are not very explicit when it comes to SPP, yet procurers are still often reluctant to move forward with SPP because of them.

The WTO GPA, revised in 2012, has made a significant step forward in promoting award methodologies going beyond the lowest price and in including technical specifications including references to the environment. However, other clauses can be read and interpreted in light of SPP and sustainable development more broadly.

How is Canada implementing SPP?

Canada has a few different initiatives to ensure public procurement becomes a strategic driver of innovation and of a low-carbon economy.

The Centre for Greening Government, under the Treasury Board Secretariat, focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the federal building stock and fleet through green public procurement. It also issued Canada’s Green Procurement Policy in 2006, which aims to consider the environment in various procurement activities, from planning to maintenance to disposal.

In 2018, the Canadian government also launched a one-year pilot project encouraging more women-owned or women-led businesses to supply catering services in the Atlantic Region.

How is IISD contributing to the dialogue?

Our new paper, Canada’s International Trade Obligations: Barrier or Opportunity for Sustainable Public Procurement?, explores these issues in detail.

We recently hosted a workshop in Ottawa, Canada, to speak with government officials about public procurement as a driver of Canada’s low-carbon economy and cleantech industry, highlighting findings from our report. Key recommendations from the workshop include:

• Linking procurers and suppliers more directly on SPP opportunities
• Aligning SPP approaches across governments
• Accelerating development of a national database on life-cycle assessmentI
• Incorporating social policy considerations directly and explicitly into trade laws that would include references to workers’ rights and fair labour conditions, and participation of specific economic actors, such as Indigenous communities and women-owned enterprises
• Including environmental specifications, encouraging transparency and opening competition for the tender process
• Instituting pilot or demonstration projects to raise awareness of SPP opportunities and approaches
• Focusing on military spending under the Department of National Defence, as top government procurer.

What do we recommend to policy-makers?

Returning to our example from earlier, the municipality could:

• Hold targeted dialogues with suppliers and procuring authorities to ensure each knows how they can actually work together in pre-procurement phases to inform the procurement process in a transparent way
• Create accessible tool kits for municipalities on how to evaluate and utilize SPP in their procurement needs and processes
• Translate and incorporate specific texts and clauses referencing municipal SPP procurement and distribute them to Canadian municipalities.

On March 19, 2019, the presidents of the United States and Brazil made a landmark announcement: Brazil, South America’s largest economy, would move away from pursuing special and differential treatment (S&DT) in upcoming negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

This essentially means Brasilia will stop asking for certain types of treatment, such as different agricultural subsidy limits, or extra transition time to implement new disciplines, that can potentially be accorded to developing countries when negotiating new trade rules at the Geneva-based organization.

The statement from Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro adds another wrinkle to an intensified, long-running debate in trade circles over whether and how to reconsider the WTO practice of allowing members to “self-designate” as developing countries.

That designation has implications both for the application of global trade rules and for members’ respective “schedules” of concessions and commitments for goods and services. For example, in agriculture, developed and developing countries face different thresholds over the maximum level of trade-distorting domestic support they are allowed to provide.

In recent years, the United States has increasingly called for rethinking this practice of “self-designation,” arguing not only that it is outdated, but also damaging to the institution overall. They have repeatedly made their case at Geneva negotiating sessions and during the December 2017 WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

More recently, this past February the United States submitted a proposed General Council decision that, if approved, would limit certain WTO members from being eligible for special and differential treatment in future arrangements. While unlikely to be adopted, the U.S. proposal does indicate a significant intensification of the differentiation debate, with Washington calling for a sea change in how the organization’s 164 members approach the negotiation of new global trade rules.

According to the proposed draft decision, those WTO members not eligible for special and differential treatment would include those that are currently members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or trying to join; are part of the G20 coalition of advanced and emerging economies; are considered by the World Bank to be “high income” countries; or make up at least 0.5 percent of global merchandise trade. The range of members affected under this system would be significant: it would cover countries ranging from Argentina to China, India to Indonesia, with vastly different national and regional characteristics.

Notably, Brazil is beginning the process of trying to join the OECD, a move the Trump Administration says it supports.

The U.S. paired this proposal with a 45-page communication explaining its rationale. The rules-based trading system “is hardly monolithic,” the U.S. argues, citing the disparity between developed and developing countries over who is required to play by which rules. “The perpetuation of this construct has severely damaged the negotiating arm of the WTO by making every negotiation a negotiation about setting high standards for a few, and allowing vast flexibilities for the many.”

The U.S. also argues it is unfair to the organization’s poorest members to be lumped in the same category as larger economies that have better outcomes in indicators such as the Human Development Index or gross national income (GNI) per capita. Unlike other developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs) do not self-designate themselves as such, but are instead deemed as LDCs based on United Nations classification.

“Self-declaration also dilutes the benefit that the LDCs and other Members with specific needs tailored to the relevant discipline could enjoy if they were the only ones with the flexibility,” the U.S. says.

What this could mean for global trade talks

Coming as WTO members are actively pushing to conclude negotiations to discipline harmful fisheries subsidies before 2020, the U.S.’ call for ensuring these disciplines “apply to the world’s largest fishing nations, many of which are self-declared developing countries,” is already making waves in negotiating sessions, bringing an already contentious issue in the fisheries talks back to the forefront. A footnote in that U.S. document refers specifically to China, Indonesia, Peru, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines as ranking among the “top ten largest marine captures fisheries producers,” according to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Meanwhile, agriculture negotiators are currently in the midst of a working group process to identify priority items for the next WTO ministerial conference, and the U.S. refers to an existing proposal by China and India which, the U.S. cautions, could complicate efforts at reforming domestic farm subsidies, given how it approaches the developed-developing country issue.

The U.S.’ proposed General Council decision has drawn pushback from several WTO members, and some have issued their own communication defending the practice of special and differential treatment as essential for ensuring “equity and fairness” and giving developing country members the space to address challenges that may not show up in economic indicators, but have real implications for people’s livelihoods. A joint communication from China, India, South Africa, Venezuela, Lao PDR, Bolivia, Kenya, and Cuba, dated February 26, counters the U.S. proposal on multiple grounds, though without referring to the U.S. by name.

“Recent attempts by some members to selectively employ certain economic and trade data to deny persistence of the divide between developing and developed members, and to demand the former to abide by absolute ‘reciprocity’ in the interest of ‘fairness’ are profoundly disingenuous,” they say. Furthermore, they note, the “development divide remains firmly entrenched” and must be acknowledged.

Along with arguing that the challenges faced by developing countries across different sectors and negotiating areas are more complex than what the US’ proposed category system allows, they also warn that the WTO is facing far different, and more serious, existential threats. This includes the impending collapse of its Appellate Body, given the U.S.’ repeated move to block the selection of new judges. They also refer to the “impasse” in the Doha Round trade talks and a worrisome rise in protectionist and unilateral trade actions.  

As WTO members gear up for a packed 2019 calendar of multilateral negotiations on fisheries and agriculture, the Brazilian announcement issued from Washington has highlighted an issue that has long complicated global trade talks, but may now require even more nuanced thinking: that while the world has changed dramatically since the WTO replaced the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, there is a fundamental difference in opinion on how this change has manifested itself, and how to reflect today’s and tomorrow’s realities and challenges when crafting new trade rules.

“Slow action on climate change that is disturbing.”

That stark assessment wraps up Canada’s Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) Julie Gelfand’s final report, released earlier today. Coming a day after a government study on Canada’s rapidly rising temperatures was leaked, the report continues Commissioner Gelfand’s work to hold Canada accountable to its environmental pledges.

For her last audit before leaving office, Commissioner Gelfand assessed whether the Government of Canada has taken adequate measures to prevent aquatic invasive species from becoming established in Canadian waters, protected fish and their habitat from mining effluent at active mine sites, and made progress on eliminating tax and non-tax subsidies for fossil fuels (per its international commitments).

When it comes to protecting Canada’s abundant water supplies from aquatic invasive species such as zebra mussels, the report found Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) “did not distinguish its responsibilities with regard to aquatic invasive species from those of the provinces and territories.” Invasive species are a transboundary issue and a federal responsibility. The federal government should be coordinating provincial efforts to combat invasive species and providing the necessary provincial funds.

While the news that DFO has taken significant action to prevent Asian carp species from becoming established in the Great Lakes is encouraging, Canada’s approach to dealing with aquatic invasive species should be risk-based and informed by a national database of current invasive species in Canada that, surprisingly, still does not exist. This will likely result in stronger efforts to tackle, for example, zebra mussels, which pose a great threat to Western Canada, including Lake Winnipeg.

The report also found that DFO “met requirements to protect fish and their habitat from mining effluent.” To improve the monitoring process further, non-lethal methods of testing mining effluent impacts on fish should be more broadly adopted. This would protect fish populations—a pillar of Canada’s economy.

We also need to recognize fish are mobile and not necessarily exposed to contaminants at the site where they were captured. This opens the door for modelling exposures based on other means that do not require lethal sampling of fish—for example, passive samplers. Furthermore, with millions of dollars being spent by mining companies to compensate for loss of fish habitat, it is essential that such compensation be effective and that it be adequately monitored to ensure that it is having the desired effects.

On fossil fuel subsidies, Commissioner Gelfand found both the Department of Finance’s and Environment and Climate Change Canada’s (ECCC's) work to define both subsidies and “inefficient” subsidies to be incomplete and “not rigorous.” IISD is concerned that both Finance and ECCC disagreed with the audit’s findings, though last week ECCC put out a public call for feedback on non-tax subsidies.

Definitions matter. They are the first step toward meaningful action on eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, which in turn will speed the country’s energy transition and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to damaging climate change impacts.

From an international trade perspective, definitions also matter because countries can bring legal action against other countries’ subsidies through the World Trade Organization (WTO). That is why IISD uses the WTO definition of a subsidy in its work, a choice we will emphasize during the ECCC consultations. It is essential to get this first step right as Canada heads into its peer review with Argentina.

Transparency is good, and it is positive to see two major developments on Canadian fossil fuel subsidies in less than a week. However, the CESD report and our own preliminary assessment of the ECCC discussion document show that there is a lot more work to do on this file if the G20 process is going to be productive. ECCC and Finance must take a harder look at their prior assessments and strengthen both their approach and their definitions.

The next meeting of a United Nations working group debating options for reforming investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) will take place in New York from April 1 to 5.

Two years into the process, it remains unclear whether this work will lead to the desired reforms or what shape these changes may ultimately take.

Meanwhile, countries remain frustrated with the current system, and have extensively voiced their concerns in the ongoing multilateral ISDS reform discussions being held under the Working Group III process within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

UNCITRAL is a UN body mandated to “further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade.” Their focus is on laws that involve private actors and how their activities affect interstate commerce.

The multilateral deliberations on possible ISDS reform began in 2017, when UNCITRAL gave the working group the mandate to “work on the possible reform of investor–State dispute settlement” and deemed that discussions would need to be “Government-led… consensus-based and fully transparent.”

Since then, delegates have met formally twice a year, in April and November, alternating between New York and Vienna. Delegates are now preparing for the third and final phase of their deliberations.

The two initial phases were devoted to having delegates (i) “identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS” and (ii) debate “whether reforms are desirable.” Phase three will be dedicated to “which type of reform would be preferable and which solutions would need to be developed.”

What is coming up at UNCITRAL Working Group III

Among the main subjects at next week’s session is third-party funding, which refers to cases where financial support is provided to the claimant investor from a third party, typically a litigation fund. Now increasingly common in investment arbitration, third-party funding is seen by many developing countries as a source of speculative and costly claims, putting them in a highly disadvantaged situation and making it difficult to settle the dispute amicably.

Delegates are also due to discuss “other concerns not already covered by the broad categories of desirable reforms already identified,” as agreed at their November session. Many issues that developing countries and observers have previously raised as concerns—such as investors’ ability to skirt domestic court systems for ISDS arbitration or the right to participation by affected parties—have ultimately ended up in an “other concerns” category, without giving them the time or space they deserve.

Also on next week’s agenda are proposals for developing a work plan for upcoming deliberations on phase three of the mandate. Delegates at the November 2018 session agreed that the work plan “would address: (i) how some or all of the concerns …identified as desirable for reform should be addressed in phase three of the mandate, and (ii) questions such as sequencing, priority, coordination with other organizations, multiple tracks, ways to continue the work between sessions of the Working Group, and any other matter that the Working Group considered necessary.”

Aside from third-party funding and the work plan for phase three, another item expected to draw intense scrutiny is the European Union’s proposal for a multilateral investment court (MIC). The European Commission submitted this proposal to the UNCITRAL process in January and accompanied it with a separate submission for a work plan leading up to an MIC.

Chile, Israel and Japan have also jointly made a work plan submission, where they propose an approach that prioritizes the concerns identified to date. They propose the Working Group “develop a Schedule for addressing the list of solutions, beginning with solutions that can have the most immediate material impact.” A submission by Costa Rica also proposes “prioritizing reform options,” while a submission by Thailand advocates for discussing and deciding on the best reform options based on their advantages and disadvantages, and discussing the details of the most desirable options that have been prioritized.

A third path to consider

The submissions are an indication of the crucial issue that the working group will have to decide: whether to prioritize certain concerns and put holistic reforms on the backburner or whether instead to tackle the more complex holistic reforms with the risk of leaving states for many years without solutions to the challenges they are facing today.  

In our view, neither solution is desirable. Rather, the working group should consider a third approach. Its members should conduct both discussions in parallel: this will allow them to begin discussing the much-needed holistic or systemic reform while addressing certain pressing issues that can be fixed as a priority.

This parallel two-track approach would require creative thinking in Working Group III, as some of the work would have to be undertaken and prepared at a distance, possibly through sub-committees, between the biannual UNCITRAL sessions. Similar approaches are often undertaken in trade negotiations, with intersessional meetings and exchanges in between major negotiating rounds. Of course, this will require travel support to developing countries, who are eager to participate and find solutions.

Only a parallel two-track approach can steer clear of mere tinkering while also avoiding getting caught up in long conversations about the pros and cons of deeper change.

Gender power hierarchies in rural households mean women have secondary access to food.

Women provide 85 to 90 per cent of the time required for household food preparation. While they strive to ensure nutritional needs are met within their families, their own access to food suffers due to gender norms, as they prioritize the nutrition of children and men above their own.

In times of crisis, women also suffer from food insecurity at greater rates than men in most countries. Shockingly, this can also be the case for pregnant or lactating women with anemia, affecting 38 per cent of pregnant women.  

Food security is an intersectional issue. It touches on income, poverty, access to resources, gender-based discrimination and health.

With food security being critical to so many facets of a woman’s livelihoods, how can development organizations utilize voluntary sustainability standards (VSSs) to contribute to empowering women’s food security in agriculture?

Foster sustainable production practices that contribute to diverse and nutritional diets

VSSs can contribute to food security through sustainable production requirements, making new sources of subsistence crops available. One example is, when shade requirements within several coffee certifications are followed, new sources of nutrient-dense foods, like bananas, become available for women and their households.

In many areas of agriculture, men and women are also responsible for different crops due to the gender division of labour. Development organizations working on the ground can promote food security and women’s empowerment by promoting the use of female-grown crops. This includes the new, nutrient-dense crops, such as bananas.

Promote women’s financial decision making and independence

According to research, certified producers, such as those growing organic or Fairtrade crops, can sometimes earn 7 per cent higher net income than non-certified producers due to productivity increases and price premiums.

Higher incomes can be linked to improved food security. In Uganda, for example, certified producers consumed 19 per cent more calories, 35 per cent more iron and 48 per cent more zinc than non-certified households because of the improved soil fertility in their crops, which they are able to grow due to their increased incomes. However, these nutritional advantages tend to disappear when men control the household income. This is likely due to the differences in how men and women manage household finances: women tend to invest their funds back into the household and crops, while this isn’t always the case for men.

Development organizations working with farmers and agricultural communities can take a gender-transformative approach to encouraging gender-equal food security in households by working with men and women in agriculture to promote women’s decision making around household income and their economic independence.

Conduct gender impact assessments to reduce cash crop incentivizing

VSSs can inadvertently incentivize cash cropping, the practice of creating agricultural crops for their commercial or financial value, often for export, as opposed for individual consumption. Cash crops are typically overseen by men, therefore unintentionally reinforcing gender biases.

Development organizations working with farmers and agricultural communities should invest time in learning local gender dynamics and developing a gender-impact assessment when considering certification programs for agricultural producers and smallholders to ensure women’s food security and income are not jeopardized by converting their lands into cash crops.

By using VSSs as a development tool and implementing them in a gender-sensitive way, development organizations can foster women’s food security, economic independence and health.

To learn more, read our report, Leveraging Voluntary Sustainability Standards for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture: A Guide for Development Organizations Based on the Sustainable Development Goals.

Even before President Trump took office in January 2017, he pledged to jump-start the country’s struggling coal industry and create more jobs. Since he has been in office, it is a promise that’s led to substantial policy changes at the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

In what’s seen as another stage in this process, in December 2018 the EPA proposed a revision to the cost–benefit methodology behind its Obama-era regulations on mercury. The EPA now argues that limiting mercury and other toxic emissions from coal- and oil-fired power plants is not cost-effective and should not be considered "appropriate and necessary" under the Clean Air Act.

In short, the EPA is reconsidering the importance of co-benefits in its calculations to determine the impact of its mercury regulations on industry and public health. Co-benefits—side benefits that are in addition to the direct benefits resulting from a policy—are traditionally assigned a monetary value and included in EPA policy calculations to justify pollution regulations.

For mercury regulations, the monetized direct benefits of reducing mercury are the increases in I.Q. and lifetime earnings of children born to recreational fishers who consume mercury-laden freshwater fish during pregnancy. The monetized co-benefits include significant health benefits from the reduced emissions of other contaminants not directly regulated by the rule—PM_2.5 and sulfur dioxide (SO₂). These additional contaminants are reduced due to the installation of required mercury control technology.

When the EPA set up mercury regulations, co-benefits accounted for 90 per cent of the total monetized benefits. Removing them allows the EPA to suggest it is no longer “appropriate and necessary” to regulate mercury emissions since industry costs grossly outweigh the monetized benefits to the public. If this proposal moves forward, it could potentially lead to a loosening of mercury regulations.

What do the United States’ mercury regulations currently look like?

In 2011 the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) were established under the Clean Air Act. It affected new and existing commercial coal- and oil-fired power plants—about 600 across the country. It set standards that were expected to not only dramatically reduce releases of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants into the atmosphere but also releases of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Utilities have spent more than USD 18 billion to comply with the requirements.

MATS has significantly contributed to reducing mercury in the environment and improving public health at a lower cost than anticipated.

The EPA’s Toxic Releases Inventory National Analysis reported that mercury air emissions from electric utilities have fallen by nearly 90 per cent over the past decade. Furthermore, the MATS regulation has been instrumental in fulfilling the country’s requirements under the international Minamata Convention on Mercury.

Why is mercury a problem anyway?

Mercury is emitted into the environment from many natural and human-made sources. Industrial processes like coal combustion, chemical manufacturing and waste incineration can release mercury as a by-product into the atmosphere (nonpoint source pollution). It can also be released in wastewater from a factory or mine directly into the environment or into bodies of water (point source pollution).

Atmospheric mercury can be transported over long distances before it is deposited on land and water. Once mercury enters bodies of water, bacteria convert it into methylmercury—its toxic form—which is then carried up the food web into top predator species like sport fishes. When people eat those fishes, they also ingest the methylmercury contained in them.

Once the mercury is in our bodies, it is not easily excreted, meaning it accumulates over time causing serious health problems. Mercury poisoning, or Minamata disease (named after the Japanese town in which it was first documented), has a wide range of physical and mental symptoms. These include hair loss, muscle weakness/paralysis, organ damage, loss of senses, depression and even death.

Even so, aquatic systems can recover when mercury stops being added. Just ask the scientists at IISD Experimental Lakes Area, who, in a highly controlled experiment, intentionally added small amounts of traceable mercury to a lake to see how it moved through the ecosystem and food web. Predictably, the amount of mercury found in the fish increased. When they stopped adding mercury, the amount found in fish decreased, suggesting that reducing the amount of mercury that enters the atmosphere may have a significant impact on the amount of methylmercury that ends up in fish (and therefore humans). It should be noted, however, that the response time will vary considerably between lakes.

What happens next?

Typically, a rule-making process in the United States must follow an open public process, which includes publishing a statement of rulemaking authority in the Federal Register for all advanced notices, proposed and final rules.

These proposed changes are currently at the second stage: notifying the public and soliciting comments. The deadline for comments is April 17, 2019. The EPA will also hold a public hearing on March 18, 2019. Before the final rule is published, it will undergo a review by the president and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.

Interestingly, some of the greatest criticism of the proposed regulation changes has already come from industry itself. Several umbrella organizations representing hundreds of electric utilities wrote a letter to the EPA in July 2018 asking that the Trump administration to leave the existing standards in place, given the money and time has already been spent to implement the current standards, and given the benefits those regulations have delivered.

What could this mean for Canada?

According to Environment and Climate Change Canada, 17 per cent of mercury deposited in Canada (through nonpoint source pollution) comes from the United States.

The impacts of proposed changes for the health of Canadians are uncertain. They will depend on the outcome of the consultation process, the U.S. EPA’s next steps and industry’s response to any mercury regulation changes. However, if new plants are built and mercury emissions do increase, Canada may expect adverse health impacts for populations fishing for subsistence, particularly its First Nations populations.